Less than a year ago a damaging scandal over payments to Japanese gangsters by senior officials at Nomura Securities suddenly propelled a little-known and comparatively young executive, Junichi Ujiie, to the office of president and chief executive. There he took on the task of stamping out corruption and modernizing management at Japan’s largest securities firm.
Today, Dr Ujiie, as he is widely known inside the firm, sees the crisis passing for Nomura and is developing plans finally to make it a powerful international investment bank on an unusual model.
The collapses of Sanyo and Yamaichi last year have been a boon to Nomura. It is winning back clients that had deserted it following the scandals, investigations and official sanctions that threatened the firm last spring. During the summer, new account openings by retail investors were a desultory 10,000 a month and Nomura’s share of business on the Tokyo stock exchange declined from over 10% to around 5%. By last December, new account openings were back to 80,000. Ujiie has even had the luxury of telling his brokers that they don’t need to chase those accounts too eagerly. “If you used to be the client of a company that failed [Ujiie seems almost superstitiously carefully to avoid mentioning Yamaichi by name], where are you going to go? There used to be the big four, now it’s the big three or maybe the big one and then two.”
As well as retail customers, corporate issuers that stopped using Nomura as an underwriter last year are coming back very quickly, says Ujiie. “Since banks have difficulties over their BIS ratios, there is a decline in new bank loans, and, as it is also difficult to access the equity market, corporates have to rely on straight bond issues. There’s a big queue. If they need someone to place ¥50 billion ($392 million), they come to us.”
With its domestic stronghold shored up, Nomura may now have the opportunity finally to build the links between its Japanese, European and North American operations and create a new type of international investment bank. The foreign operations of Nomura have largely operated as independent stand-alone firms and, perhaps surprisingly, thrived by giving a few talented traders and managers enough capital and autonomy to make money.
In America, Nomura’s strength during the 1990s has been its mortgage bond traders and latterly its expertise in commercial real estate securitization. It makes a higher return on capital than any other part of Nomura. In Europe it has minted money in one of the most unusual and closely watched groups in London, its principal-finance group (PFG). PFG has made money buying businesses, using innovative asset and cashflow securitization techniques to finance the purchases, running the businesses, in some cases improving operating performance, and then selling them off, rather like an LBO-shop, a mini-KKR. “In the last three years, the profit contribution of Europe and the US has increased significantly,” says Ujiie. “Tokyo makes some profit, but when Japanese equities are going down, our hands are tied. The US and Europe make a large contribution.”
Nomura’s overseas principal position-taking groups thrive on capital and luckily Nomura has plenty: $3.6 billion of equity and subordinated debt in Europe and $1.3 billion in the US. Nomura as a whole has the potential to raise more capital. Its balance sheet shows leverage of 10 times, conservatively low for a brokerage with mainly liquid assets. Some western investment banks are 20, 30 or 40 times leveraged. Its foreign operations regularly ask for more capital on the not unreasonable basis that they produce a higher return on it than Nomura’s Japanese operation.
The problem that Nomura could never solve was how to integrate these successful niche operations abroad with the head-office operations of Nomura in Japan. That is the task that Ujiie is now tackling in an intriguing managerial partnership which holds the key to Nomura’s future. Ujiie will rely heavily on the tough American Max Chapman, a former president and chief executive officer of Kidder Peabody, who has run Nomura in America since 1992.
Part of the reason for Ujiie’s promotion to the top of Nomura is that he was out of Japan during the two great corruption scandals of 1991 and 1997. Much of that time he spent in America, working in a Nomura office where the predominant ethic among the top American traders was of personal loyalty to Chapman and simmering discontent with backward Japanese management in Tokyo. Whatever the official titles might have said, no-one who worked at Nomura in America was Chapman’s boss. “We met more than 10 years ago and have worked a lot together side by side,” says Ujiie. “Now Nomura wants to use Max more.”
