RMBS: Securitization stuffs the seniors – again

Senior RMBS bondholders will pay the price from US mortgage chaos.

Of all the unintended consequences of the chaos in the US mortgage markets, the impact on RMBS noteholders of stalled foreclosure proceedings might be the most perverse.

Each mortgage securitization is established using a pooling and servicing agreement (PSA). This sets out the rules under which the mortgages in the pool are serviced and directs cashflows into the structure to a reserve account. These monies are then distributed to bondholders in line with the waterfall laid out in the prospectus until such time as the mortgage trust structure is dissolved – for example, through foreclosure on the assets in the pool.

So far, so straightforward. When the deal is in trouble and the mortgages in the pool are in default the lender forecloses, the transaction is unwound and cash is distributed to bondholders, with the junior noteholders taking the first hit. But what happens when widespread abuse in servicing practices is discovered and foreclosure procedures are stalled and challenged in court? Then things start to get rather complicated.

The impact of the recent challenges to many foreclosure proceedings on the securitization transactions that are backed by the mortgages in default is essentially to leave them in limbo. The mortgage payments are not being made, the assets are in default but cannot be foreclosed upon so the transaction cannot be wound up. As long as the mortgage trust remains in this state it is required to continue disbursing funds to all bondholders from the reserve account. The result? Junior bondholders, who would likely be wiped out if foreclosures had gone ahead and cash had been trapped are now happily getting paid for the foreseeable future and senior bondholders, who should have seen their position protected by the juniors taking the first loss, have to watch the reserve account being depleted by continued payment to the otherwise underwater juniors.

Moody’s reckons that an 18-month delay in foreclosure can result in the net present value (NPV) of the triple-A tranche falling from 72% to 65% and the NPV of the triple-B tranche rising from 2% to 5%.

This is not the first time that triple-A noteholders have been shortchanged as a result of the meltdown in securitization. Buyers of super-senior and triple-A securitized paper have seen their purportedly risk-free investments collapse before their eyes time and time again. But for the foreclosure scandal in the US to now result in not only a hit to the senior but a corresponding benefit to the junior investors – who received a healthy premium to bear the cost of the deal going wrong – might be the tipping point for all-out tranche warfare across the RMBS space. You have been warned.

see also:

Securitization: Mortgage banks hit by putback time bomb
Securitization under question?

Editorial: US mortgage mess hits government credibility
US foreclosures: Between a rock and hard place