A SUPPLEMENT TO EUROMONEY/FEBRUARY: MARKETS 1998
Emu is just three dinner parties away for one senior European banker. That doesn’t mean he has a barren social diary – his reference date for the single currency is not January 1 1999 but May 1 1998. That’s when countries to be included in phase one of European monetary and economic union will be announced, with bilateral exchange rates set two days later. Market participants reckon it’s the pivotal date in the Eurobond market calendar.
“One surprise of 1997 was that we didn’t see much growth in the market in euros,” says Mark Watson, managing director and head of Wxed-income syndicate at Salomon Smith Barney. “Cross-border Xows still aren’t happening to any great extent. But once we get clariWcation of Emu in black and white – who’s going to be in, and at what exchange rate – I think it will be a catalyst to the whole market.”
Last year Ecu Xows accounted for just 1.5% of the primary market. “For all the talk that we’ve seen in the last year, until such a time as every investor feels the need to buy and to hold euros rather than Deutschmarks, francs, lire or whatever, then that market is not going to explode. But at some point that explosion will come,” reckons Simon Meadows, global head of syndicate at Credit Suisse First Boston.
With May set to be a watershed in the Ecu/euro market, syndicate desks will be expecting to see more deals in the pipeline. Meadows points out that the market still hasn’t developed to a level where there is arbitrage that will get issuers immediately interested. As long as they can Wnd arbitrage in other European currencies, there is little motivation for tapping the Ecu market.
Such a negative outlook would seem to sit uncomfortably with the success that some of the high-proWle euro issues enjoyed in 1997. The Wrst European Investment Bank Ecu1 billion ($1.1 billion) issue was generally agreed to be a blow-out, and was increased after launch by a further Ecu300 million. This year there have already been two Ecu750 million issues – from Osterreichische Kontrollbank and Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten – for both of which there was good demand. But investors haven’t necessarily been buying Ecu-denominated, euro-fungible bonds as part of a strategic preparation for life after the single currency. They’ve been buying them because they’re cheap.
If the euro-fungible bond is simply considered a marketing tool, perhaps that doesn’t matter. As long as the bonds reach the target investor base, increasing awareness and understanding of the borrower’s credit, the investors’ motivation for buying the issue is irrelevant. The borrower is happy to give up a basis point or two to ensure that the issue realizes its aim.
But some reservations remain. “A key point is that the future euro market, which will be driven by credit spreads and liquidity, is going to have nothing to do with the historical Ecu market, which is now moribund,” argues Charles Berman, managing director of Wxed-income capital market at Salomon Smith Barney.
After January 1 1999, the Ecu will be replaced by the euro, and the Ecu Eurobond market will cease to exist. But the more salient point is that issuing an Ecu-denominated bond now will make no real diVerence to how a borrower fares in the single-currency market. The implication is that the most eYcient and successful means of targeting new European investors in the run-up to Emu remains issuing bonds in their preferred currencies, be they Deutschmarks, French francs or – to reach the broadest range of investors – dollars.
“Europe is going to end up with two single currencies: the euro and the us dollar,” suggests one banker. “At the moment, the dollar is the only currency that everyone is happy with. It’s the currency taking all the cross-border Xows.”
This was certainly the case in 1997, when the dollar’s market share grew to account for over half of all new issues. In stark contrast, the Deutschmark’s share dropped below 10%, even with the assistance of global Pfandbrief issues. For fund managers still holding a diverse portfolio of the separate European currencies, the diversiWcation of choice will continue to be dollars, at least as long as dollar yields remain comparatively high.
But at the same time as European fund managers are increasing their dollar holdings, interest in the euro from us fund managers is set to rise, as the single European currency becomes the liquid alternative to the dollar. “The amount of money coming into Europe from North America will explode,” forecasts Berman. “If portfolio managers are going to diversify out of dollars, they are now more likely to buy euros, even if they have never bought the existing European markets. There will be some great business to be done.”
