Correspondent banking faces a costly and complex future

Not long ago, correspondent banking was as basic as finance got. These days it is compliance and cost-heavy and in the crosshairs of aggressive and powerful regulators. Little wonder that so many banks are exiting small or fragile markets – actions that help their bottom line but hinder efforts at financial inclusion.

Once upon a time, correspondent banking was as basic as the financial industry got. Its premise was – in many ways still is – extremely simple.

Correspondent banks are financial middlemen that act as go-betweens in cross-border transactions. Often on the large side and with a regional or global branch network, they act as conduits between usually smaller and more localized respondent banks that want to do business with each other but lack formal ties.

This business can involve pretty much anything finance related, from wire transfers and payment processing to settling trades by crediting or debiting accounts.

It makes the process, at least in theory, “fairly straightforward, given you don’t have as many counterparty banks as you have customers to deal with,” says Astyanax Kanakakis, chief executive and co-founder of Norbloc, a Swedish know-your-customer (KYC) specialist. “So it should be very efficient.”

Correspondent banks still abound, although the number is falling. The messaging platform Swift reckons the practice is core to the business of at least 3,700 banking groups worldwide. Swift itself is the largest network of correspondent banks, connecting 11,000 financial institutions in 200 countries and territories.

And it is big business. In a 2019 survey, the European Central Bank put the total value of payments processed daily by all correspondent banks in the 30-nation European Economic Area at €686 billion.

The margins are slim, but it is also highly sticky. Banks have anyway long seen it as a loss leader, a way of attracting other business from new clients in key markets.

Historically, correspondent banks relied on respondent banks to carry out all customer checks, including identifying the ultimate beneficial owners of assets, funds or vehicles. But as regulators clamped down on money laundering and terror financing, correspondent banks were forced to carry out financial due diligence not just on counterparty respondent banks but on all their customers too.

Sanctions then entered the fray in the 2010s, as the US used the dollar to weaponize its fight against rogue banks, corporates and states. Overnight, the industry changed.

Eric Young, Guidepost Solutions.jpg
Eric Young, Guidepost Solutions

Many correspondent banks once adopted what Eric Young, senior managing director at financial compliance and monitoring consultancy Guidepost Solutions in New York, calls a “kind of wilful blindness” to the actions of their customers’ customers.

“The price of a laissez-faire approach to correspondent banking is very high, to put it mildly,” he adds.

It can harm a bank’s reputation among its customer base and result in the payment of huge fines to increasingly aggressive and empowered regulators that see correspondent banking as “the next frontier when it comes to cross-border financial regulation and oversight,” notes Kanakakis.

The biggest fine so far was the $8.9 billion levied against BNP Paribas in 2014, after which the French bank decided to exit the business.

“That was them telling regulators: ‘We are taking correspondent banking risks seriously; we’re not even going to do business with third-party banks; we’re only going to clear US dollars for our subsidiaries and affiliates,’” says Young. “Other major banks have followed that approach.”

He knows what he’s talking about. A former chief compliance officer at RBS and global chief compliance officer at S&P Global Ratings, Young joined BNP Paribas Americas as chief compliance officer in 2015, six months after the record fine was handed down.

Cutting ties

Most banks tend not to exit the correspondent business completely. BNP Paribas still processes trades for respondent clients valued in euros. Many lenders have de-risked in recent months by cutting ties to Russia and retrenching from non-core markets.

The fines will continue to be handed down by increasingly proactive regulators. And the eyes of many in the financial compliance world will be on Danske Bank later this year.

In 2018, a trio of regulators including the US justice department and Denmark’s special crime unit, investigated the Danish lender for its involvement in a vast money-laundering scandal. Up to €200 billion, most of which originated in Russia and other former Soviet states, is alleged to have flowed through Danske’s tiny Estonia branch between 2007 and 2015.

The probe is still under way. Danske chief executive Carsten Egeriis said in July it was a “fair assumption” to expect it to be wrapped up by the end of 2022.

What is relevant here is the role played by three of the world’s largest lenders. Bank of America, Deutsche Bank and JPMorgan are all alleged to have acted as correspondent banks, providing Danske’s clients with a link to the US financial system.

JPMorgan reportedly severed its ties to Danske Bank Estonia in 2013 around concerns that transactions did not meet its anti-money laundering (AML) rules. Deutsche was fined €13.5 million in October 2020 by German prosecutors for failing to report suspected instances of money laundering in a timely manner.

