Bond Outlook January 11th

Among all those economic data, only two things really matter: what happens when the mewing stops, and when will the Chinese withdraw dollar support.

Among all those economic data, only two things really matter: what happens when the mewing stops, and when will the Chinese withdraw dollar support.

Bond Outlook [by bridport & cie, January 11th 2006]

Is it possible to reduce the arguments on whither the economy to two key factors? We shall be so bold as to say that it is. To put it another way, we identify two driving forces, with most other variables dependent on them:

 

  • Mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW) as the means of maintaining US consumer spending
  • The Chinese policy towards supporting the dollar.

 

The first of these lends itself to conventional economic analysis; the second falls more into the realm of politics. So let us begin with the easier task.

 

Since the beginning of the decade (when the post-dotcom recession was not allowed to work its way through the economy), household earnings have grown far less than either spending or what may be considered normal during a recovery. The shortfall has been made up by “mewing”, a phenomenon dependent on rising house prices with easily available and cheap credit. When the mewing stops, so does spending ahead of earnings. There is every sign that mewing is already slowing and will probably stop completely in 2006. Consumers will have no choice but to tighten their belts and reintroduce the practice of saving. In terms of timing, the current year seems very likely. In terms of severity, much depends on whether house prices merely level off, or whether they actually fall. If the latter, the fear factor will lead to a recession, not just a slow down.

 

“Chinese” and “inscrutable” have always been closely linked adjectives, so any analysis of Chinese policy is fraught with imponderables. Current policy is however clear: create industrial jobs regardless of profitability by keeping the RMB much cheaper than it would naturally be. The People’s Bank of China acts as “buffer purchaser” of T-Bonds to support the USD. The vulnerability of holding reserves mainly in a currency which, left to itself, would weaken against the RMB, is obvious, but is a risk the Chinese Government has taken on, eyes open. The current policy is no more sustainable than the USA’s. Lack of industrial profitability has put the banking system into a totally unhealthy position on non-performing loans. How long will the Chinese sustain the unsustainable? That is where inscrutability comes into play. We would suppose longer than we could imagine, and with current signs pointing to only the most modest revaluation of the RMB and diversification of reserve holdings in 2006.

 

Put together, the two forces above suggest a year of dollar weakness, but not collapse, and a slowdown in the US economy but not a full recession. Why not a full recession? Because the Fed will probably follow its Greenspan policy of lowering rates at first sign of a slow down, still spurning the slimming diet needed for long-term health. Unless Bernanke surprises everyone by not continuing the denial policy of Greenspan. Even 4¾ % for the Fed rate would imply yield curve inversion. Our perception (currently also the market’s) is that the Fed will take fright at 4¾ %, although “overkill” to 5% cannot be excluded.

 

Of course, we cannot be unaware of the risks associated with Iran, the Holy Land, bird flu and terrorism, but these worries that have to be “lived with”.

 

We are currently at “neutral” in our USD maturity recommendation. Our next step is likely to be to lengthen. The proposed barbell for EUR makes sense so long as the ECB looks like raising its refi rate.

 

As reported last year, our clients are showing interest in diversifying their currency holdings. Poland, South Africa and Brazil all look attractive in this context, Brazil standing out amongst Latin American countries with its free-market and commodity-supported economy. Elsewhere on the continent, there are disquieting moves towards populist and state economic control policies.

 

It is hard for us to take seriously the promises of Ford and GM to return to profitability without passing through Chapter 11. Yet their management has managed to persuade investors at least temporarily that their outlook is positive, leading to both a rise in stock prices and a narrowing of bond spreads. Our view is that narrower spreads provide an opportunity to withdraw from the slowest car crash in history.

 

Recommended average maturity for bonds in each currency

 

No change while awaiting ECB decisions.

Currency: USD GBP EUR CHF
As of 04.01.06 2011 2013 Floaters & 2016 2013
Dr. Roy Damary