Problems grow for foreign lenders in Saudi Arabia

How much does the Kingdom care about foreign investment?

Saudi banks’ third-quarter results might have been much worse given that the reporting period closely followed two of the most shocking credit events ever seen in the Kingdom. Aggregate net income of the seven Saudi banks covered by Credit Suisse fell 5% on the second quarter.

In the second quarter, debt repayment troubles at two of the Kingdom’s biggest businesses – the Saad and Al Gosaibi groups – raised concerns about what HSBC estimated was a total of between $4 billion and $7 billion owed to Saudi banks by the two groups. Afterwards, there was a general shying away from Saudi family businesses, exacerbating an earlier debt payment crisis among smaller private groups.

Provisions in the third quarter were around three times as big as in the same period in 2008 yet roughly equal to the provisions in the second quarter. The banks did not signal whether the provisions were related to the Saad and Al Gosaibi groups’ problems. But considering the pile of potentially distressed debt, it might appear that some Saudi banks were quietly confident that they would recoup their lending to the Saad and Al Gosaibi groups.

Market participants believe Saad took an important step towards clearing its debts in September. Neither the banks nor the group have officially stated this. Rumours and unconfirmed reports on the matter differed, with some saying all debts from Saad to Saudi banks had been cleared, and others saying only collateralized portions of bilateral debt had been exchanged for shares, real estate and other assets – all, though, said foreign lenders had not been included.

Credit to the private sector is suffering because of the lack of clarity. International lenders in particular are standing aside until they have more concrete information about the restructuring programmes (international banks could be owed about $15 billion by the two groups). This is causing delays to private-sector projects. It is having a knock-on effect on the economy.

Saudi Arabia would not be the first country where local banks had been prioritized in debt settlements. Foreign banks, however, would find it especially hard to pursue a complaint against a defaulting group through Saudi courts, which have a unique Islamic system. Even finding a lawyer to bring such a case might be close to impossible. The Saudi legal framework around restructuring is particularly undeveloped.

Despite extra complications from foreign court cases and denied allegations of fraud, at the end of October positive talk on the Al Gosaibi restructuring was heard, suggesting involvement of foreign lenders in payments from the Al Gosaibi group. But one could still argue that creditors have had more than enough uncertainty in both these cases. More transparency could be vital, so investors no longer read phrases in Reuters regarding a deal between Saad and Saudi banks such as “international creditors in the cold”.

On the other hand, if debt restructuring in Saudi Arabia is as biased towards locals or as informal as some bankers imply – and if personal connections are as important in banking as they have sometimes been in equity investing in the Kingdom – opacity could be the best policy. Such characteristics would not be the best thing to boast about to foreign investors.