Cases like these keep bank chiefs up at night and cause them to question why they’re in the business at all. Young says plenty of financial institutions “cannot afford the cost of doing correspondent banking for third parties.”

Some banks have left or are looking to leave the business, although many continue to take this vital gate-keeping process seriously.

“Typically, these are banks with large international operations and which stand to lose the most if something goes wrong,” notes Kanakakis.

Their annual spend on compliance and AML screening is consequently high and rising all the time.

Many others cannot justify the rising cost of compliance. It is one thing to adhere to every rule imposed directly on them by regulators, quite another to monitor the actions of every financial institution with which they do business.

Billions of transactions worth trillions of dollars wash through the global banking system each day, so spotting any illicit trade can be like “finding that needle in the haystack for some institutions,” says Young.

Fail to do so, however, and you face the wrath of regulators with “great expectations and zero tolerance” for law breakers.

“That is only going to be compounded with the continuing Russian war,” he adds.

With rampant inflation, weak growth and supply chains jammed, the global economy in late 2022 is struggling on many fronts. But imagine the state of play without correspondent banks greasing the wheels of global trade. In a world where large lenders decline to process and clear trades for smaller ones, it isn’t hard to imagine global trade coming to a halt.

Joel Lange, Dow Jones.jpg
Joel Lange, Dow Jones

However, that is the direction of travel. In a March 2020 report, the Bank for International Settlements said that while the value of payments is rising, the number of correspondent banks in all markets is declining – down 20% between 2011 and 2018.

Its analysts wrote: “The retreat is broad-based but affects some countries more than others.”

This is due to a mix of factors: high compliance costs, low profitability and the sanctions and money-laundering risks involved in third-party activities and processing payments.

Fragile states under US sanction are the hardest hit. The number of correspondent banking relationships fell by 50.8% in Cuba between 2012 and 2018, by 59.8% in Venezuela and 73% in Syria, according to data from Swift.

Over that seven-year period, just 11 nation states – a mixed bag including Chad, Georgia and Myanmar – reported a rise in the number of correspondent relationships.

Correspondent banks play an immensely valuable role in low-income states and regions. De-risking is a big problem. Exiting a smallish market – say Benin or Burkina Faso – might be an attractive proposition, but it also does irreparable harm to export-focused local banks, corporates and state agencies, not to mention regional multilaterals.

While laudable, a widespread push for greater transparency and due diligence threatens to create “a financial inclusion problem in countries that are potentially cut off from the wider global financial community”, warns Joel Lange, general manager at Dow Jones Risk & Compliance. “That may drive activity into areas that are potentially less transparent, such as crypto, which is actually very transparent, but an area where regulation is still evolving.”

Many traditional banks that aren’t crypto savvy or involved in blockchain transactions are busy reviewing traffic in their correspondent banking networks.

“They’re evaluating crypto exchanges to provide a better understanding of what kind of traffic exchanges engage in,” notes Lange. “That’s going to be become increasingly pervasive and challenging for traditional financial institutions and emerging payment services.”

Strength in numbers

So, what can financial institutions do? There are solutions that don’t have to involve exiting correspondent banking.

There is strength in numbers. One senior KYC expert urges banks to band together to compare data and checks on respondent banks.

“If you’re a network of banks doing KYC for each other, the KYC of one bank is reviewed by all of your peers,” he says. “So even if the Bank A does a poor job, Bank B may do a far better job. By working in unison to validate a file and by standardizing the data you share, you eliminate substantially the capacity for error.”

Paying the price

Fines associated with correspondent banking rule breaches range from a slap on the wrist to a punch that can leave a bank reeling.

In June 2022, Ghana International Bank in London was ordered to pay £5.83 million after the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) found flaws in its anti-money laundering (AML) controls around correspondent banking over a four-year period. In 2019, the FCA fined Standard Chartered £102.2 million for AML breaches in two areas of business, one of which was its UK wholesale bank’s correspondent banking unit.

The biggest penalty so far involved BNP Paribas. In 2014, the French bank paid the US justice department $8.9 billion for what former federal prosecutor Preet Bharara called a: “hattrick of sanctions violations, unlawfully opening the doors of the US financial markets to three sanctioned countries.”