If investors and issuers remain ambivalent on straightforward Ecu-to-euro deals, they appear more at ease with other euro-fungible transactions – those that are denominated in various European currencies but contain clauses deWning the terms of conversion into euros. The thinking behind these so-called parallel or tributary bonds is straightforward: after the third stage of Emu they will merge to form a single, liquid euro-denominated bond, and in so doing will unite a diverse group of investors into a single, pan-European investor base. The promise of future liquidity is seen as the key feature. Yet some suspect the logic is Xawed: “You create three smaller issues that are illiquid until Emu happens, and then wave a magic wand and make them liquid. But a bond is liquid from day one. You can’t make an illiquid bond liquid overnight,” argues Manfred Schepers, managing director, debt capital markets at sbc Warburg Dillon Reed.
Borrowers seem devoid of such reservations. January has been the most active month for euro-fungibles to date, including the Wrst asset-backed tributary bonds from Chase Credit Card Master Trust, and new tributary programmes from high-proWle French borrowers Caisse d’Amortissement de la Dette Sociale (Cades) and Caisse Centrale du Crédit Immobilier de France (3cif).
European sovereign issuers have been enthusiastic sponsors of the euro-fungible concept, conscious that after 1999 their domestic investors will be diversifying into other government markets. Both Spain and Austria issued Eurobonds that include mandatory conversion into generic treasury debt, and which are also strippable. During 1997, strips markets were also launched in the uk and Germany, and their relative success may have a signiWcant bearing on the structure of the European markets after Emu.
Rather than issue parallel bonds in the Euromarket, Belgium issued domestic olos denominated in French francs and Deutschmarks containing similar fungibility provisions. Not only did this achieve the diversiWcation of investors that is the aim of any parallel Eurobond, it also acquainted investors with the workings of the Belgian domestic market, and, on the Deutschmark tranche, provided Belgium with a much better price than it would have achieved in the Eurobond market.
Despite the moves being made by the smaller sovereigns to ensure that they won’t be marginalized in the pan-European debt market, intermediaries are still uncertain about the eventual structure of the government market. “One issue that is still unclear is how governments will issue debt in the future. What dealer structure will they employ? Will they still have primary dealers, and if so, what exactly will that mean? These questions will become increasingly important as we move towards 1999,” says Cyrus Ardalan, global co-head of bonds at Paribas.
There are few remaining opportunities in the core European government bond markets. The convergence game that has kept investors occupied for the past three years is now played out. Only at the short end of the Italian curve is there any sign of value, perhaps an indication that some people still can’t take on board the strides that Italy made towards qualifying for Emu during 1997.
If they are looking for pick-up from European sovereigns, apart from the uk government bond market, investors will have to look further east in 1998. Greece and Poland appear particularly attractive, with the more adventurous venturing into Hungary, Russia and the Czech Republic.
While governments are working on adapting their borrowing strategies for the single currency, other issuers are being short-sighted, suggests Anders Bergendahl, managing director and co-head of global debt capital markets at Merrill Lynch. “The sovereigns and supranationals have thought it through carefully, and I also think that the continental banks have gone a long way in their preparation. What I do worry about is the corporates. I think some have not taken this seriously.”
German corporate Siemens would appear to be an exception. Last year it returned to the public debt markets for the Wrst time in 25 years, with a three tranche, euro-fungible deal. Although some people suggest that the deal was more about making a splash in the market than astute treasury management, at least it showed that Siemens was taking Emu seriously. What many smaller borrowers are ignoring is the fact that in the future they will need to appeal to investors beyond their own domestic markets. “Going down to the second and third tier of issuers, I think that they’ve done too little to educate investors in other countries as to who they are. The education process is one that many issuers have underestimated,” says Bergendahl.
A good example is the German banking sector. Picking out the diVerences between the banks in terms of their underlying structure has always been a complicated task, not something that investors are overly keen to undertake. But it is the nuances of structure that will matter in future. If issuers fail to diVerentiate themselves to prospective investors, they will inevitably be lumped in with their perceived peers, whether they like it or not.
