As General Motors boss Rick Waggoner takes charge of the company’s US factories, he should ask himself a basic question: Why bother? There’s no doubt that GM needs a tune-up. And Waggoner might be the mechanic for the job. But GM faces a bigger problem, one that tinkering with the engine is unlikely to fix – long-term solvency.
The threat to solvency comes from the company’s huge liabilities for pensions and healthcare. The big number is the
$61 billion of unfunded healthcare liabilities, of which $28 billion are on the balance sheet. These are likely to get much bigger as the ratio of retired to active workers – already an astonishing 2.4 to 1 – increases. As for pensions, the company reports a mere $8 billion underfunding for the end of 2004, but more realistic return assumptions would bring the total up.
Those off-balance-sheet liabilities are not exactly debt; nevertheless they already dwarf the company’s $28 billion of equity. As the workforce ages and these obligations have to be paid out, GM will struggle to find the cash.
To solve these problems for good, GM needs to start afresh. Declaring bankruptcy would do the trick. US airlines do it with startling regulatory, allowing them to redraft the terms of their benefits for employees and retired workers, occasionally with the help of the government.
But is GM really like the airlines? In two important respects, it is. First, the auto maker has the same sort of unaffordable retirement burden. GM’s extra pension and health care costs give it a $1,500 starting cost disadvantage against Japanese carmakers for each vehicle it produces.
Second, like the airlines, GM can blame the structure of the US retirement and health care system. For years, the pension system encouraged good employers such as airlines and carmakers to take on open-ended liabilities for their workers. That kept the politically powerful unions happy and reduced the pressure on the government’s own retirement programmes. But the regulations also encouraged companies to underestimate the amounts that should be set aside to take care of these promises. For mature companies, these liabilities have proved crippling.
Still, bankruptcy might sound like an extreme step. After all, GM reported earnings of $2.8 billion in 2004. And it has $20 billion of cash. On the face of it, the company hardly looks as if it is at death’s door.
But those earnings come entirely from the finance business, General Motors Acceptance Corp. GMAC earned $4.3 billion before taxes last year while the vehicle operations lost $3.1 billion. GM now reckons its automotive operations will burn through $2 billion this year alone.
As long as GMAC continues to make money, the industrial business could limp along for years. Waggoner has been brought in to help stop the burn. But even a super-manager could not expect to overcome the huge cost disadvantage caused by its healthcare liabilities, cut-throat competition in the US market and global overcapacity.
So GM will likely remain entirely reliant on GMAC. But GM’s money-losing ways are a threat to the finance business. GMAC depends on the parent’s credit rating to fund itself in the capital markets. As the group’s woes have grown recently, GMAC’s unsecured bond spreads have widened. Bankers are trying to find ways to “ring-fence” GMAC from its parent’s woes, but it will not be easy, as long as GM controls GMAC’s cashflow.
Split or bust
GM should act now to preserve both companies. One solution would be to sell GMAC. Putting GMAC’s net profit of $2.9 billion on a conservative multiple of 11 values the finance arm at $32 billion. But the proceeds would simply fund future healthcare liabilities. That would do nothing for shareholders and would only partly solve GM’s solvency problem. It would still need to find another $30 billion to cover all of its deficits.
A better option would be to break GM into two – a finance business and a carmaker. This would not be simple, since a large proportion of GMAC’s business comes from GM. But necessity is the mother of invention. After all, GM managed to spin off Delphi, its captive auto parts business, in 1999.
Bereft of the cash drip-feed from GMAC, the car business would have to face up to the realities of its long-term liabilities. Bankruptcy looks like a realistic option. It would be the new start the company needs to restructure its pension and healthcare obligations. And it could bring its costs down to the level of its increasingly agile Asian rivals.
A split-up followed by bankruptcy would not be an easy option. Lawyers, politicians and unions would have to be pacified. But it is the only realistic way to keep GM going.
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