Paris Club: reform or die

When an institution declares that under no circumstances will it reform you can be sure it faces a rocky future. The idea that any economic player, public or private, can carry on acting in the same old way, regardless of external changes, strikes most people as absurd. Yet this is what the Paris Club believes. Events will surely force it to shape up or wind up.

When an institution declares that under no circumstances will it reform you can be sure it faces a rocky future. The idea that any economic player, public or private, can carry on acting in the same old way, regardless of external changes, strikes most people as absurd. Yet this is what the Paris Club believes. Events will surely force it to shape up or wind up.

The Paris Club is the informal group of sovereign creditors that meets to reschedule the official debts of developing countries. In times past when official Financing dominated capital Flows to emerging markets, the Paris Club could afford the luxury of dictating terms to the debtors and the private sector.

Apart from occasional interference by politicians, creditor mandarins were left to get on with the job and happily turned themselves into hard-hearted debt collectors. As the organizers of the club, French treasury officials were in the most privileged position of all. But now the Paris Club is under attack from every side and has the choice either to reform itself or become redundant.

The main reason for the demise of the Paris Club is that the official Flows, of which it is the guardian, are dwindling into insignificance. The Institute for International Finance estimates that net official Flows to emerging markets will turn negative in 2000, down from plus $5 billion last year to minus $0.8 billion as debtors repay IMF and bilateral lenders.

By contrast, it estimates that net private Flows will grow from $150 billion to nearly $200 billion. So even if official Flows were to get themselves back into positive territory, their overall impact would be marginal. In this situation, Paris Club chest-beating and declarations that “comparable treatment between public and private sector debts only runs one way, in favour of the Paris Club”, would seem to defy reality.

The world has changed. Bond investors, not banks, are the major source of private credit and they are not prepared to take the assaults of the Paris Club lying down. They are getting organized, conducting research, employing lawyers and lobbying governments in pursuit of their goals. Except in the case of the poorest countries, which cannot access the capital markets, their argument is rather strong: that as the leading Financiers their requests should be accommodated.

The foremost demand of bondholders is that the haphazard process of sovereign workout be replaced by an orderly system, with the kind of dialogue between different creditors that already exists for corporate bankruptcies.

Central bankers are also starting to support this idea but hard-line Paris Club devotees are sure that nothing of the sort is on the cards.

Maybe their belief that a group of private sector bondholders could never hold sway over governments is based on a misunderstanding of the politics of sovereign debt. After all the Paris Club only exists because national governments considered it economically desirable to subsidize exporters.

Beneficiaries such as the power, aerospace and defence industries have lobbied successfully for the benefits to stay. They may have a more difficult time doing so in future.

The economic case for export credit guarantees is becoming harder to make. In market-driven, service-based economies why should governments want to subsidize heavy industry? The OECD is arguing for export credit guarantee departments (ECGDs) to operate on a level playing Weld. It seems like a contradiction in terms. If all countries are going to oVer the same subsidy then why not do away with them altogether?

Then, there is the political dimension.

Delegates to the IMF/World Bank meetings in Prague were worrying ahead of time whether they would be besieged by demonstrators protesting about global capitalism. While the IMF as a target is out of the protesters’ reach, they may have more success if they go back home and focus on their national ECGDs.

In these days of so-called ethical foreign policy, subsidizing arms exports to countries where people are starving would seem to have reasonable mileage as a populist campaign.

Already the British ECGD has found itself under the scrutiny of a parliamentary select committee with pressure groups such as Friends of the Earth and the Campaign Against Arms Trade voicing strong objections. In forthcoming elections it may be that these kinds of pressure groups Figure more significantly than defence manufacturers. In a service economy a government may also decide that the needs of the Finance industry are more critical than those of manufacturing and support their cause.

No-one expects, of course, that Paris Club mandarins are going to study the facts, suddenly gain enlightenment, start talking and stop bullying the private sector. So far they are having trouble recognizing that things could work better if the system was even half-way transparent, rules were written down and the outcome of negotiations made clearer. But it is truly a case of reform or die. If the Paris Club wants to play a meaningful role in future sovereign debt workouts, it will have to appreciate the new economic environment in which it finds itself. Otherwise a politician with an eye on the main chance is going to invent something new, based somewhere else.