Defaults by Russian borrowers on their international debt are rare. So it was a surprise when International Industrial Bank became the first bank in the country to miss a repayment on a Eurobond since the August 1998 financial crisis.
The bank failed to repay €200 million of 9% notes on July 6, triggering a cross-default on another $200 million of loan participation notes maturing in 2013. The circumstances leading up to the bank’s default suggest that it was an isolated event and that systemic risk in the Russian banking system is limited. But it also demonstrates how quickly fortunes can turn in a country where the state is omnipotent.
IIB, also known as Mezhprombank, is owned by Sergei Pugachev, a senator and businessman with close ties to Vladimir Putin – so much so that he has been dubbed “Putin’s banker”. For whatever reason, however, Russia’s prime minister declined to come to Pugachev’s rescue when IIB ran into trouble following a series of events that led the bank to fail to meet the Eurobond repayment as well as more than Rb10 billion ($330.8 million) of non-collateralized loans owed to the central bank, putting its future on the line.
The bank’s liquidity situation deteriorated after a court announced that it would have to pay Rb1 billion to Bashneft, an oil company, after it sued IIB over a trust agreement. IIB had originally won the case but an appeals court overturned the decision and increased the claim made against it. The decision immediately put the bank into difficulty as an injunction was placed against its credit lines from the central bank. Altogether IIB owes Rb32 billion to the central bank, accounting for more than half of the Rb50 billion of unsecured loans outstanding to the institution from Russia’s banks.
To make matters worse, Fitch downgraded the bank’s foreign-currency debt to negative on June 9, sparking a run in which IIB lost more than 20% of its corporate deposits in the space of a few weeks.
Pugachev desperately tried to sell his military shipyard assets to the government for up to $3 billion to stave off a default but to no avail.
Instead IIB entered into a restructuring on its 2010 bond, which Credit Suisse advised on, having first gained an agreement with the central bank to extend its debt until January.
According to the terms of the restructuring proposal, Pugachev plans to repay the 2010 bond by selling his shipyard assets to the government. These assets are held through nine companies, which have guaranteed the bond. Although IIB is seeking a one-year extension, the debt could be repaid sooner as the loan becomes due and payable within 20 days of the assets being sold. To provide a greater degree of comfort to investors, the source of payment will be through a special purpose vehicle based in Luxembourg.
Holders of the 2010 notes voted overwhelmingly in favour of the proposal, with a 91% backing, well past the 67% needed for the resolution to go ahead. Bankers say the asset sales should also ensure timely repayment of the 2013 notes.
Clearly, though, there are still big risks, not least Pugachev’s ability to sell his shipyards. Although it is not in the government’s interests to alienate foreign investors, it has not yet shown that it is willing to meet Pugachev’s asking price. And with the stakes getting higher, the government knows it’s in a strong position to bid down the price or pick up the assets on the cheap if IIB is forced into bankruptcy.
Questions have been raised too about the quality of IIB’s loans. Eighty-seven percent of the bank’s loan book at the end of 2009 was unsecured, leading Fitch analysts to query “the robustness of underwriting procedures”. Uncertainty also surrounds the size of IIB’s related-party lending business. Those close to the bank claim that it is less than 6%, although others say there’s not enough transparency.
It’s to be hoped that IIB’s problems will be resolved. Whatever else, though, they are a timely reminder that the state retains the power to make or break Russian business.