FREE MARKETS HAVE been blamed for many things, but last month they were implicated in something new: blocking debt relief for tsunami-hit countries.
The problem arose after G7 finance ministers decided that to help out the affected countries they would not expect debt repayments from them for at least a year. Since they owe the Paris Club of bilateral creditors $5 billion this year, the gesture was more than merely symbolic.
Yet doubts were soon raised about the likelihood of full implementation. France’s finance minister, Hervé Gaymard, told Radio France Internationale: “Some countries, for example Thailand, do not wish to benefit from this moratorium simply because … they don’t want their name to be downgraded on financial markets.”
Meanwhile, the Economist said of Thailand that “to delay its repayments may send the wrong signal to the capital markets, it fears, suggesting that [it] is a mendicant country unable to carry its debts. This might deter new creditors and investors.” Fitch Ratings issued a press release warning of “unintended consequences from a sovereign rating perspective”.
In the end the fears proved to be largely unfounded. However, they did demonstrate vividly a significant weakness in the international financial architecture.
Maintaining reputation key for sovereigns
Part of the problem was that the initial statement from G7 finance ministers was rather vague. “We would not expect debt payments from affected countries that request it until the World Bank and IMF have completed a full needs assessment of their reconstruction and financing requirements, recognizing that some countries may be unable to make debt payments.”
This seemed to imply that the G7 was taking this action not because its members wanted to help out but rather because the affected countries simply couldn’t afford to pay them. It’s easy to see how most of the countries in question – not just Thailand, but also Indonesia and India – would not want to get involved in a programme that assumed they were unable to service their debts. India, after all, with $100 billion in foreign reserves and very little foreign debt, is not going to be in that position in the foreseeable future.
A sovereign debtor’s reputation is its access to markets. The only reason that lenders in the private sector ever fund a sovereign is that they believe that the country in question has the ability and willingness to pay obligations in full and on time. No-one can force a country to pay, and litigation is expensive and often unsuccessful. Any hint that a sovereign might not be able to pay its debts can devastate its standing on the international capital markets.
That said, one subordinate clause in a G7 statement is not and was not enough to make markets reprice country risk from Thailand to India. What most worried those warning of damage to ratings and access to private capital was comparability.
The Paris Club has long held to a principle known as comparability of treatment, whereby any concessions that it grants to its borrowers must be reflected in similar (or “comparable”) concessions by all of that borrower’s other creditors. Exactly what this means has never been defined, and probably could not be. For one thing, the Paris Club generally prefers flow restructurings, where principal repayments are pushed out but not reduced; the private sector generally prefers stock restructurings, once-and-for-all deals whereby the principal is reduced, sometimes drastically.

Since the G7 was entirely unclear on whether they wanted to forgive the debt repayments or simply push them back, some market participants – notably Paul Rawkins, of Fitch Ratings in London – worried that, at some point, Paris Club debt forgiveness might turn into a demand for comparable treatment by private-sector creditors. He wrote: “While there has been no suggestion that private creditors would be caught up in any official debt moratorium, any subsequent debt rescheduling could conceivably spill over to private creditors, including bondholders.”
For a moment it appeared that a well-meaning attempt to do good might have seriously harmful unintended consequences for the disaster-hit countries.
A couple of days later, however, Rawkins was reassured by comments from Jean-Pierre Jouyet, chairman of the Paris Club. Jouyet stressed that the Club’s deal came without any conditions – either for comparability of treatment or for the countries in question to enter into an IMF agreement.
Indonesia, for example, has only recently exited its last IMF agreement and has no desire whatsoever to negotiate a new one.
“The architecture has not changed, but this is a unique situation and they’re going to fashion a unique response,” says Rawkins, who has largely laid to rest his worries about possible implications for credit ratings. Although it is still conceivable that the moratorium might result in a bunching of maturities that would place an undue fiscal burden on the countries concerned, no-one thinks that very likely.
Indeed, notes Vincent Truglia, co-head of sovereign ratings at Moody’s, the Paris Club action “doesn’t need to have any negative effect at all, and could have a positive effect” on ratings, insofar as it simply frees funds for debt service to other creditors.
Unfazed investors
Investors seem to be of the same mind. Euromoney spoke to a handful of emerging-market bond investors, and none of them showed any concern whatsoever about the prospect of a country accepting tsunami-related debt relief. And in the context of a country like Sri Lanka, which has no bonds outstanding but does have private industry, debt relief could be an enormous help.
“Sri Lanka is growing, well managed, and wants to ensure steady access for private borrowers to its private market,” says Nancy Birdsall, president of the Center for Global Development. “A moratorium is a great idea: it’s a very effective form of capital transfer, much more efficient than new aid.”
Bilateral aid and multilateral aid generally needs to go through approval and auditing to ensure it is spent in the right places and doesn’t cause incidental harm. A good government, such as Sri Lanka’s, on the other hand, can simply deploy resources exactly where and when they’re needed; and if the government no longer needs to pay debt service, that’s money it is free to spend on disaster relief.
Some governments, Australia, for example, complain that there’s no audited assurance that the money saved on debt relief will go to disaster relief. But if there is a bad government, there’s a very good chance that when foreign aid arrives, the government will simply spend that much less money on relief efforts itself.
Either way, the fungibility of money implies that debt relief can be the most efficient way to get aid where it is needed.
Indeed, although the US has yet to pronounce on tsunami-related debt relief, it used much the same argument at the Paris Club itself when it asked for 95% debt forgiveness for Iraq. This, went the argument, was tantamount to aid for the Iraqi people: it would free government resources to be spent on reconstruction, and it would catalyse private-sector capital inflows.
The US won that argument. Although it didn’t get the 95%, it did get an 80% haircut – an unprecedented number for a middle-income country, especially one with massive oil reserves. That deal, however, came with full Paris Club conditionality – an IMF programme and comparability of treatment.
Paris Club not overlooking all repayments
Thailand and India, though, are too proud to get lumped in with the deadbeat countries with which the Paris Club deals. India covets a permanent seat on the UN Security Council: it wants to be seen by the G7 as an aid donor more than a recipient. And for Thailand, any kind of deal with the G7 and/or the IMF could spell disaster in the February 6 general election, given that prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra has done very well for himself by taking a stand against such foreign meddling.
For all the Paris Club’s goodwill, then, it is likely to be only Indonesia, Sri Lanka and maybe the Seychelles that qualify for the debt moratorium. Even Indonesia, it seems, is still going to have to pay $1.2 billion in interest payments in 2005; although details have not been released, it looks as though only the $3.3 billion in principal repayments will be overlooked.
As the world’s rich governments start getting more generous – in Iraq, and now in response to the tsunami – it seems they are increasingly running up against obstacles that make it harder to deliver the relief they want to give. Comparability of treatment can make debt forgiveness counterproductive if it means less private-sector investment, and domestic political concerns can mean that countries have good electoral reasons to reject proferred aid.
A partial solution could be UK finance minister Gordon Brown’s proposal for an international financing facility, which could take some of the politics out of global aid and poverty reduction. But governments always want to control where their money is going, so international politics will always intrude.
As for Paris Club comparability, it seems to be here to stay.