Relations with the US reach a new low

September is a popular time for international get-togethers. Near the end of the month there was a small one in New York, organized by the Brazilian/American Chamber of Commerce. It took place while the IMF/World Bank meetings were still under way in Dubai, shortly before the opening of the UN General Assembly, and a week after the collapse of the World Trade Organization talks in Cancún.

Zoellick and Rodrigues: a schism has developed over the issue of agricultural trade barriers

September is a popular time for international get-togethers. Near the end of the month there was a small one in New York, organized by the Brazilian/American Chamber of Commerce. It took place while the IMF/World Bank meetings were still under way in Dubai, shortly before the opening of the UN General Assembly, and a week after the collapse of the World Trade Organization talks in Cancún.

Robert Zoellick, the US trade representative, had just published an article blaming Brazil for the failure of the WTO negotiations, and most of the delegates at the Sheraton Hotel in New York feared that relations between Brazil and the US – the co-chairs of the talks on a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) – had reached a low point.

US assistant secretary of commerce William Lash couldn’t make the conference, so he sent Eric Stewart, his deputy. Stewart was extremely upbeat, characterizing the US-Brazil relationship as “very, very positive”, and talking about a possible future development which, he said, “could double the trade with the US”.

Brazil is an agricultural powerhouse, and even a small reduction in subsidies to US farmers or lower tariffs on Brazilian exports such as sugar cane, oranges, soybeans, coffee and beef could boost Brazil’s trade with the US. Agricultural subsidies had never reached the negotiating table in Cancún, so everybody was interested in what Stewart had to say on the subject.

But Stewart said nothing about it at all. Instead, the object of his optimism was digital television, or DTV. “We don’t make televisions in the US,” he said, “and we hope the Brazilians will help build that market.”

The comment suggests that large parts of the US administration simply don’t understand what happened in Cancún. The emergence of the G22, led by big agricultural exporters such as Brazil, India and China, prompted World Bank president James Wolfensohn to hail “a new paradigm of global financial relations for the 21st century”.

In Dubai, the big number on everyone’s lips was $300 billion – the annual value of OECD countries’ subsidies to their own farmers being six times their aid budgets – and the potential for full and fair liberalization of world trade to raise 300 million people out of poverty by 2015. For now, though, it seems that the US hasn’t got the message.

“The US is becoming more and more isolated,” says Riordan Roett, director of the western hemisphere department at Johns Hopkins University. Roett notes that at the UN General Assembly French president Jacques Chirac largely endorsed Brazilian president Lula’s ideas about using the G22 to reduce global poverty and hunger through trade negotiations.

Argument for peace Roberto Rodrigues, Brazil’s minister of agriculture says: “We have to open agricultural markets in rich countries to developing countries because it’s the only way to get democracy and peace in the world.”

And on a purely economic level, says Paulo Leme, head of emerging markets research at Goldman Sachs: “Economics is all about present value, and Brazil cannot afford the present value of three years gone without any progress on trade negotiations.”

But that seems to be the upshot of Cancún, which Donna Hrinak, the US ambassador to Brazil, says “offered a once-in-a-generation opportunity to bring down world trade barriers”. Hrinak is still optimistic in public, but it’s hard to see why.

A large part of the problem is that the US is still adamant that agricultural issues should be dealt with at the WTO level and not at the FTAA level – if the WTO has collapsed for the foreseeable future, it’s clear that the FTAA is going nowhere.

“If the US thinks they can keep agriculture on the back-burner, there’s not going to be any progress,” says Leme. “Brazil is going to play hardball, and without agriculture there’s no game.”

Meanwhile, Zoellick – who until Cancún was Brazil’s best friend in the White House, – has now turned on Brazil as the leader of the rebel countries in Cancún. Zoellick has grouped the world into “can-do” and “can’t-do” countries, with Brazil firmly in the latter camp. The US will negotiate bilaterally with the former, and leave the rest to stew in their political rhetoric.

“You have conflicting stories about whether Brazil was really the bad guy, and whether they were serious about negotiating,” says Kimberly Elliott, a research fellow at the Center for Global Development. “Zoellick is clearly putting Brazil in the bad-guy camp, and is blaming them for the breakdown.”

The Brazilians are furious at being blamed, since, they point out, the talks collapsed before agricultural negotiations could even begin.

Mutual anger Either way, Brazil and the US now have to chair a ministerial meeting of the FTAA in Miami in November, and no-one seems hopeful that anything much can be achieved there. The US is angry at Brazil and Brazil is angry at the US for bringing agricultural proposals to Cancún that didn’t even go as far as those the US had already agreed at Doha.

“Brazil is a can-do country, but it can only enter into negotiations with a country that is among the willing,” says Columbia University professor and former World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz. “You can’t negotiate an agreement with a country that doesn’t live up to prior agreements.”

So the key task in Miami, if there is to be any hope for the FTAA, is for the US and Brazil to make friends again and start working with, instead of against, each other. “How much can we count on trade as an engine of growth? It depends on how much we react to Cancún,” says Hrinak. “There’s a danger on all sides of allowing our rhetoric to overwhelm our trade policy.”

Certainly, there seems to be no hope for a substantial hemispheric free trade area by the 2005 deadline, especially with US presidential electioneering already well under way and the WTO talks in tatters.

The question is whether, in the longer term, the US is going to come around to the new reality of a WTO where developing agricultural countries play an important role in negotiations. For that to happen, some ingrained attitudes of such senior officials as Eric Stewart will have to undergo substantial revision.