Although participants seem to agree on the direction that the market should be taking, there is more uncertainty over the speed at which progress will be made. “It is going to be a year of many unknowns,” suggests Paribas’ Ardalan.
At the top of that list is Asia. Beyond saying that the problem is not going to disappear overnight, no-one is making any predictions on exactly how the Asian crisis will be played out in the bond markets over the course of the year. What is certain is that European borrowers will be less able to insulate themselves from such sequences of events in future.
“During the Asian crisis, all the big borrowers were able to go back to their domestic markets and fund at much better levels. After monetary union they will not be able to do that,” points out Christian Wait, managing director and head of European Wxed-income syndicate at Lehman Brothers. “While there will be greater liquidity after the euro, a large homogenous credit market will be far more susceptible to global event risk.”
But the Asian crisis has contributed to what one participant calls “a tremendously good backdrop” for the Eurobond market in 1998: low absolute interest rates with receding likelihood of inXationary pressure, and reasonably stable economies with slow growth characteristics.
The fourth-quarter widening in credit spreads also met with approval from many in the market. “In the long term recent spread widening in the credit markets will be viewed as positive,” says Paul Richards, managing director of European syndicate at Merrill Lynch. “It has been a sharp reminder to traders, investors, issuers and underwriters that markets are dynamic and credit spreads are not always a one-way bet.”
The spread-widening appears to have caused only a momentary blip in the new-issue calendar. The pent-up supply from the fourth quarter has Xooded into the market in the early weeks of 1998, often without due consideration. “The quality of some pricing and execution has been poor,” agrees Richards. “This has led to increased inventory levels among dealers which has added to the pressure on spreads. We are likely to see a period of consolidation, and then see real money Xow back to the marketplace. At this stage, properly negotiated and priced transactions will bring a degree of stability to the market.”
Banking consolidation is also set to continue, with Europe expected to be the focus of merger activity. By the year-end there may be fewer banks in the game, but the competition will be tougher than ever. “The aggressive guys are seeing the end in sight, one way or another. They’re not going to give up now, because they know that if they’re not up there at the end of 1998, then they’re going to struggle,” says Meadows at Credit Suisse First Boston.
When the real money does return to the market, where will it go? Liquidity has already proved to be a more pressing concern in 1998, with the $4 billion global benchmark note from Fannie Mae setting a new standard. It’s a trend that can be expected to continue, with the major borrowers coming out with fewer, larger trades.
It also seems that the European credit market is set to extend beyond its traditional 10 years-and-in range. “The smart money will all want to be invested in the long-duration, back-end of the curve. We are seeing very strong demand for 30-year maturities in France and Germany, and anticipate the development of a credit market out past 10 years in French francs and Deutschmarks. At the moment there are only a handful of non-government issues [at that point] in each curve,” says Lehman’s Wait.
Two sectors of the market that continued to grow well in 1997 were asset-backed issues and subordinated debt. Further expansion is expected in both in 1998, as banks become increasingly conscious of regulatory capital levels and the new mantra of shareholder value.
“Bank capital will be one of the biggest-growth asset classes in 1998, speciWcally here in Europe,” suggests Wait. “Banks will be looking to get tier 1 capital on a cost-eVective basis, and the challenge will be to Wnd structures that simultaneously satisfy both regulatory requirements and investors’ criteria.” The continuing Xow of subordinated debt from Japan will add to volumes, especially in the run-up to the end of the Wnancial year on March 31.
Although spreads on European asset-backed issues have narrowed dramatically over the last couple of years, they continue to oVer investors yield pick-up over other triple a and double a rated bonds, a situation that aVected the frn market in the second half of 1997. More asset-backed issues beyond the dollar sector can be expected in 1998, as well as increased demand for lower-rated tranches from European investors. “In the past European investors were largely interested only in the triple a pieces, with b pieces gravitating towards the us,” says Richards at Merrill Lynch. “Currently, the European investor is a far more aggressive buyer of b pieces.”
