UK PFI: pawning future income?

The UK has the EU's most extensive public finance initiative programme. According to pro-PFI lobbying group the PFI Forum, at March 1 this year 276 projects with a combined capital value of more than £34 billion ($61 billion) had been completed and were operating.

The UK has the EU’s most extensive public finance initiative programme. According to pro-PFI lobbying group the PFI Forum, at March 1 this year 276 projects with a combined capital value of more than £34 billion ($61 billion) had been completed and were operating.

Some of these, such as the London Underground PFI, are crucial to the UK’s infrastructure. It can be assumed that the government will bail them out even if the PFI company goes bust. So borrowing by PFI companies creates contingent liabilities for central government or local authorities.

“The simple starting point is that public infrastructure can only be paid for in two ways, either by the taxpayer or by user charges,” says Peter Robinson, senior economist at UK think-tank the Institute for Public Policy Research. “It doesn’t matter what clever financing structures or accounting mechanisms you have. Any major infrastructure project will create a future claim on the government.”

Whether PFI projects go on or off the government’s balance sheet is decided by government auditors, in theory according to how much risk is transferred. “The key rule is that the accounting treatment of the project should never drive the decision on that project,” says Robinson. “In practice, the accounting treatment does get in the way.”

“In the last five to 10 years the scale of these liabilities has increased quite dramatically,” says Jonathan Loynes, chief UK economist at Capital Economics. “You could argue that there has been a deterioration in the state of the public finances that hasn’t been reflected in the figures.”

It’s hard to quantify that deterioration. When the Conservative opposition claimed that the UK government had borrowed £100 billion off balance sheet via PFIs, it was shouted down for simply adding up the full cost of all PFI deals, including maintenance and services over the lifetime of the projects, to get its total figure. This is too simplistic.

“It is by no means agreed that all contingent liabilities should be on balance sheet,” says Loynes. “Do you assume a 100% likelihood of these liabilities having to be met? We have suggested some sort of risk weighting. For example, if there’s a 10% likelihood of these liabilities having to be met, include 10% on balance sheet.”

So how much missing debt are we actually talking about? In 2003, Capital Economics looked at letters of comfort supporting PFI companies, and guarantees to other companies such as Network Rail. A conservative, as opposed to a Conservative, approach, using Loynes’s weighting methodology and counting only PFI capital expenditure, not service costs (which are already published in the UK budget), as debt, still revealed that UK public sector debt was being understated by £25 billion.

In March this year, Capital Economics updated its estimates. It found that off-balance-sheet liabilities had continued to increase and could now total £60 billion. This is at the upper end of estimates, but the figure is indisputably high. “A lot more debt should be [on balance sheet],” says Peter Spencer, chief economic adviser to Ernst & Young sponsored economic forecast group the Item Club. “With Network Rail and the PFI deals you can easily get to £40 billion.”

This isn’t just a matter of creative accounting. It’s bad business. If the market effectively sees contingent liabilities as government debt anyway, why not guarantee projects and get cheaper debt? As one public sector banker told Euromoney at the time of the London Underground PFI financings, which were opposed by London mayor Ken Livingstone on the grounds that a straight bond deal would make more sense: “Livingstone could raise billions of dollars in minutes if he had a government guarantee.”