We now have two supranational European crises on our hands. Both are the ugly offspring of the global credit crisis.
The eurozone crisis springs from the fact that the sheer cost of financial sector bailouts for some smaller eurozone governments will make it impossible for them to finance and service their public sector deficits and debt. That will lead to such countries as Ireland and Greece defaulting.
The eastern European crisis results from the excesses of the credit explosion in the household and corporate sectors of many countries in central and eastern Europe, including many that are EU members. Much of the huge increase in private sector debt in the region since 2002 has been in foreign currencies (euro, Swiss franc, dollar and even yen). With the collapse of this credit (and housing) bubble, many eastern European currencies have gone south, increasing the level of defaults by households and corporations. Complete circle
What brings both crises together is that the eastern European banks that have made these foreign-currency loans to corporations and households are owned by eurozone banks (mainly based in Austria, Italy and Belgium). If defaults rise, losses for these banks will mount to levels that could threaten their survival, unless they are bailed out by their parent banks. Those parent banks, in turn, already facing losses from their own domestic borrowers, could then be forced to ask for capital from taxpayers. So the circle is completed as eurozone governments have to raise even more debt.
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We now have two supranational European crises on our hands. Both are the ugly offspring of the global credit crisis |
When push comes to shove, the eurozone crisis will be resolved. The eurozone countries will be ring-fenced to prevent any domestic credit crisis becoming a sovereign debt default. This will most likely be done by using a separate institution sponsored by the Bundesbank and including other significant eurozone national central banks to provide funds or to buy eurozone government debt. This gets around the constraints imposed on the European Central Bank by its constitution and upon governments by the Maastricht treaty. Some have argued that Ireland, Greece, Portugal, etc. won’t be bailed out because Germany won’t allow it. I don’t agree. Germany would do it, say in the case of Ireland, because it would prevent an avalanche effect of an Irish sovereign default spilling over into further defaults by other eurozone governments.
The super-glue that holds the eurozone together is historical, cultural and political. It is the essence of Germany’s decision to interlace its national identity with a European one – itself the result of war. Far too much has been invested in the European project by Germany to drop it because of a leverage problem in a few individual countries that individually count for paltry sums of eurozone GDP. They could collectively create one hell of a mess if the avalanche were allowed to roll forward unimpeded.
That is why Germany will ultimately pay, despite this being a difficult volte-face for chancellor Angela Merkel to sell to people on the German streets. Of course, the Germans will exact a price for underwriting any government debt. Fiscal stringency and strict and minimal bailouts will be the rule.
It will be a different story for eastern Europe. There is not enough ammunition and absolutely no will to extend the ring fence being constructed around the eurozone to any state outside it.
The problems of eastern Europe are two-fold: stupid (often foreign-owned) banking systems that are funded with strong currency liabilities; and the corollary of hugely geared households and corporate sectors that borrowed in foreign currencies from the banks.
Sovereigns destroyed
These are loans that can never be repaid unless a five-year period of debt deflation and depression is accepted by the borrowers. That’s a pretty unlikely outcome. So default rates will rise dramatically. And any attempt by eastern European governments to bail out their locals will simply destroy sovereign debt ratings to boot.
So the risk of such countries as Romania and Ukraine defaulting on their sovereign debt is high. The currency pegs adopted in the Baltic states and Bulgaria are also likely to break. Even if the IMF steps in to bail out these countries (and the IMF is to be given extra funds to do so by the G20 governments), further devaluation of local currencies might become acceptable rather than adopt horrible deflationary packages that will be “conditionality-attached” to any bailout. Moreover, the stringent and budget deficit limitations imposed on eastern European governments are as likely as not to be contested on the streets.
David Roche is president of Independent Strategy Ltd, a London-based research firm. www.instrategy.com