This trend in the asset-backed market supports the consensus view that in the market after Emu, happiness will begin with a c. Credit, in its many guises, will be the name of the game.
There is general agreement over how the euro-denominated bond market will eventually operate: a lot like the domestic us bond market. But it has a lot of catching up to do. One analyst suggests that Europe is as much as 20 years behind the us in the development of a corporate bond market. If the us bond market can be considered to have reached maturity, the Eurobond market is just entering adolescence, potentially the most troublesome and uncertain years of its life.
“Historically, if you are a triple a credit and you want to borrow, especially out to Wve years, you come to Europe. If you are a single a credit you go to the us, particularly for longer maturities, where the triple a/single a curve is much Xatter,” says Paul Hearn, head of European debt syndicate at jp Morgan.
The us bond market is dominated by lower-rated investment-grade credits but in Europe triple a and double a rated borrowers still account for well over half of all issuance. It’s a situation that’s expected to alter quite dramatically after Emu as the spread diVerential between credits in Europe narrows. That started to happen during 1997, and despite some spread widening as a result of the fallout from Asia, at the beginning of January the spread diVerential between triple a and single a credits in the 10-year sector stood at 27 basis points, well below the 44bp average for the past three years, according to Lehman Brothers.
During that time, fund managers have generally made their money through the convergence of European interest rates. The big decisions used to be the relative asset allocations for the various European currencies, dollars and yen. DiVerentiating between credits other than through the rating awarded by an agency was just a passing concern.
But putting 11 European currencies into one removes many of these asset-allocation decisions. The money managers are going to have a lot of spare time on their hands. From the intermediaries the message is clear: the best way to use this time will be in developing credit expertise. That, after all, is what the intermediaries themselves are doing.
At Paribas, the credit research department has grown from virtually nothing a year ago to over a dozen people today. However, Paribas’ Ardalan is not persuaded that simply having the bodies in place necessarily amounts to having the right product: “In Europe we are still at an early stage in the development of a sophisticated credit-research product. People are still grappling with how to structure the business.”
That suggests that in credit research, as in so much else, us investment banks will enjoy a signiWcant headstart. “The biggest import to Europe from the us is research and relative-value analysis,” says Lehman’s Wait. “Investors want more research along the lines of the fundamental credit research which they get in the us Wxed-income and equity markets. That is what is going to create the foundation for relative-value spread trading in the euro marketplace.”
At Merrill Lynch’s London oYces, lost souls seeking the credit-research department are directed to salvation by a piece of paper stuck to a partition wall. It is evidence of the haste with which the bank has expanded its European research capabilities. Even though it has been focused on credit for a number of years, its research department has grown from four to 11 over the past 12 months.
Richard Deutsch, a Californian who heads the high-yield sector of the bank’s Wxed-income research department, has also noticed the gap between research capabilities on either side of the Atlantic: “Generally us and European practitioners [of credit research] diverge. Europeans still tend to see credit research as being devoted to the higher-grade sector of single a and triple b credits.” By contrast, in the us credit research is focused on adding value through analyzing true high-yield issuers.
The emergence of a European high-yield market was one of the biggest surprises of 1997. Although some participants question whether a collection of less than a dozen issues really constitutes a market, few doubt the sector is set to grow.
During the year it was helped by the popularity of emerging-market debt. Investors who were happy to buy a double b or single b rated emerging-market sovereign became aware of similar opportunities to pick up yield in the European corporate market. Now that the emerging markets appear closed until further notice, the European high-yield sector could again be the beneWciary.
“What European investors want right now is something they can touch, and see, and feel,” says Timothy Grell, managing director of Merrill Lynch’s European leveraged-Wnance group. That means corporates based in Europe, producing products that the investors recognize and can understand. Telecommunications is the sector expected to provide the initial impetus for this in 1998.