US regulators variously accused BNP Paribas of processing transactions for Sudanese sanctioned entities via a “sophisticated system of ‘satellite banks’”; hiding the names of Cuban-sanctioned entities in payment messages; and engaging in more than $650 million in trades with entities tied to Iran. All were under US sanctions at the time.

The bank was also dealing with entities willing to cloak their real identities in the pursuit of washing money through the financial system.

Non-sanctioned individuals or entities, working on behalf of sanctioned entities, “literally lifted or stripped” their real names out of Swift wire transfer messages, notes Eric Young, a senior managing director at financial compliance and monitoring consultancy Guidepost Solutions. This enabled them to avoid being identified by compliance and screening systems at some of Europe’s largest banks, including Societe Generale and ING.

This is a key challenge for any bank. Bad actors – including rogue states – determined to commit crime on a grand scale tend to be pretty smart. They like to hide behind shell companies under multiple layers of identity and issue fake invoices.

BNP Paribas was banned for conducting certain US dollar transactions for a year and barred from carrying out dollar clearing as a correspondent bank for unaffiliated third-party lenders for two years in London and New York.

The combination of the size of the penalty, ensuing public condemnation and the hit to its balance sheet convinced it to exit US dollar-denominated correspondent banking altogether.

Those keen to run the rule over a respondent bank can turn for help to any number of experts.

“With a ‘please help me, I’m drowning’ KYC request, they tend to turn to one of the big four” accounting firms such as Deloitte or KPMG for help, the expert notes.

Others might reach out to due-diligence and risk and compliance experts such as Refinitiv, Bureau Van Dijk or Dow Jones Risk & Compliance.

“What we do in part is to help banks to recognize high-risk individuals and entities,” says Lange. “We created databases of state-owned companies, of negative news on banks and other corporations. We have negative news on banks that can be highlighted and helpful from a correspondent banking due diligence perspective.”

Then there’s Bankers Almanac, which reckons it helps KYC analysts at 98 of the world’s 100 largest banks to identify counterparties at 200,000 financial institutions, including the ultimate beneficial owners of assets and businesses. Its systems comb through annual reports, Wolfsberg questionnaires, corporate governance documents and intelligence from over 1,000 enforcement agencies and 32,000 media sources.

Swift claims to be developing new monitoring tools with its 11,000-plus members to provide a “group-level, top-down view of payment chains and relationships.”

It admits this is a work in progress, noting on its website: “Many AML tools are designed for retail rather than correspondent banking.”

Background checks help lenders in two key ways, says one risk expert: “First, they have to do KYC on customers anyway, to check there’s no money laundering involved. And second, it’s through KYC that you get a lot of information that can help your commercial operations. You really get to know the client and what products to offer them.”

None of these are perfect solutions.

For one thing, full-blooded KYC verification is “a pain” for lenders, says Norbloc’s Kanakakis. “It’s expensive and convoluted, even with all the data sources available, as the sources are usually full of quite outdated and inadequate information.”

Moreover, financial institutions have only themselves to blame if they fail to spot a payment from a criminal or sanctioned entity.

“If something goes wrong, it’s the bank that gets fined,” says one KYC expert. “The regulator doesn’t care who is your service provider.”

And while technology is a godsend in many ways – good due-diligence search tools save countless human hours – it can also create lots of annoying and false alerts, each of which has to be expensively followed up.

So you also need qualified experts who, says Young, can “determine what alerts should lead you to freeze or reject a payment, to block, freeze and report an attempted sanctions evasion payment and – if a violation indeed occurred – submit a voluntary self-disclosure report to OFAC [the US Office of Foreign Assets Control] and other government agencies.”

Risks from criminals

Can any lender ever really be 100% sure of the legality of every trade it processes on another bank’s behalf? In 2018, the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority published a survey of 2,000 banks and building societies in the UK, claiming to be the first “collective industry view” of the risks posed to society by criminals.

It put the group’s total number of customer relationships at around 550 million, including 427.8 million in the UK and 113.2 million in the rest of Europe. Among this, it identified 112,000 ‘politically exposed persons’ and 1.6 million ‘high-risk customers’, of which nearly 40% were new to the bank in question.

Another reason for banks’ enduring struggles to catch bad actors is the speed at which the world changes.

