After Brazil, could China’s currency be the next to fall? Billions of dollars are said to have gone missing in foreign exchange over the past year – a development that Chinese officials are desperately trying to play down to minimize market jitters over the fate of the renminbi. At the end of 1998, the nation’s forex reserves looked impressive at $145 billion. But they had risen by only $5 billion over 1998 despite a record trade surplus and strong inflows of foreign direct investment. Some China specialists calculate that almost $89 billion in trade and investment gains never found their way to the official coffers, despite the country’s tough foreign-exchange regulations and central bank controls.
Officials try to explain away this massive shortfall by admitting to another major embarrassment. The ministry’s statistics, they say, are being distorted by fraud and smuggling. The trade data are said to be skewed by export scams so that actual foreign exchange earnings were lower than the levels indicated by official trade data. They also blame a major concession the government introduced in late 1997 that allowed trading firms to retain up to 15% of their hard-currency receipts instead of having to sell the full amount to the state banks. Another strand in the story is last year’s three cuts in interest rates payable on renminbi deposits. This led to a switch by firms and individuals to foreign currency deposits that, again, are not reflected in the published figures.
Independent economists add another gloss to the sorry tale. They point to the impact of last year’s fears about the Chinese government’s ability to withstand pressures to devalue. The response within China was forex frauds and a massive outflow of hard currency. The former head of the state administration of foreign exchange has admitted that illegal outflows could amount to several billions of dollars.
Anthony Chan, regional economist for HSBC Securities, thinks the impact on the Chinese economy of any shortfall in the foreign-exchange reserves will be small. He says: “$145 billion is still a lot of money. There is no need to worry about the health of the economy. The major impact is on the financial markets which will be even more sceptical about the ability of the renminbi to keep stable.”
Chan underlines the importance of exchange controls in defending the currency: “We must remember that the renminbi is not convertible on the capital account. Thus the offshore forex markets cannot directly affect the value of the renminbi.” He also doubts whether speculators can push China off the present parity: “If there is a devaluation, it will be a policy decision and not the result of pressure from the offshore markets.”
Some economists argue that the drop in reserves is exaggerated anyway. Daryl Ho, senior economist at Jardine Fleming, believes that the amount of money missing is probably no more than $10 billion to $20 billion. He says that China has very tight capital controls. He lists the technical factors that have reduced the amount of forex inflows over recent months:
First, Chinese companies are now reluctant to borrow in hard currency. Second, those that do have hard-currency debt try to repay it as soon as possible. Third, export scams to take advantage of value-added tax rebates have boosted sales receipts and made them inaccurate. Fourth, foreign banks have become more cautious of lending large sums. “All in all, forex inflows are thus depressed and show up in the books as the missing billions,” he says.
HSBC Securities’ Chan makes much the same point: “There has always been leakage in the system but this time the leakage is especially visible because Hong Kong’s stock and property markets, a major destination of illegal outflows, have been in the doldrums. This meant that sizeable amounts of money could not be repatriated to the mainland to cover the outflow as in other years.”
The reports of a shortfall in repatriation of foreign-exchange earnings cast light on the background to the biggest corporate collapse in China’s history: the closure of Guangdong International Trust & Investment Corporation (Gitic). The Chinese authorities had realized that stringent management of the reserves had become essential.
The knock-on effects of the Gitic collapse have included widespread market disenchantment. But Philippe Delhaise, president of Thomson Bankwatch, says: “A country’s creditworthiness is based both on objective factors, such as external debt, inflation, growth and the like, and on subjective factors, like the collective willingness of international creditors to maintain their support. Although the willingness to lend might have been affected by the Gitic problem, when it comes to China’s domestic borrowers in general, there seems to be no reason why, as a sovereign state, China’s ability to access foreign markets should be impaired.”
Financial institutions committed to the China market stress that despite Beijing’s problems in managing a high-growth economy, its forex reserves are still the second-largest in the world. International financial markets take the same positive view and the price of China’s sovereign bonds, which are officially backed by the central Chinese government, fell back only slightly in the wake of Gitic’s bankruptcy.
Unlike in many developing countries, the Chinese government has tackled the problem of forex leakages with considerable vigour. The government has threatened to send black marketeers to prison – for life for serious offences. A national auditing campaign is under way to ensure that payment in foreign exchange is genuinely connected with import dealings, with proof of imported commodities. Institutions found breaching regulations will have their licences suspended or revoked altogether.
Last October the government ordered Chinese companies to repatriate all funds parked in overseas accounts and disclose all illegal foreign currency transactions within 48 hours. Light penalties were promised for those who complied. The move immediately flushed out $773 million and HK$47 million ($6 million). But this sum is, by even the lowest estimates, only a fraction of the foreign exchange that is reckoned to be missing. In the meantime, there have been renewed predictions that the exchange rate will come under pressure.
The official stance is that the renminbi will not fall. Premier Zhu Rongji is on record as saying that there will be no devaluation this year. Hong Kong-based investment adviser Marc Faber – known as Dr Doom for his pessimistic and contrarian views – has little faith in official reassurances. He says: “I think China will have to devalue sooner or later. Tax rebates for exports are similar to devaluation. We’ve always said the economy is weak and statistics distorted.”
Adding to market jitters is a report in the state-controlled China Daily‘s Business Weekly that a devaluation or float of the renminbi might not be a bad thing. The report says that any such move “may not trigger the fresh round of currency devaluation that has been feared by most people”. Huang Jinbao, an economist at the Bank of China, the country’s main foreign-exchange bank, says: “There is a possibility of limited fluctuations in the exchange rate, but unlike Brazil, China does not need to announce that the exchange rate will float because the exchange rate has been set through a managed floating rate since 1994.” Pauline Loong