Another factor assisting the growth of the high-yield market is investors’ tendency to shop at either end of the credit spectrum. “At the moment investors are buying either triple a or asset-backed securities, or they’re going to the other extreme and buying double b,” says one banker. “It is a lot easier for the uninitiated to see the diVerence between the balance sheet of a triple a and a double b credit than between a single, double, and triple a.” While participants expect high-yield market volumes to increase at least fourfold during 1998, expansion of the lower-level investment-grade market is expected to be more modest.
But as the spread between investment-grade credits compresses, investors wanting to Wnd yield will need to diVerentiate between the tightly packed bands of issuers in order to locate relative value. “The book is not closed on how to do credit analysis,” says Salomon Smith Barney’s Berman. “People are going to have diVerent views and approaches, and investors are not going to be satisWed with taking the views of the ratings agencies at face value.”
Among the as yet undiscovered aspects of Emu is the identity of Europe’s future benchmark. The most popular candidate among bankers seems to be the euro swap curve. But equally plausible is a combination of Germany and France, or Wtting a curve that includes all the relevant government bonds. Many doubt that an academic solution will prove workable, and that ultimately the choice will emerge from market trial and error. “It remains the great unknown, and will be so right up to January 1 1999,” says Schepers at sbc Warburg Dillon Read. “Perhaps if we haven’t resolved anything people will just use the Bund. That is not necessarily good for the markets. The ratio of German government debt to the rest of Europe is rather distorted. [Whatever the outcome] it will cause some interesting moments, and perhaps create some spread volatility.”
One unknown at the start of 1997 was where the soon-to-be euro capital market would be located. That is one question the markets have answered, at least according to Schepers: “Borrowers are going to be seeking to issue continuously, and every single credit is increasingly looking towards London for a solution for their funding problems.”
Abbey grasps new opportunities
Alexander Braun, director of funding and asset management at UK bank Abbey National, is expecting investors’ preferences to change in 1998. “Last year investors wanted smaller deals that are going to perform. This year we’re already seeing investors seeking a liquidity premium, and after May that is going to accelerate.”
The bank borrowed just over $7.5 billion in the Eurobond market last year, and is expecting to issue a similar amount in 1998. Braun says there were two real highlights of last year’s borrowing: “The first was that we finally cracked the Swiss market. In the past we’ve never been able to do anything in any real size, but last year one of our Swiss franc deals was increased three times.” Abbey ended up issuing a total of Sfr900 million ($600 million).
“The other key development was the first time we have been able to access the Japanese domestic retail market,” says Braun. “A change in regulations allowed us to issue, and we were the first UK bank into the market, with a ¥20 billion [$155,000,000] uridashi through Nomura.”
Japan is a market that Abbey will continue to tap in 1998. Traditionally the exclusive territory of sovereign-related borrowers, the Japanese domestic market is becoming increasingly open to others. “I’ve always been a great believer in competition,” comments Braun, especially when Abbey is the newcomer, taking market share from the established borrowers.
Inevitably, plans for 1998 centre on the imminent adoption of the euro. Braun points to the success that Abbey has enjoyed in the French franc market as evidence of its ability to target continental European investors successfully. The bank’s CD programme now has over Ffr30 billion ($4.9 billion) outstanding, and through comprehensive marketing Abbey has managed to turn the Eurofranc market into one of its most important investor bases.
But from next year, core European markets such as Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium will become viable destinations for Abbey National bonds. “Suddenly the restrictions are going to disappear, and we’ve already started targeting these people,” says Braun.
Quite which intermediaries Abbey will be dealing with in those markets remains unclear. “Some of the smaller players will no longer be able to compete in their own domestic markets,” suggests Braun, although he feels that in countries such as Italy, sizeable niche markets will continue to exist. “But investors aren’t going to differentiate between a domestic bank they’ve dealt with for decades and an international bank they haven’t,” he continues. “All they’ll be interested in is who’s got the product and at what price.”
Argentina shakes off Asian worries
This year, Argentina looks set to maintain its position as the pre-eminent emerging-market borrower. “We have set a target of borrowing $8 billion in the international markets and $5 billion locally,” says Frederico Molina, director of the bureau of national public credit.