You only have to go back to 2016 to find the following passage in a report on correspondent banking by the Financial Action Task Force, an independent inter-governmental body that develops and promotes policies to protect the financial system against money laundering and terror financing.

It says: “There is no expectation, intention or requirement for the correspondent institution to conduct customer due diligence on its respondent institutions’ customers.”

Six years on, any financial or credit institution taking that advice at face value would be inviting trouble.

In that period, the US imposed new sanctions on certain entities in countries and territories including China, Hong Kong, Myanmar, Nicaragua and Venezuela. And that’s before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Today, all banks must scrutinize every transaction for fear it may be connected in some way to a sanctioned Russian bank, company, oligarch or entity with military links. Any transaction that aids Russian trade and seems designed to circumvent the US dollar system will attract scrutiny.

Multiple sources tell Euromoney that banks are aggressively reviewing their AML systems. Regulators, they believe, are unlikely to penalize a bank for missing a single sanctions-related breach but are likely to go after systematic failures.

For major transaction and commodity flows, correspondent banking will continue to exist. It’s just too important and currently irreplaceable

Joel Lange, Dow Jones Risk & Compliance

So where does correspondent banking go from here? That some banks, eyeing risks ranging from reputational and financial damage to soaring compliance costs, see it as more trouble than it’s worth is hardly a shock.

But the business is unlikely to disappear. For one thing, while regulators may at times view correspondent banking in a dim light, they need it. Should too many banks exit correspondent banking, new payments systems that may not be so easily traceable or supervised will surely emerge to fill the vacuum.

For another, large banks will always see it as an invaluable way to boost profits and bolster relations in key markets. No financial institution would want to stand aside and watch an industry that has worked well for centuries continue to benefit rivals at their expense.

Moreover, from sovereigns, through commercial banks and corporates, to migrants remitting salaries back home, the world needs correspondent banking to work. As it stands, there is no alternative.

If banks were no longer willing or able to process transactions on one other’s behalf, trade flows – already under severe strain from congested supply chains – would surely seize up. Lange at Dow Jones reckons it is “here to stay for some time.”

“For major transaction and commodity flows, correspondent banking will continue to exist,” he adds. “It’s just too important and currently irreplaceable.”

Banking’s big brother

A report published on July 8 by a team of lawyers at Mayer Brown is essential reading for any financial institution engaged in correspondent banking and with a vested interest in analyzing and understanding the impact of sanctions on their brand and bottom line.

Led by Jason Hungerford, an investigations and regulatory partner based in London, the report starts with the basics. Notably, transactions that do not at first glance violate rules but might on closer inspection involve sanctioned targets in dodgy jurisdictions.

It reminds readers of the power of US secondary sanctions, which target foreign financial institutions. These can result in a foreign financial institution (FFI) being “cut off from US correspondent and payable-through accounts” and even being tagged as a ‘specially designated national’ by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and having its assets blocked.

Legislation rolled out by OFAC and others, including the UK’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, is being continuously updated and strengthened. The damage caused by breaching these rules is real and can be lasting.

In 2012, Bank of Kunlun, owned by state-run China National Petroleum, was barred from accessing the US financial system for knowingly facilitating transactions for designated Iranian banks. Ten years on, Mayer Brown’s team note, the ban remains in place.

The US requires banks to report all cases of rejected funds or blocked property to OFAC within 10 business days. In June 2019, the regulator’s powers were expanded to apply to all ‘US persons’ – not just banks – and rejected transfers. Reports must include a full description of all blocked transactions, names of intermediaries such as correspondent banks and identities of associated sanctioned entities.

Correspondent banking “raises several noteworthy sanctions issues for US and non-US financial institutions,” the team says. US banks are expected to carry out “sufficient” risk-based due diligence on FFI relationships – including an FFI’s clients.

This leaves the rules somewhat open to interpretation.

“There is no generic standard for what constitutes appropriate ‘due diligence’ in this context,” admits Hungerford. “What is reasonable for a particular bank to determine in advance of a transaction about that transaction and the parties to it will depend on the circumstances. Woolly, indeed.”

He adds: “A reasonable shorthand for a minimum standard is what information a bank has available to it and what information can it reasonably obtain. That is, what did the bank know or ought to have known? Given that many US and UK sanctions are strict liability regimes, there is a tendency by many financial institutions to go well beyond what I have described as a minimum standard.”

