Sir,
I would like to commend you on the articles you published in the April 2005 issue of Euromoney with respect to “naked” short selling in the US securities markets. Readers may be reminded that a “naked” short sale is in effect the sale of a security that the seller does not own and has not borrowed. “Naked” short selling is in every instance a violation of several federal laws in the US – for example, laws against counterfeiting of corporate securities (a crime) and against sales of unregistered securities (a civil violation), although the securities industry’s self-regulatory organizations with the blessing of the SEC have written for themselves “regulations” that permit the industry to indulge in the practice under certain circumstances. In your article “SEC seeks to curb naked ambition” [Euromoney, April 2005], James Brigagliano of the SEC in effect admits that the SEC determined that preventing upside price volatility – and thus the resultant financial losses by the manipulators and their industry partners – was of greater concern to the SEC than righting the wrongs done to investors by those same manipulators. This grandfathering of admittedly known, pervasive market manipulation and securities fraud is appalling, to say the least.
Although Brigagliano at least acknowledges the manipulation, his boss, Annette Nazareth, who is reportedly being considered as a future commissioner of the SEC, stated in the New York Times that individual investors who complain about being victimized by illegal short selling schemes “just want their stock to go up”. Although the victims no doubt do “want their stock [prices] to go up”, it is reasonable to assume that they also want federal securities and other laws against illegal short selling enforced by the federal agency entrusted with that responsibility.
I applaud the hard work of the SEC in many areas and believe it serves a necessary function in the US markets. The SEC is overburdened and underfunded, which is not its fault. The SEC is – to the great credit of its officials – very diligent at prosecuting long-side manipulation, the “pump-and-dump” schemes, but for some reason has considerably less interest in pursuing those criminals who manipulate the markets downward.
The SEC could eliminate much of the incidence of illegal short selling, removing most of the incentive, by forbidding short sellers from withdrawing the margin dollars securing their short sales until the short positions were fully closed out. This is known as “withholding the mark”. If nothing else, it would shorten the duration of most illegal “bear raids”. The SEC considered doing this when debating its Regulation SHO but for some reason decided not to.
Related to this, the SEC should never allow a brokerage or clearing firm to subtract a buyer’s money from his account until the securities the buyer attempted to purchase are actually delivered into his account. Put a hold on the funds, sure, but don’t let them be taken from the buyer until the goods are delivered.
The SEC could prohibit any clearing firm (including the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation, which the SEC is responsible for regulating) from loaning more shares of an issuer than it actually holds in trust and has the informed consent of the beneficial owner (not the broker) to loan, and from loaning out the same shares to more than one borrower at a time; and require clearing firms (including DTCC) to go into the market and buy in settlement failures that persist for more than a set time (any time frame is fine, just require them to be closed out at some point!). This was routinely done before DTCC set up its lucrative stock “borrow” programme.
Finally, the SEC could require full, regular public disclosure by each broker across all US markets of all short (as well as long) positions. Short selling in itself, if done in accordance with the rules, is not illegal or wrong – indeed it can provide needed market liquidity – so why the secrecy? If the US securities industry faced transparency in its shorting activities, it would no doubt act more honourably toward the investing public. Related to this, the SEC requires long holders (including affiliated groups) of 5% or more of a fully reporting publicly traded company to file public reports on their holdings. Why not require those who, individually or as a consortium, short sell 5% or more of the securities of that same company to file similar reports?
These necessary complements to Regulation SHO would not stop market makers from abusing for profit their regulatory exemption from borrowing shares to sell short during the course of “bona fide” market making (which was granted to them for the purpose of providing liquidity to illiquid markets, not to give them an unfair advantage in their proprietary trading), nor would it stop all of the illegal short selling by unscrupulous investors in PIPE transactions (often through hidden offshore affiliates), but they would be a good start. Combined with strict enforcement of the new Regulation SHO and appropriate punishment of repeat violators, most of the problems exposed in your April 2005 articles would be eliminated.
It might be difficult, if not impossible, to change the industry’s and regulators’ attitudes toward the companies whose share prices are manipulated and their shareholders (the nomination of Representative Christopher Cox, who is not to my knowledge a securities industry insider, as the new chairman of the SEC at least generates hope).
Until serious changes are made, potential investors in the US securities markets should be aware that legitimate supply and demand do not necessarily determine the prices of securities in the US markets, that illegal short selling – even the criminally illegal counterfeiting of unregistered corporate securities for the purpose of downside market manipulation – will often go unpunished, and that buyers of US securities may never receive what they paid for, because the US securities industry and regulators do not always require that the goods be delivered in exchange for the purchase price. An undated and unenforceable futures-type “contract” for the goods, with a hidden and unaccountable counterparty, seems to be close enough.
Much more action is needed to restore the integrity of the US securities markets.
H. Glenn Bagwell, Jr
Attorney-at-law
Raleigh, North Carolina, USA