Hutchison Whampoa's Frank Sixt is unlikely to
forget October in a hurry. Instead of waxing lyrical about
rolling out 3G services to select customers in the UK and the
opening of a couple of 3G stores in the UK and Italy, the Hong
Kong conglomerate's group finance director spent much of his
time explaining his company's botched foray into international
capital markets.
Late on September 30, Sixt took the unprecedented decision to
cancel Hutchison's planned e1.5 billion multi-tranche bond issue.
Against a backdrop of falling global equity markets and widening
corporate bond spreads, he was left with little choice. But such
treatment by the market was a sharp shock for an Asian corporate
that is used to getting exactly what it wants.
As one analyst puts it: "The big gorilla of Hong Kong got a wake-up
call. It now knows that, unlike in the domestic arena, it can't
bully the international market into giving it the price it
wants."
Other large Asian corporates planning similar ventures would be
wise to take note of Hutchison's experience.
In public, Sixt, alongside his three joint lead arrangers -
Deutsche Bank, HSBC and JPMorgan - lays all the blame for the
pulling of the deal on market conditions. "The markets were
horrendous," says a banker from one of the leads. "And far higher
rated names were pulling deals, so you shouldn't look into it too
deeply." Companies such as Volvo and Hewlett-Packard also had to
postpone transactions.
It may also be the case, though, that Hutchison and its bankers
between them misread the mood of the euro and sterling
market.
Despite Hutchison's attempts to change the perception many in
Europe hold of all telecommunications companies, and even though
the conglomerate's activities are much more broadly based than many
rivals', it is still viewed primarily as a telecom that's based in
Asia with a huge $10 billion 3G exposure.
"There is very bearish sentiment regarding its overseas investments
into 3G," says Cusson Leung, a conglomerates analyst with ING
Barings. "The major assumption is that if 3G is not successful it
will be a major drag on the company's cashflow which will have a
long-term impact on Hutchison itself."
A banker from JPMorgan who worked on the bond deal admits: "We had
not appreciated how much investor education was still
required."
It's a surprising admission because it should have been obvious to
all those concerned in the deal. The share price is down just under
40% year to date and Standard and Poor's and Moody's both have its
single A/A3 rating on negative outlook.
Just speaking to a few investors in Europe would have given an idea
of the amount of uncertainty about Hutchison's telecoms ventures.
One investor, for example, believes that Hutchison is too bullish
about its 3G operation at a time when operators such as KPN and
DoCoMo are writing down 3G investments. "We want a bit more
reality," he says. "Hutch can't continually be in the press every
day with a view so far removed from what everyone else thinks and
not be viewed as somewhat strange. They tell us they will make a
business out of it but I'm the investor and I want to be paid for
it."
The failure to educate the market meant that the only way Hutchison
would have got the deal done was if it had been prepared to pay the
price of a bombed-out European telecom.
But the diversified global conglomerate - which has major interests
in ports, property, retail, manufacturing, energy and
infrastructure as well as telecoms - did not want to do that. So
now, behind closed doors, questions are being asked about who was
to blame.
Hutchison's aim in tapping the euro and sterling markets was to
broaden its investor base. With many of its assets now in Europe
because of the large investment in 3G and considering its e1.3
billion acquisition of Kruidvat, a Dutch health and beauty
business, that looks sensible.
Yet even several bankers involved in the deal are said to have been
worried that entering the euro and sterling markets would be
ill-advised given the level of market volatility.
Jason Carley, Merrill Lynch's head of fixed-income research,
suggests why. "To go into the euro is something that has to be
considered very carefully because there haven't been that many
Asian issuers going to it before," he says. "And since the euro
market is less developed for Asian borrowers you need to have more
positive market conditions to get a deal done."
Ivan Lee, head of regional debt research at Salomon Smith Barney,
agrees. "Tapping the euro market to broaden its funding base was
exactly the right thing for Hutchison to do. But when markets are
volatile the euro is a lot shallower than the dollar."
That was indeed the case. But as many participants in Hong Kong's
financial sector will tell you, there is very little upside to be
gained from telling Hutchison's management what it doesn't want to
hear.
The head of debt capital markets at one of the lead banks, who
doesn't wished to be named, explains very cautiously why his firm
didn't advise Hutchison against going into these markets. "We were
of the understanding that that's what they wanted to do and that it
wasn't open to question," he says.
Pressure from the banks?
There is another
interpretation of events, however. A conglomerate analyst from a US
house reports that Don Roberts, Sixt's number two, was on the
telephone to him a few days after the deal was pulled. "I asked him
what the hell they thought they were doing in the market at this
time," says the analyst.