Of that borrowing programme, $2.5 billion was pre-funded at the end of 1997. A $2 billion syndicated loan through local banks followed a $500 million, fixed-rate yankee bond issued through Merrill Lynch at the beginning of December. That deal was the first from the republic to use a Dutch-auction procedure for setting future coupons. The 375 basis point spread over treasuries will be reset in May and November this year and annually thereafter. The result is that the notes will have the volatility of a five-year treasury rather than an emerging-markets issue, but it will retain the spread of an emerging-market bond.
It was a brave decision in a market still suffering from Asian flu. Of the structure, Molina says: “It seemed appropriate at that moment. We could pre-finance some of 1998 requirement at a rate not set on the basis of the spread prevailing [in the market]. And the level of [US] treasuries was also attractive.”
Argentina was the first emerging-market borrower to return to the Eurobond market after the Asian crisis sent spreads reeling, with a L300 billion ($167 million) deal in late November. It was also first into the markets this year, with a debut issue in Ecu. The Ecu400 million ($435 million) deal indicates that it intends to maintain its innovative approach to the markets. “We have been thinking of issuing in ecus for some time,” says Molina. “Our surveys found strong interest in the market and we feel it is important to be present in that market, as we are a frequent issuer in the currencies that will be replaced in 1999.” Similar market surveys carried out earlier in January dissuaded the republic from its idea of issuing in US dollars.
Of the Asian crisis, Molina dryly observes: “It does make our life a little difficult. I don’t know how it will end up, but in the short term, perhaps for the first quarter, we may have pay a bit more.”
One issue set for imminent resolution is the selection of a bank to act as technical adviser on managing the republic’s $100 billion public debt. The contenders are Merrill Lynch, Salomon Smith Barney, Citibank, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan and Swiss Bank Corp.
Karsenti keeps his sights on Emu
“It is quite an opportunity to be in charge of the treasury and funding at such an institution [as the EIB] in this period,” says René Karsenti, director general of finance at the European Investment Bank. Last year, the bank achieved its aim of being the largest non-government issuer in Europe and went a long way towards the goal of establishing itself as a benchmark issuer in euros.
The bank issued $6.75 billion-worth of euro-fungible instruments through its so-called euro-tributary issues – notes denominated in various European currencies which will consolidate into a single, liquid euro issue after January 1 1999 – and its Ecu-denominated, euro-river notes.
However, Karsenti denies that the bank is seeking to become the benchmark issuer in euros. “What the benchmark will be is the big question. I think the market will decide on that. But there won’t necessarily be one benchmark. There are two or three major government borrowers, and we will look to provide a complementary benchmark.” He believes that for these very high quality issues differences in pricing will be justified by liquidity. This year the EIB will seek to include in its borrowing programme two features designed to enhance liquidity: strippable bonds and issues eligible for delivery into futures contracts.
In 1997 the bank borrowed a total of Ecu23 billion ($25 billion), compared with 1996’s Ecu18.5 billion, and Karsenti expects this to increase to around Ecu25 billion in 1998.
The year certainly got off to a flying start, with the bank issuing nearly $3 billion equivalent in the first two weeks of January. “Some front-loading [of funds] has been helpful to us over the past two years,” says Karsenti. “I’m not saying history repeats itself, but we take a very pragmatic approach to the markets, and if they are favourable, we will issue.”
The bank also delayed around Ecu1 billion of funding from December of last year, a ploy made possible by its strategy of partly delinking funding from disbursements. As a result, Karsenti says, the EIB achieved a much better cost of funds than those on offer late last year.
In 1998 the bank will continue to diversify its funding into currencies outside the euro, its local-market MTN programmes being a prominent tool. It will also be seeking to extend the geographic range of its investor base, with distribution of Eurobonds to us and Asian investors a particular target.
