Speaking at events organized recently in Europe by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Hans Tietmeyer, former president of Germany’s Bundesbank (Buba), suggested that central bank intervention in FX markets could only ever have a limited impact.
Tietmeyer made his comments during a series of lectures on prospects for the survival of the euro. As a preamble to the main discussion, Tietmeyer suggested that the global economy was in remarkably good shape despite high oil prices, trade imbalances and the threat of terrorism. Of these, Tietmeyer said that trade global imbalances were the biggest problem, particularly those between China and the US.
“China needs to tighten rates and needs more FX flexibility,” Tietmeyer said. “The 2% revaluation was clearly a move in the right direction, but further steps are unavoidable.” According to Tietmeyer, a sharp decline in US assets could lead to a global recession and some concentrated action might now be necessary. The US has to address its fiscal deficit and China has to move further towards FX flexibility.
He raised the possibility of a new Plaza agreement between China and the US. The original Plaza agreement in September 1985 involved the G5 of the US, Japan, Germany, France and the UK embarking on a common policy to drive the dollar’s value lower. However, as he pointed out, the situation 20 years ago was extremely different from the situation now.
“The FX rate then was really about yen and dollar and Europe, and the rates were fully flexible. The problem was caused by an overshoot. The problem today is about a lack of flexibility. China might not be fully prepared for free rates,” he said, adding: “Lots of problems have been caused by not enough FX flexibility.”
For a man who was instrumental in creating the euro, which critics would claim has removed FX flexibility for its participants, this seemed an odd thing to say. “Why then, we might ask, did 12 countries move into the euro?” asked Tietmeyer.
According to Tietmeyer, the creation of the euro was fundamentally different from simply fixing FX rates because the countries concerned were prepared to give up national control over monetary policy.
The result, said Tietmeyer, is “really a special thing. The previous segmentation of national money markets has disappeared – a single money market has emerged.”
Tietmeyer acknowledged that the eurozone’s relative macroeconomic growth was much weaker than that in the rest of the world and that its prospects were not good. However, this was not the fault of the euro. “The euro has made structural problems more transparent and they can’t be compensated by exchange rates,” he argued.
Instead, the real problem was that some of the eurozone’s national governments seemed unable and unwilling to tackle the problems of labour mobility and flexibility. The breaking of agreed fiscal criteria by France, Italy and Germany had led to political tensions, which served to undermine the confidence of many investors, although the euro’s stability had not yet been adversely affected.
“France, Germany and Italy have benefited from the removal of the FX rate, especially Italy,” said Tietmeyer. He claimed that Italy had scooped up the benefits, such as lower borrowing costs, but had not been willing to tackle the substantial reforms its public sector needed. “The Italian economy was used to regular devaluations of lira. It can’t do that any more.”
Tietmeyer said he did not believe Italy would be tempted to leave the euro. “The consequences would be disastrous. Italy would lose the confidence of the markets. I think that’s not realistic.”
Credibility paid for
As for FX intervention, Tietmeyer said that it was almost impossible to “hold the value of big currencies in line by intervening to a big extent. That could be counterproductive and compromise monetary policy.” He added: “Fixing rates – and controlling it by intervention – gives some credibility but the credibility is bought. It has to be supported by national policy.”
Tietmeyer was then asked whether a lack of credibility was the reason why the European Central Bank had done little to support the euro after its precipitous fall following its launch. He skirted around the question, but the implication was pretty clear. The ECB neither had sufficient credibility to move the market nor had a national policy to support it.
After the event, Tietmeyer amused those who stayed with his recollections of sterling’s ignomious exit from the exchange rate mechanism in September 1992. He claimed that Buba saw a window of opportunity to devalue sterling in the summer, but that the UK spurned the chance. When sterling came under pressure in the following months, the UK begged Germany to cut its interest rates to help support the pound. Tietmeyer said this was a request that Buba had made clear was not possible because it faced inflationary pressures following German reunification and because it believed that at the time sterling was completely overvalued. The result was inevitable.