Regional Awards – Latin America

Headline: Regional Awards – Latin AmericaSource: EuromoneyDate: July 2001Author: Felix Salmon Best Bank in Latin America Citigroup Best debt house in Latin America JPMorgan Most improved debt house in Latin America CSFB Best equity house in Latin America Merrill Lynch Best M&A house in Latin America Goldman Sachs Best bank at risk management in Latin […]

Headline: Regional Awards – Latin America
Source: Euromoney
Date: July 2001
Author: Felix Salmon

Best Bank in Latin America
Citigroup

Best debt house in Latin America
JPMorgan

Most improved debt house in Latin America
CSFB

Best equity house in Latin America
Merrill Lynch

Best M&A house in Latin America
Goldman Sachs

Best bank at risk management in Latin America
JPMorgan

Best bank at transaction services in Latin America
Citigroup

Best bank at treasury in Latin America
BSCH

There have been high hopes for Latin American capital markets for the best part of a decade, but the region has not done as well as many expected. Local equity markets are tiny and shrinking; bond markets are dominated by two sovereign issuers; spreads are wide, and it could be decades before they return to the levels seen in 1996-97.

       
Weill: celebrates Citi’s move for
Mexico’s biggest bank

In this atmosphere, banks need both sheer size and a strong long-term commitment to the region in order to weather the crises and turn a profit. Many have tried their hand, but mergers and successive crises have whittled down their number essentially to four: Citigroup, JPMorgan, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), and Banco Santander Central Hispanico (BSCH).

Other banks are still active in the region, including Credit Suisse First Boston and Deutsche Bank. Two more banks have strong equity franchises – UBS Warburg and Merrill Lynch – and Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs are formidable elephant-hunters when it comes to pitching for the large M&A and bond mandates. But no-one will be surprised if the list continues to shrink in the years ahead.

The award for best bank in Latin America comes down to two contenders: Citigroup and BSCH. After losing out in 2000, Citigroup comes back to win the award this year, as Citibank’s long-standing banking operations in the region – it has been in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, Colombia and Peru for over 70 years – start to leverage the investment-banking expertise of Salomon Smith Barney. Citigroup can now uniquely provide a soup-to-nuts one-stop shop for its customers.

When it comes to retail banking operations, though, BSCH is leagues ahead of Citibank. Citibank might be proud of its two million customers in the region, but BSCH has 23 million. BSCH is the largest bank in Chile, the second largest in Argentina, and the third largest in Brazil and Mexico; the only place that Citibank even comes close to a dominant position is Paraguay. In Latin America’s largest market, Brazil, BSCH has 1,900 branches, Citibank has 35.

BSCH also continues to post impressive numbers on growth and efficiency: its Latin profits rose a stunning 72% to $1.01 billion in 2000, while its regional return on equity rose to 18.5% from 14.6% a year previously. In 2001, it expects ROE to exceed 22%. On the other hand, Citibank, too, made over $1 billion in the region in 2000, ROE of over 30%.

And when it comes to wholesale banking, BSCH can’t compete. It has no presence in the international bond or syndicated loan markets, very little M&A expertise, and can hardly hope to compare to the mighty Citibank in the foreign exchange markets. And while BSCH is strong in equities, Latin equity markets are very small, shrinking, and increasingly concentrated in New York where Citigroup has a natural advantage.

Weighing it all up, BSCH won in 2000, and has greatly improved over the past year. But it’s a close-run thing, and Citi answered all of last year’s criticisms with one knockout blow in the final round. “Even though Citi has talked of serving a broader cross-section of customers than its traditional large corporates and wealthier clients,” we wrote last year, “progress has been limited.”

Well, it’s not limited any more. Three banks made profits of over $1 billion in Latin America in 2000: BSCH, Citi and Banacci. And on May 17, Citi announced that it was buying Banacci, the company that owns Banamex, Mexico’s best and biggest bank, for $12.5 billion.

The deal was universally acclaimed. Citi’s Mexican presence had always been a bit of an embarrassment, and it was now dominant in the country. Furthermore, Citi made it clear that in the wake of the Banamex acquisition it was looking elsewhere in Latin America as well. Specifically Brazil was in its sights, where the best banks – Banco Itaú·, Bradesco and Unibanco – remain locally owned.

BSCH wins awards for the best banks in Argentina, Chile and Venezuela, and is the model of a bank with strong franchises across the region. But the combination of Citibank, Salomon Smith Barney and Banamex is going to be a hard one to beat in the years ahead.

When Chase bought JPMorgan, the biggest area of overlap between the two banks was in Latin America. Both were extremely strong in the region, and it’s not surprising that the combined entity, which trades under the JPMorgan brand name, has a dominant position in the region’s debt markets.

