Western Europe: Bank provisioning for a rainy day

Post-2008 accounting standards set aside capital for tomorrow’s problem loans today. In doing so, they rely on the judgements of the banks themselves. However, after Covid-19, European banks cannot afford to provision for write-offs in the same way as their US counterparts.

No wonder investors struggled to believe the upbeat tone in European banks’ third-quarter 2020 results.

Given how much banks reduced and even wrote back provisions, you might have thought Covid-19 was over. Instead, the continent was just entering a second wave of infections and lockdowns, and the main vaccine test results had not even been made public.

Under the new accounting frameworks designed to prevent a recurrence of the 2008 crisis, banks are supposed to hike loan-loss provisions when they see risks increasing.

Nevertheless, most banks in Europe marked lower provisions in the third quarter of this year than the second. Analysts had expected them to set aside about twice as much as they did.

It is understandable to an extent.

Government support measures, such as furlough schemes and mandatory loan repayment holidays, will prevent some defaults. There’s little evidence in Europe, so far, of a big rise in loans that are objectively impaired. The lifting of restrictions over the summer gave the economy a jolt, and when banks were preparing third-quarter results, the second lockdowns had not been announced.

The known unknown is the impact on balance sheets when furlough schemes end

Peter Stage, EJF Investments
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Yet the timing of those results – just as lockdowns were being reinstated in late October and early November – only added to widespread incredulity about banks’ projected losses.

“It looked too good to be true,” says Andrew Stimpson, KBW’s head of European banks research. “Even before the third quarter, there was an element of disbelief in the market as to the level of provisions that the banks had made so far.”

Clearly, there’s a long way to go. Andrea Enria, chief financial supervisor at the European Central Bank, told journalists in the autumn that Covid’s second wave could bring loan losses as high as €1.4 trillion.

The top 50 listed European banks will not even write off a 10th of that in 2020, according to data from UBS.

Fourth-quarter writedowns will probably be higher, perhaps entailing revisions of loan-loss guidance. But only a few banks have gone through individual loans systematically to reassess their risk post-Covid. It would still be a guess in most cases, although the supervisor is encouraging them to do so now.

No one knows how long social-distancing restrictions will last or how much further countries might extend their support measures.

“The known unknown is the impact on balance sheets when furlough schemes end,” says Peter Stage, co-chief investment officer of EJF Investments, a London-based hedge fund focused on subordinated bank debt, speaking after the second lockdowns were imposed. “The day of reckoning has been pushed back until 2021.”

One thing that is clear is how much more US banks ramped up provisions than Europeans in the first nine months of 2020 – even though the recession in Europe was set to be about twice as bad for the full year, according to the IMF.

The top listed eurozone banks’ cost of risk was on average only 82 basis points in the first three quarters, compared with almost 200bp at their US peers. The big four UK banks were in the middle, writing off 124bp of their book on average, even though the UK is suffering an even deeper recession than the eurozone.

Under IFRS9, there is more of a stepped approach than in the US current expected credit losses (CECL) methodology.

Although both are about anticipating defaults, CECL does not allow for IFRS9’s initial stage of merely writing off the next 12 months of missed repayments rather than for the lifetime of the loan.

This might make less of a difference were it not for the generally shorter duration of loans in the US, where mortgages tend not to be kept on banks’ balance sheets. It makes no difference at all to short-term consumer borrowing such as credit card debt, according to Simon Samuels, at Veritum Partners, a boutique bank-focused consultancy

Is the bigger reason for the discrepancy simply that US banks can afford to write off more?

Automaticity

Speaking to Euromoney, senior European bankers stress that their provisions are not done on a whim but on the basis of complex internal models and economic scenarios.

“There’s a high level of automaticity in the process,” says Philippe Bordenave, BNP Paribas’ deputy chief executive and chief operating officer.

It is easy to imagine a much worse situation

José Antonio Álvarez, Banco Santander
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José Antonio Álvarez, chief executive of Banco Santander, adds: “This is still a very uncertain environment. It is easy to imagine a much worse situation. But accounting-wise we model our potential credit losses based on economists’ consensus.”

However, there’s nothing forcing banks to adhere to the IMF’s forecasts, for example. Moreover, management can add extra provisions if they think the model does not adequately capture the risks in a specific sector or activity.

“The level of IFRS9 provisions is a mathematical model, but the model integrates several economic scenarios,” says Jérôme Grivet, chief financial officer of Crédit Agricole SA (Casa). “There is flexibility in what the scenarios are and how much weight we allocate to each one. We also give our business divisions scope to add provisions for their most vulnerable sectors.”

Indeed, were it not for this flexibility, more banks might have written back provisions in the third quarter – precisely because their models wouldn’t sufficiently capture the growing likelihood of second lockdowns, says KBW’s Stimpson.

In the event, only Nordea did so.

Management overlays also drove much of the increase in provisions in the first quarter of 2020, as the pandemic took economic forecasters by surprise.

Working out loan-loss figures on the basis of expectations is obviously more art than science. The auditor’s job is to ensure that the level of provisioning is consistent with what the bank has marked down before, says Hervé Phaure, risk advisory partner at Deloitte France. There would be questions, in other words, if a bank wrote back provisions when the environment deteriorates.

In the real world, capital strength is a factor.

“Each bank has a limit on the amounts of provisions they can afford,” says Phaure.

As investors know this, banks that mark higher loan losses look better, especially in 2020.

“It is easier to be positive on a bank that has frontloaded provisions,” says KBW’s Stimpson.

True to character, UniCredit chief executive Jean Pierre Mustier tried to prove his bank’s solidity before the first-quarter results by targeting a cost of risk of between 100bp and 120bp for 2020.

He based that target on an annual eurozone economic contraction of 13%, while other banks were much more aligned with the IMF’s prediction of 7.5%. Now, according to Mustier, UniCredit does not need to change the guidance because it already factored in the likelihood of a second wave.

“We are taking the impact up front and putting the crisis behind us,” Mustier tells Euromoney. “We can do that because we have a very strong capital base, so we don’t need to smooth out the impact.”

However, while UniCredit’s economic prognosis stands out, its capital ratio (14.4%) does not. It is about average for Italy and Western Europe, according to Citi.

European banks’ capital ratios are on average about 200bp higher than their US peers, according to Deutsche Bank.

Central banks on both sides of the Atlantic have given banks various forms of regulatory capital relief, but Covid has exacerbated the US banks’ lag, not least due to Europe’s dividends ban.

Credibility problem

Does this mean that the economy and business mix are the only relevant factors in how much they are provisioning?

That might be comforting, but bank investors and supervisors also need to look at what underpins the capital ratios. Most importantly, they need to look at how much of a profit-and-loss buffer banks have before defaults require them to eat into capital, and at how easily they could replenish that capital without rights issues or bailouts.

“You do see some relationship between the more profitable banks and the level of provisions,” says a senior official at one international supervisory body. “If you casually look at provisions this year, they seem to be just enough so you don’t get a big loss: you provision a certain amount, and you’re still profitable… That means you will see American banks provisioning more and Europeans less.”

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Plotting US and European banks’ profitability versus their Covid provisions in a scatter graph illustrates this. