Government debt: A cosmetic collateral solution

The ECB’s reprieve doesn’t solve the underlying problems surrounding European government debt.

There was some relief but little surprise for bond markets on March 25 when European Central Bank president Jean-Claude Trichet announced that the central bank wouldn’t be restoring pre-crisis minimum collateral rules. That would have required a minimum credit rating of A3 from Moody’s and BBB+ by Standard & Poor’s to qualify as eligible collateral for the ECB’s repo facility.

It was an issue Greek bondholders had sought to clarify because Moody’s had effectively become the sole arbiter of Greece’s ability to fund itself in the bond markets, because it held the final card that kept Greece’s debt eligible when the threshold changes next January. The big risk was that should Greece fail to meet Moody’s expectations in implementing its austerity plan the agency would cut the rating below A3. The result would be catastrophic for Greece and its banking system.

Moody’s said it couldn’t envisage the ECB raising the threshold while Greece’s credit rating remained on such shaky ground. The rhetoric from central bankers, however, suggested something different. In late February ECB member José Manuel González-Páramo said it was unthinkable to change the rules to solve the specific problems of any individual country or bank.

This was clearly just posturing as politicians held Greece’s feet to the fire to get fiscal concessions they were seeking. With Germany and France having now agreed to provide a funding back-stop to Greece (with some IMF assistance) there is now a consensus among European governments and the ECB to maintain financial stability in the region. In the short term, this should mean Greece is able to negotiate its refinancing hump where it needs to raise €16 billion by the end of May.

Nevertheless, keeping the collateral threshold lower is still only a cosmetic solution and doesn’t address a more fundamental concern: the over-reliance on credit ratings. As Goldman Sachs argues, the present non-credible nuclear threat of losing eligibility altogether needs to be replaced with a credible ‘’conventional army’’ option that imposes incremental pain on fiscal sinners without ever pushing a sovereign EU state to the edge of the cliff.

The ECB has sought to address this by announcing a sliding scale of haircuts on collateral, which penalizes the fiscally weak. Yet they are still based on credit ratings. It is argued that a system whereby a broad set of measures, with ratings agencies only a complement to a more facts-based assessment, should be used. More specifically, the scale determining the size of the haircuts could combine the average rating of the three big ratings agencies and the ECB’s own assessment, based on a set of transparent indicators. That could produce a key index number, which would be pared back using a haircut.

This would be a fairer system for two reasons. First, it removes the outcome whereby a ratings agency could theoretically push a sovereign over the eligibility cliff, and the ECB wouldn’t encourage abnormally low spreads for less creditworthy sovereigns during more normal times when the haircuts were uniform. The ECB has tweaked at the edges. A more radical reform is needed.