JPMorgan comes at the top of just about any league table you care to mention. Latin bond issuance over the past year? JPMorgan, with $6.9 billion, with Salomon Smith Barney a distant second on $3.6 billion. How about bond exchanges for the year 2000, which are not included in the league tables? Again, JPMorgan comes out on top, with $5.8 billion, a stunning 41.7% market share; second-placed Goldman Sachs has just $2.8 billion. Nothing has changed this year, either: JPMorgan remains on top of the 2001 league tables.

JPMorgan has quality as well as quantity. It was chosen by that pickiest of issuers, the World Bank, to issue its debut bonds in both Mexican and Chilean pesos.

Debt is more than just international bond issuance, of course. If domestic underwriter rankings are included, JPMorgan was bookrunner on $7.3 billion of deals in the 12 months to May 2001; again, Salomon Smith Barney was far behind with $4.4 billion.

Add in loans, and JPMorgan still comes out on top, although its lead over Salomon Smith Barney narrows somewhat.

And what about the markets? JPMorgan is the largest dealer in Brady bonds and Eurobonds, and is the largest primary dealer in fixed-income paper in Mexico. It is also is top of domestic Argentine bond trading – not surprising, considering that it is the product of a merger between two of Argentina’s 12 official market-making banks.

JPMorgan also performs an invaluable service to the emerging bond markets as a whole by creating and keeping up to date its Emerging Market Bond Index, or EMBI. The EMBI indices, from individual countries through to emerging markets as a whole, are used by banks and investors across the world.

The merged bank has, unsurprisingly, seen a lot of defections since the merger, especially from the old JPMorgan side of the business: JPMorgan expertise has been showing up at houses such as Credit Suisse First Boston, Deutsche Bank and Merrill Lynch. What remains has been able not only to keep its position at the top of the league tables, but even to keep the status that JPMorgan and Chase combined had previously. Rivals say that it has been very aggressive on fees, and that eventually its dominance will wane. We shall see. But for the moment, there’s no doubt that JPMorgan is the best debt house in Latin America.

Considering that the best debt house award includes loans as well as bonds, there was really only one other contender for the prize: Salomon Smith Barney. Solly is at the top of both the 2000 and 2001 Latin syndicated loan league tables, although so far this year volume has been relatively anaemic.

The Citigroup subsidiary has stayed in the limelight in the bond markets as well, acting as lead manager on all of the bond exchanges announced so far this year, from Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Colombia. Salomon Smith Barney has a strong presence in local markets, placing domestic bonds in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Grenada, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru and Trinidad & Tobago over the past year. It is also the only real competition to JPMorgan in the first tier of Brady-trading houses, and might even have the edge if local bonds and options are included.

If JPMorgan and Salomon Smith Barney are the biggest, who is the brightest? Although both of the big houses have their heavy hitters, both Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs have excellent reputations on Wall Street and with the biggest sovereign, quasi-sovereign and corporate issuers.

Morgan Stanley’s small team has an enviable ability to price and execute bond deals: it has not cancelled or postponed any of its announced transactions, and has never priced outside the announced guidance. The house has not been as visible as usual in 2001, however, maybe because it has not been involved in the liability management exercises that have been so dominant in the region.

Goldman Sachs, by contrast, almost invented the bond swap, and has been so successful at them that Richard McNeil, the firm’s head of Latin American capital markets, has recently taken on responsibility for all liability management operations worldwide.

Goldman has taken the lead in innovating new types of bond in the region: for example, it structured a 40-year bond for Brazil in August that was part of what was at the time the largest Brady exchange ever. There were two big innovations in the deal: the bonds become callable after 15 years, and the auction mechanism avoided front-running in the secondary market and helped steepen Brazil’s debt curve, something necessary if corporate issuance in the country was to take off.

Goldman also structured the second ever sovereign deal partly guaranteed by the World Bank (the first was also a Goldman bond). The deal, for Colombia, was universally applauded, and had a brand-new structure.

As global markets slow down, Latin America is not top of the priority list for most banks. Indeed, the rule at the moment seems to be for banks to lighten up on their operations in the region. Credit Suisse First Boston is the exception.

       
David Mulford

Although it doesn’t compete in the loan market, CSFB is making a concerted push in bonds. In the first five months of 2001 it had more bond mandates than any other bank bar JPMorgan, and underwrote $4.5 billion of bonds, including exchanges – more than any other bank except for JPMorgan and Salomon Smith Barney. That figure compares with just $1.3 billion in the comparable period of 2000. In 2000, CSFB topped the league table for euro-denominated issuance from Latin issuers, with six deals – more than any other bank – worth e1.9 billion ($1.64 billion), a market share of 18.8%.

That’s not a new thing; CSFB has long been dominant in the euro sector. But as the dollar market closes to Latin issuance for increasingly long periods of time, euros are becoming much more important in terms of Latin financing strategies. And CSFB has proved adept at turning its presence in euros into a foot in the dollar-market door.