Non-US lenders would be well advised to share this above-and-beyond approach to due diligence in the brave new regulatory era.

OFAC’s extensive reporting rules mean FFIs have a clear incentive to check all dealings with US banks. Screening, the Mayer Brown team add, should include: “Due diligence [that determines whether a] bank’s customers or potential customers are front companies for sanctioned countries that are trying to access the US financial system.”

And be mindful of the extent of OFAC’s reach. Two notable penalties catch the eye. In September 2019, British Arab Commercial Bank was fined $228.8 million for allegations it breached US sanctions on Sudan, although all but $4 million of this was suspended. And in January 2021, OFAC hit France’s Union de Banques Arabes et Francaise with a $8.6 million fine for operating US dollar accounts on behalf of sanctioned Syrian banks.

“These financial institutions decided to perform these payments and take on this business, but they clearly failed to understand the multi-jurisdictional outreach of OFAC in relation to the US dollar,” says Joel Lange, head of business management at Dow Jones Risk & Compliance.

Always assume financial big brother is watching.

[…]

Know your customer

The origins of modern correspondent banking lie in the ‘first globalization’, an era of expansionary free trade spanning the years 1870 to 1914. By 1935, according to Bankers Almanac, a British publication owned by LexisNexis, more than 2,000 banks had extensive correspondent networks.

That number continued to rise. By the turn of the century, notes Joel Lange, head of business management at Dow Jones Risk & Compliance, Swift’s annual Sibos conference was “full of banks meeting other banks, creating relationships and opening accounts with each other.”

The year 2000 is a key date. This is when 13 global lenders including Citi, HSBC and MUFG Bank, assembled at Chateau Wolfsberg in Switzerland.

What emerged was the Wolfsberg questionnaire, a standardized know-your-customer form that banks keen to do business with one other would fill out and post online.

The questionnaire has grown in depth and density. Its first iteration was 18 questions long. Back then, notes Lange: “That was the extent to which organizations did correspondent banking due diligence. It would be: ‘Have you filled in the Wolfsberg survey?’ ‘Yes – here it is posted on our website.’”

Version 1.3, published in 2020 and translated into Spanish, Japanese and French is 20 pages long, has 110 questions and concludes with a declaration of truth. The document reflects the onerous task of managing a bank in an ever more connected yet divided world.

, for example, is point 106 in full, where “[legal] entity” refers to the bank in question. “In addition to inspections by the government supervisors/regulators, does the [legal] entity have an internal audit function, a testing function or other independent third party, or both, that assesses financial crime compliance, anti-money laundering, counter-terrorism financing and sanctions policies and practices, on a regular basis?”

(If you’re a bank, the correct answer to that should be ‘yes’.)

Today, correspondent banking is as intricate and sophisticated as any part of finance. No longer can correspondent banks simply rely on respondent banks to do their own due diligence. They also need to know the identity of their customers’ customers. Failure to do so risks enraging regulators such as the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority or the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

“OFAC’s view is it’s on you to cut through the multiple layers and identify the ultimate beneficial owner”

Eric Young, Guidepost Solutions

OFAC is a key player in this story. Founded in 1950, it was once a fairly light touch regulator. Today, as the US treasury department’s financial intelligence and enforcement agency, it is at the forefront of America’s increasingly robust global sanctions policy.

As of August 29, OFAC’s database of ‘specially designated nationals and blocked persons’ includes 77 in Cuba, 120 in Zimbabwe and 679 in Iran. Input ‘Russia’ and an automated message pops up: “Your search returned too many results. Please narrow” it. The number of entities connected to Russian president Vladimir Putin and his war effort in Ukraine includes state lenders, military contractors and oligarchs. It grows longer all the time.

The regulator is not shy about pursuing and penalizing financial institutions that neglect their due diligence. You can no longer lean on the excuse that you didn’t know who a bank did its business with. “

OFAC’s view is it’s on you to cut through the multiple layers and identify the ultimate beneficial owner,” notes Eric Young, senior managing director at financial compliance and monitoring consultancy Guidepost Solutions in New York.

Lange offers a useful rule of thumb for any correspondent bank doing business with any other lender anywhere denominated in the greenback: “If the US dollar is being used in any way, even if it is between multiple counterparties not in the US but who are using the dollar as the underlying currency, it comes under OFAC oversight.”