Peloton Partners, the fund set up by a group of partners including former Goldman Sachs’ alumni Ron Beller and Geoff Grant, took its name from the French word given to the main bunch of riders in a cycling road race. The peloton, by working together, moves forward faster than any individual rider can – teamwork will always beat individual flair.
When the fund was set up, one of my push-biking muckers pointed out that there are frequently crashes in the peloton, leading to substantial collateral damage. For a long time, it looked as if his view would be proved wrong. But when Peloton did crash, the results were, as has been widely reported elsewhere, quite spectacular.
Some of the press coverage has displayed a large amount of Schadenfreude. Like most hedge funds, Peloton tried to operate largely below the radar – one thing the fund never did was shout about how successful it was. Its founding partners are all market-savvy and were no doubt very aware of their dependence on their banks and prime brokers to operate.
A couple of weeks ago, a reliable source called me and told me that a major disagreement had broken out between Beller and Grant, who had spent a considerable amount of time working together at Goldman. When I asked why, his response was brutal: “That’s just the Goldman way. Those guys can’t help themselves. They have to kill each other.”
So when news broke that Peloton had imploded, I assumed that their spat must have been rooted in a disagreement over the positions being put on in its ABS fund, which suffered a dramatic fall in value through February. However, I’m told this is not the case. The fallout stemmed from a breakdown in their personal relationship, not helped by their geographical distance. Beller was based in London, while Grant managed a team out of Santa Barbara, California. Beller and Grant are believed to have been discussing going their separate ways before the ABS fund collapsed.
The Peloton story illustrates the dangers of leveraged dealing in what can be illiquid assets. It’s great when things move your way, but it can be catastrophic when things conspire against you. In February, Peloton’s lenders increased their haircuts from around 2% to 20% at the same time as the market started to fall. Although Peloton said it had a significant amount of free cash, it was not sufficient to meet margin calls and it had to engage in what has proved a fire sale. In time, Peloton’s long positions in triple-A-rated RMBS will probably prove a winner, but as has been seen on numerous occasions, mean reversion can sometimes take far longer than anticipated.