Over the past year, CSFB has done deals for nine different sovereign issuers in the region, including Venezuela and Costa Rica, where it picks up best bond house awards.

The Swiss bank has also proved adept at attracting talent, both in-house – it un-poached the 40-strong debt team that had defected to Barclays –and from JPMorgan, hiring Joaquin Eslava, JPMorgan’s head of sales and trading in Argentina, along with four of his team.

CSFB has also managed to snag high-profile mandates, including, most spectacularly, the job of lead-managing Argentina’s record $29 billion mega-swap deal. Much was made at the time of the relationship between CSFB’s international chairman, David Mulford, and Argentina’s finance minister, Domingo Cavallo. They know each other from the days when Cavallo held the same job under president Carlos Menem and Mulford was deputy secretary for international affairs at the US Treasury.

There is no doubt, however, that CSFB, which is only now getting market-maker status in Argentina, would not have got the mandate had it not been for the bank’s proven ability in bond swaps and the access to Argentine pension funds that came with the Eslava hiring.

In bond swaps, CSFB persuaded both Brazil and Argentina to choose it to lead-manage their first par-for-par exchanges, innovative accounting-driven transactions that were designed to attract investors who would otherwise never give up their Brady bonds.

In Brazil, CSFB Garantia is the leading trader in local fixed-income instruments, and in the Brady market CSFB has seen its volumes rise to $67 billion in the first quarter of 2001 from $45 billion a year previously.

CSFB has long been considered a second-tier bank in Latin debt capital markets, and the more established players still think of it as climbing the learning curve. But it certainly has momentum and a commitment to the region, and it could soon be considered a real threat.

“Latin equity market” is increasingly becoming an oxymoron: bolsas are shrinking, volumes falling, and trade is moving towards ADRs listed on the New York Stock Exchange. It takes money, commitment and optimism to maintain a strong Latin equities franchise, and the only banks that have all three are Merrill Lynch, BSCH and UBS Warburg.

Of the three, in a way it is not surprising that Merrill Lynch comes out on top. Its dominance in New York means that it is easily the top trader of Latin American ADRs, which nowadays account for the bulk of regional equity trades. But the firm is also the number two trader of Latin American ordinary shares, behind only BSCH, with its unrivalled network of regional banks.

In the primary markets, Merrill was bookrunner on the largest-ever offering out of Latin America, last August’s $4.3 billion partial privatization of Petrobrás, the Brazilian oil company. The deal was more than twice the size of all equity and equity-linked offerings from Latin America in 1999 combined, and automatically put Merrill at the top of the Latin America equity league table.

Since the beginning of 2000, Merrill has run four equity offerings out of Latin America. It doesn’t sound like much, but it is more than any other house. It hasn’t postponed or withdrawn any offerings, either – an impressive achievement considering the volatility in the region over the past 18 months.

In general, though, equity finance is still provided much more through private equity transactions than it is through the public markets.

Merrill’s top-ranked analysts cover more than 130 companies in the region. But the broadest research team is that of BSCH, which covers 177 companies by dint of its regular mid-cap review. This publication, which covers firms worth between $100 million and $500 million, is often the only source of research that international shareholders in these companies can find. Take away the BSCH’s 55 mid caps, which aren’t covered in anything like the depth of the other stocks, and Santander’s research base is roughly the same size as Merrill’s.

BSCH has a natural advantage over Merrill Lynch in that the costs of its equity operations can be subsumed to some degree into the P&L accounts of its local banks. Also, local banks’ research, sales and trading operations are much cheaper than the equivalent professionals based in New York. Merrill might have entrenched itself as the top equity house in Latin America, but if the markets continue to dry up, Santander is probably better placed to continue to make money.

The most aggressive house in the region, though, is UBS Warburg. Its Rio de Janeiro-based operation picks up the best equity house in Brazil award this year, and it sits atop the league table for ordinary shares in the first five months of 2001, as measured by international institutional orders, with a market share of 26%.

No one house has dominance in the Latin American M&A market. Arguments over league tables can go on all night, and depending on who you ask, you might find JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs or Salomon Smith Barney at the top.

The undisputed leader in terms of number of deals is JPMorgan. The merged bank has a strong presence throughout the region and has been doing deals in such areas as central America, even as big hitters such as Goldman and Morgan Stanley concentrate on Brazil, Mexico and Argentina.

JPMorgan picks up country awards in Brazil, Venezuela and Chile; no-one else gets more than one M&A award in the region.

Merrill Lynch deserves an honorable mention as well, with its innovative structure in which no senior professionals are based in New York. Often that means a banker based in Mexico, say, going to a company based in Spain in order to advise it on a Latin acquisition. But it also means that Merrill, like JPMorgan, ends up advising the company on the Latin end of the transaction much more than someone like Morgan Stanley or Goldman Sachs does.