Roberts, he says, told him that the banks pushed Hutchison
forward despite the corporate not being comfortable. "He said
Hutch's management wanted to stop everything earlier but that their
advisers said that the markets were not that bad and that they
could continue."
Rival bankers suggest that a deal would have had more chance of
success if everyone concerned had homed in on the small number of
Asian investors that can take debt denominated in sterling and euro
and had used that bid to drive the pricing into Europe.
Even after an extensive roadshow in Europe the deal failed to pick
up the necessary momentum and the European book of demand remained
weak, making pricing a challenge.
Following the tour, the leads set the price range for the e1
billion 10-year tranche at between 215bp and 225bp over Euribor and
for the £300 million at 220bp to 230bp over sterling swaps.
Pricing was tricky because most of the issuer's liquid bonds are in
dollars and held by Asian investors with a favourable view of the
credit. But euro investors apparently concluded that European
credit spreads had moved out to a point that meant even at these
levels Hutchison wasn't great value.
"It's a single A name on a negative outlook and doesn't offer
anything different from what you can get on your own doorstep," one
banker says. "So the investor will always choose the single A from
Germany rather than from Hong Kong. And also bear in mind that
European investors have seen the telecom story blow up in their
faces so they want to be paid for the risk."
It seems that those working on the deal may have become nervous
about its prospects much earlier than any of them still care to
admit.
On CNBC, a week before the proposed launch, a banker pointed out
that in the secondary market Hutchison's bonds were trading at
250bp above treasuries.
As soon as he returned to his office he received a telephone call.
"There was a guy from one of the leads on the line telling me to
stop being so hostile towards the transaction," he says. "I told
him that I wasn't because I don't see the point of dumping on a
deal on TV.
"The moment a lead manager starts taking swipes like that, you know
that they are in trouble. They were already looking for scapegoats
for why it was failing."
Hutchison still persevered, aware that this might be its last
opportunity to raise money in the euro market this year or until
its 3G business was a proven success and before it was possibly
downgraded to a BBB issuer.
Although most bankers agree that Hutchison made the right decision
ultimately to withdraw from its planned issue, it's not without
costs, says one head of debt capital markets. "That's because by
pulling back it shows that they didn't have enough demand and they
also didn't have a clue," he says. "Now that's not good for
Hutchison because it has to go into defensive mode because it still
has a lot of debt coming due and still faces the same pressures as
before."
Over 60% of the company's total borrowings of $20 billion are
coming due over the next four years. This includes the $3 billion
exchangeable bond next September. But Hutchison has a liquid
balance sheet with around $13 billion of cash, money market
securities and high credit quality bonds.
Danie Schutte, a conglomerate analyst with CLSA, says: "Next year
it has HK$23 billion (US$3 billion) to repay and it has the cash to
do that. The following year it has HK$20 billion to repay and it
has the cash to do that. It's in an extremely comfortable position
to be in."
Does Hutchison's failure to complete its euro market deal raise the
risk of a credit crunch for corporates as a whole in the region?
Other Asian companies have less impressive balance sheets than
Hutchison, after all.
However, because the region restructured so slowly following the
1997 financial crisis few corporates were ever in the position to
get caught in the trend of gearing up the balance sheet. "We are
not going to see a funding crisis," says one analyst. "There are
not many that need to raise money and those that do are sovereigns.
The corporate sector is in decent shape and there isn't a huge
amount of debt coming due."
Quality will win
out
The region's bankers also refuse to
believe that just because Hutchison's deal was negatively
perceived it has unduly affected international sentiment
toward other Asian issuers. One banker, plainly desperate for
a revival of deal flow, says: "Yes, markets are volatile but
the markets remain open and will continue to remain open for
high-quality issuers."
That's good news for Posco, Korea Development Bank, Korean Ministry
of Finance, China Development Bank and PCCW, for example, all of
which are rumoured to be looking to get bond deals away in the next
few months.
Hutchison provides some lessons for any corporate from the region
that is seeking to raise debt soon. "Issuers can't be arrogant,"
says a banker. "They need to know exactly the market they are
capable of issuing in and be ready to jump very quickly. It's a
window-driven market now, and sometimes the window doesn't stay
open very long."
Hutchison Whampoa, which is a financially sophisticated and
well-reputed borrower in Asian markets, is all too well aware of
that now. And already some bankers believe that it is only a matter
of time before it returns to the markets just to prove that it can
do so.
Others, however, believe it would be well advised not to return
until everyone has forgotten about its embarrassing last
attempt.
That could take some some time.