But in Karsenti’s diary, May 1 is looming large as the year’s most significant date. “It is an important deadline for our strategy,” he says of the date that qualifying members of Emu are chosen. “We will be fine-tuning our strategy as we move closer to May.” He expects to see a significant shift of investors’ funds into euros, and that will be reflected in the bank issuing a higher proportion of Ecu-denominated debt after May. As he observes: “It is going to be a historically fascinating year.”
Stalled Toyota plans its recovery
Some issuers have been punished by the Asian crisis more than others. Some have suffered deservedly, while others endure guilt by association. Toyota Motor Credit Corp (TMCC) claims to be one of the more innocent sufferers. Despite being incorporated in the US, spreads on its bonds have widened significantly. “Because of the Toyota name our bonds have suffered a bit in the market. That’s something we have to live with,” says Jean Liao, funding manager at TMCC. “Given the current state of the market we realize that we can’t stick to our traditional targets,” she adds. “We need to be more flexible than we have been in the past.”
Toyota did manage to come to the market with a Sfr1 billion ($671 million) deal on January 5. That accounted for most of the funding that it had put on hold in the last quarter of 1997. “We did a large Swiss franc issue at the end of last year which went very well,” explains Liao. “We wanted to try to build a yield curve, so we went out a little further.” Maturity of current and past deal?
With at least $6 billion of funding to raise in 1998, TMCC is considering carrying out a strategic euro transaction. It is also hoping to expand its asset-backed issuance into Europe. Two deals are planned, with the possibility of a first non-dollar transaction.
But for Liao, 1998 definitely has a focal point: “The real excitement is that we’re looking at a global dollar bond for the first time.” Toyota has traditionally tapped the retail investor base for much of its funding, but in recent years, growing funding needs have brought more focus on institutional investors. A global transaction is the logical progression from the TMCC Euro-Asian bonds, and will offer the chance to access the us investor base. Last year Toyota found pricing far more attractive outside the US market, and only 10% of its issues flowed into US accounts. Liao hopes to see that change: “This year we’re looking to target the US investor base and make them familiar with our name,”
she says.
World Bank’s flexible strategy
Three years ago who would have suggested that by 1997 the World Bank would be issuing more Italian lire than US dollars and more South African rand than Deutschmarks? But that is exactly what happened last year, indicating the extent to which the bank has developed a funding strategy that is both flexible and opportunistic.
“In 1996 we decided to move away from the structure of having a rigid, fiscal-year funding programme, because it imposed artificial deadlines that hurt our ability to respond to market opportunities,” says Gumersindo Oliveros, senior manager of capital-markets operations at the World Bank. Instead, the bank installed a rolling funding programme, allowing it to issue and build up liquidity when the market offered the most attractive levels.
What the market offered in 1997 certainly found favour with Oliveros: “We saw a very strong bid for our securities and increased our funding programme to about $18 billion, delivering what was probably the most cost-effective funding programme for the Bank in years, despite its larger size,” he says.
One result of this explicitly opportunistic strategy is that the bank has no definite funding targets for the year ahead. However, Oliveros suggests that 1998 may see a different style of borrowing from the bank.
“Investor focus has clearly changed as a result of the Asian crisis,” he says. “Spreads of lower-rated credits have widened out and there is greater emphasis on liquidity and credit quality. We are picking up on this and in the last couple of months we did two large dollar deals. If this trend continues we will do more and explore new options to meet investors’ liquidity objectives.”
Liquidity is certainly the key concern of European investors at the moment. So it is perhaps surprising that the bank has yet to issue some form of euro benchmark. Oliveros counters that the World Bank’s low profile in the Emu-driven market does not reflect a lack of preparation for the single currency. Rather, he believes that the concept of a euro-fungible issue is flawed from the point of view of both liquidity and spread. “Our strategic positioning versus the euro has focused instead on making sure that the potential euro-investor pools are well covered, using the best bid instruments,” says Oliveros. In 1997 that approach meant placing nearly two-thirds of the World Bank’s bonds with investors that it reckoned would be buyers of euros after 1999.