Goldman Sachs wins the regional award not because of its league-table dominance – although the Goldman bankers are just as capable of finding league tables with themselves at the top as anybody else – but because of its seamless execution.

Goldman’s team of 50 professionals in Latin America are fully coordinated with the rest of the M&A bankers in the firm: they are very much part of Goldman’s global franchise as opposed to being an addition to it. So Goldman was involved by Spain’s Telefónica in the operation to acquire its minority shareholders in four Latin American subsidiaries for $16 billion, despite the fact that the operation was largely performed on regional equity markets, where Goldman has little if any presence.

Goldman’s experience on the Telefónica deal helped it to get the mandate when Portugal Telecom announced a similar transaction in Brazil, buying out the minority shareholders in Telesp Cellular for $2.4 billion.

Goldman has been involved in all three of the M&A deals worth $1 billion or more this year, including advising Banacci on its sale, for $12.5 billion, to Citigroup. Banacci made about $1 billion last year, and is already the largest bank in Mexico, so Citigroup is going to have to engineer some very impressive growth in the Hispanic market in the US if it is to see a good return on its investment. Banacci also ended up with an unheard-of two seats on the Citigroup board.

It has been a great start to the year, and Goldman’s bankers are optimistic that they will exceed their 2000 performance in 2001 – something few other banks say with such confidence.

In Euromoney’s poll of corporate treasurers last September, JPMorgan came out on top for risk management. In emerging markets, it only had two competitors: Deutsche Bank and Chase Manhattan. Now that Chase has bought JPMorgan, and added the investment bank’s abilities in structured products and equity derivatives to its own volume-based dominance in foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives, the merged bank is hard to beat.

That is not to say that Deutsche Bank isn’t trying. The German house had a lot of experience structuring pan-regional risk-management solutions as 15 European economies started merging together. It is now using a lot of that expertise in Latin America, especially for the sophisticated corporate treasurers in Europe who are looking to manage their Latin risk.

Employees of the former JPMorgan have been leaving for other houses, including Deutsche, since the merger, and there has been some speculation that the new house will have some difficulty keeping up with a fast-moving area – already, Deutsche is adamant that it has the edge in structuring state-of-the-art derivatives.

But JPMorgan certainly has the edge over Deutsche when it comes to US clients. And Latin America is something of a showcase region for the bank, both in breadth of presence and in leveraging client relationships into sales across all product platforms. So JPMorgan wins best bank at risk management in Latin America this year.

When it comes to securities services and cash management in Latin America, Citigroup has complete and utter dominance. It operates in 21 countries, has a formidable reputation, and typically has well over 50% market share in the countries in which it operates. No-one else even comes close.

But at least there is a worthy competitor now. BSCH has been in the business for about five years, and is slowly taking clients and market share away from Citigroup. That’s not really a reflection on Citi: given where they were before, the only way to go was down. But it is a good sign of competition.

The main difference between the two houses is that Citi likes to run much of its operations out of its Latin American hub in Tampa, Florida. BSCH prefers to keep everything local.

Custody and cash management are not games in which the score changes very quickly: only a handful of accounts come up for grabs every year, and it can take three years or longer to persuade an institution to switch from one house to another. So it looks as if Citigroup will remain dominant in Latin America for the foreseeable future, its Spanish competition notwithstanding.

BSCH has taken a deliberate decision to trade very actively in local short-term financial markets across Latin America, whereas other regional banks have held back. Partly, its large operations in the leading countries leave it with little choice. With $86 billion in funds across the region – aggregating deposits with pension fund and mutual fund assets – it must deploy these somewhere. While it has 10.3% of deposits across Latin America – built up from a standing start in 1996 – it is reluctant to extend exposure to weak corporate credits. So it is almost compelled to become a dominant player in the local short-term markets.

It owns around 10% of Argentina’s local debt, 15% of Chile’s, nearly 30% of Mexico’s and a more modest 4% of Brazil’s. These operations have been highly profitable for the bank. In Latin America the price of money is less of a determinants of investor and borrower behaviour than overall confidence. A side-effect is that country treasury groups have been able to lock in wide margins between cheap deposits and high local government debt yields.

The bank has ambitious plans in the treasury area. While it requires each national treasury operation to be a leader in its national market, it is unifying these on single global technology platform set to be completed by 2003. The bank has hired high profile local treasurers in each country, believing that being a big bank with a large base of corporate, institutional and retail customers, afford it precious insights into patterns of short-term capital flows that drive local financial markets.

It boasts 4,000 corporate, institutional, and middle market customers of its treasury operations, accounting for transactions across spot foreign exchange, foreign exchange forwards, money markets, and other fixed income and derivatives instruments worth $418 billion in 2000. BSCH intends to grow the middle market customer segment which no other large international bank in the region seems much inclined to serve.