If there was ever any doubt that Icap got a bargain when it bought EBS last June, there shouldn’t be now. Icap released its preliminary results for the year ended March 31, 2007 this week. I don’t think I have ever seen a report that trumpeted the impact of an acquisition so much.
It started on the very first page. “Last year’s acquisition of EBS has proved an outstanding success,” it said. That set the tone for what was to follow. “The most important event in the electronic division was the acquisition in June 2006 of EBS for $534 million in cash and 36.1mln shares. This significantly increased our foreign exchange revenues. The integration is going well, having delivered its pre-acquisition targets. Now that we have had the opportunity to examine more deeply the potential technology savings, we have identified further synergies and the anticipated annual cost savings by 2008/09 are now expected to be $58mln,” it continued.
EBS, which ultimately cost Icap $856.6mln, accounted for nearly half of the revenues of Icap’s electronic broking division. “In the period from acquisition to March 31, 2007, EBS contributed £99.8mln to revenue and £30.8mln to pre-tax profit (before amortization of intangibles arising on consolidation and exceptional items). If the acquisition had been completed on the first day of the financial year, the estimated revenue would have been £121.3mln with profit of £35.8mln.
The figures go to prove what an absolute coup Michael Spencer pulled off when he bought EBS. Last year, in a moment of hyperbole, which won’t have surprised many of my FX muckers – who’ve always thought I wrote a load of bollocks – I claimed Icap may well have got the deal of the century.
The deal was struck on a forward earnings multiple of just 15.
Of course, we can all deal backwards. The sale of Currenex to State Street on a multiple of 22 served to further illustrate that its former owners gave EBS away on the cheap. I got on to some of them a while back, jokingly saying I was going to report them for failing their fiduciary duties.
But this week, I had a eureka moment and I think that I’ve worked out what went on. Most of the board members were spot traders. For them, the sale of EBS represented a significant profit, as their position had never been properly marked-to-market. I also think some of them may have thought they were selling EBS for 856.6 million in Sterling – far closer to its real value – rather than the bargain 856.6 million in US greenbacks that it went for. Obviously, I got in touch with a few of the old board members again; surprisingly they didn’t seem too amused to hear my theory. One, however, promised to tell me “all the sordid details.” I can’t wait.