Now that Ujiie has reached the top of Nomura he has been quick to promote Chapman, appointing him as the first non-Japanese to sit on the firm’s key executive management committee where discussions now take place with simultaneous translation. Ujiie himself speaks fair English. Now Ujiie has allowed Chapman to fulfil a long-standing ambition to run all of Nomura’s international operations, in America and Europe. Chapman may have worried during the 1990s that, while the large American investment banks began to organize their businesses globally by product, rather than regionally, and came to dominate the business, Nomura’s structure was old-fashioned and obstructive. Now he is keen to get on with the task, not of copying Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley or Goldman Sachs, but of creating something different.
The great opportunity for Nomura is that, perhaps by pure good luck, the specific skills that have produced profits in London and New York – a blend of securitization and merchant banking – might have enormous application in Japan. “If you go out and build a great big secondary trading and sales operation, the opportunity for profits in and of itself is not great,” says Chapman. “The advantage is in particular products. So we go into markets like America and Europe where we have created businesses using local skills and combine that with Nomura’s other distinguishing characteristics: its capital, high credit rating and its strength in Japan.”
Nomura is keenly aware of the problems in the Japanese banking system. Most brokers are heavily reliant on bank finance and Nomura has been sufficiently alert to the risks of Japanese bank weakness to diversify its funding quietly over the past two years. Its overseas operations used to draw 80% to 90% of their credit lines from Japanese banks, now they are much more reliant on funding from local western banks. At home it has diversified, building relations with non-bank providers of credit including insurance companies and the central institutions of the credit unions and agricultural cooperatives. It has also become an active issuer of MTNs.
Now it sees an opportunity, as well as a risk, in the rotten loan portfolios of Japanese banks. “The problem of non-performing assets in the banking system has to be solved,” says Ujiie. “And just putting in public money is not the solution. We have to put in liquidity therefore securitization will be a big business.” Nomura’s American experts in commercial real estate securitization would find plenty of raw material in Japan to construct new securities to sell either in the US, or Japan.
Similarly, many Japanese companies face the drag of inefficient industrial investments producing very low returns. Again it is a problem that touches Nomura closely. Ujiie mentions that he is considering ways to unwind some of Nomura’s own strategic cross-shareholdings of equity in Japanese banks. If its Japanese corporate clients also embrace divestitures, these may provide opportunities for its experts in principal finance.
It all sounds great in theory, but Chapman may have some delicate work ahead, persuading senior members of quasi-independent units of Nomura that it is truly in their interests to reorganize so as to work more closely with the rest of the firm. Chapman acknowledges that investment banks are filled with egotistical and difficult-to-manage people. But the process is apparently under way. Chapman says: “PFG started as an asset business, taking assets and understanding their cashflows and financing those, and it then moved beyond that towards classic merchant banking. We are looking with Guy Hands (head of PFG) at taking that business and breaking it down into its key component skills.”
Chapman makes no pretence that such a strategy will make Nomura a direct competitor to the leading global investment banks. “We’re not going to go and hire 200 investment bankers, go and call on clients and try and become a classic relationship investment bank. We’re too late for that.” His ambition is simpler: “I have a strong incentive to produce profits.”
But Nomura is mindful of what other firms are doing and in particular of the potential for foreign investment banks to make inroads in Japan, following deregulation there. Merrill Lynch is picking up some 2,000 former Yamaichi employees with a view to creating a strong retail brokerage operation around 30 offices. Ujiie claims to welcome the development. He wants a new philosophy to underpin the retail business of servicing the huge personal financial assets which the ageing Japanese population, is accumulating.
Ujiie says: “In the past, most brokerage in Japan was very hard sell, commission-driven, pushing out product. I feel that is wrong. We want to have a more advisory-driven strategy. We want to understand the investment objectives of particular clients and help them create suitable portfolios. If we do that well, then client assets in our custody will increase and commission income will follow from later re-balancing of clients’ portfolios.” He adds: “I think Merrill Lynch will go the same way and it will probably help us to change the image of Japanese retail brokers, if we are not the only people in Japan working like that.” Peter Lee