BIS: A time for unity

The IFC’s response to the banking crisis in emerging Europe could offer guidance for those seeking a solution to Greece’s woes.

If there is one lesson in banking and finance that works in both bull and bear markets, it is to avoid the herd. Although it can be fun on the way up, when the markets come crashing down a stampede for the exits makes matters much more difficult to manage.

The slow burn surrounding Greece’s sovereign and bank debt crisis is a case in point. With the markets now seemingly in a rout and bonds trading at half their face value, there seems little evidence of an orderly market response. The spectre of a mass panic affecting all banks in Western Europe in the event of a Greek default is what frightens everyone. It was no surprise, at the end of June, to find the over-exposed French banks trying to push through a Brady-style maturity extension on Greek sovereign debt.

Vienna Initiative

And yet there is an example of banks having been cajoled into acting as one, forsaking their own narrow economic interests: the Vienna Initiative. Devised by Jyrki Koskelo at the International Finance Corporation two years ago, the initiative sought to find a way to stop all banks leaving Eastern Europe in one mad dash. The problem was that with more than half of Central and Eastern Europe’s banks owned by Western European institutions, the region was highly vulnerable to a mass withdrawal of bank funding. The lesson here was East Asia in 1998, where the initial currency collapses were made far worse by the huge amounts of Japanese bank lending subsequently pulled from the region.

The Vienna Initiative was an agreement by all the Western European banks operating in the region to maintain their funding to their Eastern European subsidiaries and not to pull back lines and liquidity. It was not in each bank’s individual economic interest to agree to such a measure. After all, if there was a scramble for the exit, each bank should have wanted to get there first. But sense prevailed. And it was agreed that what might have been a wise course for each bank individually would have been disastrous for them as a whole.

This spirit of unity and cooperation is needed once again, especially as regards the aftermath of any Greek debt restructuring or default. The actual mechanics of a default itself are manageable: it is the fear of contagion and mass panic in other markets that scares people the most.

Collective action clauses

Perhaps it is time for the Bank for International Settlements to make collective action clauses (CACs) mandatory for any bank operating internationally. These clauses are common in emerging market bond documentation as they outline what will happen in the event of a default. They are also likely to become mandatory for all European sovereign bonds issued after 2013. CACs clarify the rights and expectations of both creditors and borrowers. Most importantly they provide an orderly process, something that is sorely lacking in the debacle in periphery Europe.

These banking CACs could form part of the new regulations governing strategically important financial institutions (Sifis). And perhaps rather than be attached to individual bank facilities, they could form part of a general agreement that in the event of severe market disruption the banks would put the interests of the markets ahead of themselves.

The irony here is that the rules governing Sifis are being put together by the regulators of the G20. And they themselves cannot agree on what to do. If the regulators cannot come up with a way to work together, it is no wonder that the banks so often fail to do so.