Sovereign work-outs: a new idea

Argentina's de facto default on $130 billion in face value of debt - investors who've seen the price of their bonds more than halve to 35 cents on the dollar in four months are in no doubt that this is a default-like loss, if not yet a legal default - and the tortuous progress of its supposedly voluntary and orderly debt restructuring, which shows no sign of being either, have drawn renewed and urgent calls for a better approach to sovereign debt work-outs.

Argentina’s de facto default on $130 billion in face value of debt – investors who’ve seen the price of their bonds more than halve to 35 cents on the dollar in four months are in no doubt that this is a default-like loss, if not yet a legal default – and the tortuous progress of its supposedly voluntary and orderly debt restructuring, which shows no sign of being either, have drawn renewed and urgent calls for a better approach to sovereign debt work-outs.

There are three possibilities: large scale bail-outs by the G7 and the IMF, which markets now realize are no longer likely; some kind of sovereign bankruptcy court, though what court might claim the legal right or enforcement mechanisms to attach and dispose of sovereign assets within a country’s own borders, no-one knows; or… something else.

So last month’s simulation hosted in New York by Carnegie Mellon University of a new proposal by Adam Lerrick and Allan Meltzer, both of Meltzer commission fame, for an official floor of support during a sovereign debt default and restructuring, is worthy of serious consideration.

The heart of the Lerrick-Meltzer proposal is that official sector funds should not be used to compensate lenders for their bad credit decisions, but should be used to protect them from loss arising from market failure during a work-out. The lesson of previous defaults, such as Ecuador and Russia, is that bonds of defaulting creditors can fall to 10 cents on the dollar, even when a country’s economic fundamentals indicate it could sustain a restructured value of 60 cents on the dollar. Though bonds may eventually recover to that level, in the short term investors suffering huge mark-to-market losses are forced to sell good assets to meet margin calls and pay-outs and so contagion spreads to other markets.

Lerrick and Meltzer propose that in a restructuring, when investors offer up old bonds that the sovereign can no longer service for new ones with amended terms or lower face value, the market must seek to establish a minimum restructured value for the new bonds. If the IMF then undertakes to post a minimum bid price at 20% below this minimum restructured value, at which it is prepared to buy as many bonds as investors are prepared to sell, this will prevent panic-induced selling and contagion during the restructuring. Furthermore it will provide a funding rate for investors who see potential up-side in new bonds, based on a sovereign’s new policy framework for resuming growth. This will further help to stabilize the market in its debt at the critical moment.

The obvious risk for the IMF is that it ends up owning a country’s entire debt outstandings – yet that would be at a very low price that makes the debt serviceable. That’s a better option for the G7 and the IMF than wasting tens of billions of dollar on huge bail-outs of debt that has not been restructured to a sustainable level and so will not be serviced – Russia received a $22.6 billion package three weeks before its debt moratorium in 1998 – or tying up funds in guarantees for very long-term restructured bonds.

Could it work? Lerrick and Meltzer assembled an impressive group to put it to the test. The simulation involved trading in the bonds of a crisis country, the Republic of Mañana (clearly Argentina) and a contagion country, the Federative Republic of Innocent Bystanders (clearly Brazil). Four groups were presented: the borrower, the IMF and official sector, long-term investors and opportunistic investors. Angel Gurria, finance minister of Mexico from 1998-2000 played the borrower advised by Lee Buchheit of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen&Hamilton. Allan Meltzer represented the IMF. Long-term investors present included Mohamed El-Erian of PIMCO, Mark Dow from Mass Financial and others. Jay Newman of Elliott Associates, Ben Miller of HBK Investments, Peter Drittel of Tudor Investments and others were the opportunistic buyers.

People like this play simulations to win and the high emotions and disagreements the simulation has generated make the atmosphere surrounding Argentina’s actual restructuring seem friendly by comparison. The hedge funds mainly chose to short FRIB bonds and were furious to find the game’s controllers invalidating huge short sales in the last moments of the game and to find the IMF supporting Brazil. They have complained bitterly about the game’s shortcomings including lack of continuous trading.

But the results are more intriguing than these issues. In the first simulation, Mañana bonds had been trading at 40%, the minimum restructured value was set at 45%, the IMF-backed cash floor of support at 36%. Mañana accepted an exchange of 87% of outstandings at an average value of 54% and the lowest trading price during restructuring was 48%. The IMF didn’t end up lending a bean.

If Lerrick and Meltzer are on to something, market participants must acknowledge what a brutal game debt restructuring is. The background must be one of clear non-payment and threat of default. Inducements to accept restructured bonds would include the threat of exit consents being used to alter the governing laws and terms of old bonds that are retained by holdout investors as well as the transfer of payments on newly restructured bonds through a trustee for bondholders rather than a fiscal agent of the debtor. This makes it impossible for holdout investors to attach coupon payments on new bonds and makes residual holdings almost worthless. It’s a very confrontational approach, but as one long-term investors exclaimed when Gurria played this card in the simulation – “that’s reality”.

The biggest potential losers are the opportunistic buyers who try to pick up old bonds at 10% or below in the panic and hope to obtain huge capital gains and even full payment on the old terms, if as holdouts, they represent a small nuisance percentage of owners of the old debt. The proposal would raise the floor price and eliminate such potential gains.

What it requires, as well as a whole new approach from the IMF, is the ability to calculate a sustainable debt level and minimum restructured value with some confidence.

It’s probably too late to try this with Argentina. The poor credibility of its political leaders and uncertainty of its policy framework make its sustainable debt level very hard to calculate. But when a crisis looms elsewhere, it might just be worth a try.