In recent years, the bank has become the pre-eminent issuer of retail-targeted issues in high-yielding currencies such as the rand, Czech koruna and lira. But Oliveros says that this approach is simply a response to pervading market climate, rather than a clear issuing strategy: “If next year the market tilts back to institutional issuance it would just go to show that in our business everything comes in cycles. The key is to be prepared to change to best suit your client needs.”
Fannie Mae eyes new global benchmarks
Fannie Mae has set itself a hard act to follow in 1998. On the way to raising $84 billion in long-term funding last year, it completed a succession of headline-grabbing global bond issues in new currency sectors.
But the US agency clearly knows a thing or two about encores. It has started 1998 with the launch of a new global benchmark note programme that could raise Fannie Mae as much as $40 billion in fixed-rate funding each year. The inaugural deal was a $4 billion note that came to the market in early January, yielding 19 basis points over five-year treasuries. Even in the tricky market conditions, it tightened by 2bp in the week after issue. With the notes being strippable, and offered on a regular basis, Fannie Mae is clearly looking to establish itself as a US government surrogate. At a time of falling sovereign debt issuance, with jittery investors focusing on liquidity and credit quality, the launch of the funding programme could not have been better timed. As Linda Knight, Fannie Mae’s treasurer, observes: “One of the ways that Fannie Mae is benefiting from the current market turmoil is that investors have confidence in our rating and our credit story.”
Knight is clearly satisfied with last year’s performance in the international bond market. “Nineteen ninety-seven will go down as a very significant year,” she says. “The idea was definitely in our mind at the start of the year to broaden our ability to fund outside of dollars, but we had no particular targets.” The agency ended up with debut global bonds in sterling, New Zealand, Australian and Hong Kong dollars, as well as revisiting the yen global market.
“From a personal point of view, I think the sterling was the most satisfying deal,” says Knight. “Firstly we were the first issuer of a global bond in sterling. Secondly, it required a lot of very good work between the bankers involved, the regulators and ourselves. And thirdly, the demand that we saw was terrific – by the end it was close to $2 billion equivalent.”
Other currencies rumoured to be in Fannie Mae’s global pipeline last year were French francs and Italian lire. Knight says that the agency looked at both currencies last year. In the franc market she found that the preferred maturities that will swap back to dollars did not match Fannie Mae’s mortgage portfolio. In lira, the problem was a mixture of regulatory and tax issues, as well as a lack of enthusiasm for registered securities among the predominantly retail investor base. But Knight remains optimistic for 1998: “We are still actively talking with our lawyers and accountants about French franc and lira, and at some point in the future I’m sure that it will all come together.”
Fannie Mae is also keeping a close eye on the developing market in euros, and Knight says that the agency is “waiting for an opportunity to come our way”. However, this is unlikely to be in the form of a parallel bond issue. “We were shown a number of those during 1997 but passed on them. It is difficult to issue two very well received securities in diffperent currencies at the same time. We were not sure that the benefit of ultimate liquidity when the two issues merge is as large to the investor as the benefit from our ability to over large and liquid global issues.”
General Motors move closer to Europe
General Motors Acceptance Corp (GMAC) started 1998 with a bang. Its $2 billion global bond carried both a five- and a 10-year tranche and was the first fixed-rate global to use a version of the us pot system of bond allocation. It came as a shock to some of the more traditional European syndicate desks. The co-managers had to apply to take bonds out of a limited pool, revealing the name of their investor as they did so. It helped GMAC to access the highest-quality accounts.
David Walker, director of liability management, says that GMAC decided to go ahead with the deal despite the continuing uncertainty in the markets. “I think we’re already seeing that 1998 will be a more volatile year than 1997,” he says. There was therefore no logic in delaying the issue. “We have a heavy schedule of maturities in the first half of the year,” explains Walker. “We saw the opportunity to fund fixed rate, where we haven’t been active since our $1 billion global
last year.”
Walker is expecting that 1998 will be a fairly generic year for General Motors’ funding. If it follows last year’s borrowing pattern that will mean issues from its Australian, Belgian and Canadian%