How do you entice a highly rated, well-respected and conservative issuer to use a product they’ve never used before? You offer them a whole new investor base willing to buy a security that bags the issuer savings of 40 basis points over Libor. That’s what Wells Fargo managed last month when it issued its first convertible in at least 25 years.
For most of that stretch it was in good company. Convertibles weren’t used by investment-grade corporates. Bank loans and corporate bonds offered better funding costs.
That all changed in 2000. New structures made convertibles more attractive. And then the deteriorating economy gave the nascent high-grade converts market a shove by limiting access to commercial paper. High-grade companies could issue a convert structured in such a way that they would pay neither coupon nor yield – zero-zero convertibles – while at the same time having high conversion premiums that at times went beyond 40%. It was essentially free money; some companies, such as Novellus, even invested the proceeds in US treasuries.
Several asset-management companies took advantage of this in 2001 but Wells Fargo stayed away despite solicitous investment banks. “We’ve had them knocking on our door for three years trying to get us to do a deal,” says the company’s treasurer, Nino Fanlo. “We weren’t interested. Convertibles were a problem for our equity investors because they could dilute their holdings.”
Some issuers of zero-zeros soon encountered problems. Only hedge funds would buy with no coupon and high conversion premiums; they strip out the debt component and play the equity volatility. As the economy and stock market worsened many of the converts were out of the money – some to the point that investors were better off exercising the put. And some of those it happened to were starting to find it difficult to fund cheaply or at all in any market. Wells Fargo would not have belonged in that category, but the problems with this new structure reinforced its conservatism.
Fast forward to this year, though, and Wells Fargo is issuing, at $3 billion, the second-largest convertible of the year after Tyco’s $4.5 billion in January, and it is doing so with a 30-year maturity and the most aggressive terms of any deal. Most of the investors are hedge funds.
The bank managed to wring a conversion premium of 110% out of investors. It’s much higher than the premiums seen in the market’s zero-zero boom time in 2001, and higher than some of the more recent structures. In February, Merrill Lynch, one of the underwriters for Wells Fargo, underwrote a convertible for Affiliated Managers Group which had a similar structure to the Wells deal. It’s called the hyper, or higher premium, structure, which in simple terms involves adding extra equity exposure to the deal by attaching more warrants. AMG had issued two warrants with Merrill before, but the stock price then had been in the $60s and $70s. Now it was in the $40s and it wasn’t keen to issue a regular convertible with the stock so low. The solution was to increase the equity component in return for a higher premium. The deal, launched overnight, carried a 77.8% conversion premium. A month later BB-rated Mandalay Resort Group, of Las Vegas fame, issued a similar convert, and this carried a premium of 100%.
Those deals sparked Fanlo’s interest. Here was a way to issue cheap debt without facing the prospect of diluting shareholders.
It might sound initially as if Wells Fargo has abandoned its conservative bias to get such terms, but this is a highly structured deal that took advantage of a confluence of market conditions without leaving the bank exposed to future shock. For starters, if the stock price actually hits $100, from the $47.25 at launch, it will be no bad thing. “I think that if that’s the downside, we’ll find a way to live with it somehow,” says Fanlo.
Second, convertible investors are treating the issue as five-year paper though the deal is a 30-year non-call with the first put in the fifth year. There’s a put every five years thereafter. And the deal incorporates a new put structure, which the issuer likes, explains Dan Simkowitz, head of equity products at Morgan Stanley. “Should investors want to put the bonds they wouldn’t put them but instead the bonds are remarketed as straight one-year debt with the proceeds going to the convertible investor.” This is to keep the bonds outstanding for 30 years.
An issuer’s market March provided the right timing for the deal. First, investors were hungry for paper. “The market had hit a supply-demand imbalance in favour of issuers in the first quarter,” says David Ryan, Goldman Sachs’s head of US convertible origination. “So issuers could go in and structure deals to suit exactly what they wanted knowing that the market would be unlikely to charge them for creativity.”
It’s not so much that there had been a lack of issuance. Bankers reckon issuance this year ought to surpass last year’s $5 billion in the US, although it won’t get near the more than $100 billion issued in 2001. There are two reasons for the demand. One is the high level of redemptions in the market. “That’s caused net supply to be somewhat stagnant,” says Ryan.
What’s more, the paper outstanding wasn’t offering good value: “The average conversion premium in the outstanding market of $230 billion is about 100%,” says a market observer. “Investors generally aren’t interested in out-of-the-money paper that carries such little equity exposure.”
The other factor is that money has still been coming into convertible arbitrage funds, and new ones are still setting up.
“Established convert arb funds have done very well for the past three years while cash equity has been negative,” says Ryan. “So even if the established players feel the market is expensive, there are newer funds out there looking to establish a track record.”
Second, says Simkowitz: “March provided a good opportunity since volatility was still high, however since then the VIX has fallen. Additionally, a continuing low-interest-rate environment enabled Wells Fargo to issue attractive and low-cost capital.”
That’s an understatement. For as long as the convertible remains outstanding Wells pays Libor minus 25 basis points, way through what it would pay on a five-year bond. “It does vary day-to-day in the secondary market, but I’d say that our usual cost of funds for five-year debt is around Libor plus 15,” says Fanlo. Its five-year credit default swap was trading in a range of 22bp to 27bp leading up to the deal.
Then it was a question of fixing the exact mix of cost of funds and conversion premium. Initially it appears that the bankers tried to replicate Mandalay’s 100% premium.But Wells Fargo was looking for added comfort. In the end all sides agreed on the 110% premium after the bankers structured in the extra warrants needed to offer investors extra equity exposure as compensation.
What this means in practice, assuming the stock price goes above $100, is that investors in the convert would be participating in 43 shares per 1,000 bonds they own rather than the more usual 10 shares.
It’s not a structure for everyone, although the bankers report that other issuers are interested.
Nor is it a deal which Fanlo expects to see his bank do that frequently: “You don’t do this type of deal every quarter or every year or two. But if you see these kinds of levels available, you have to look at them.”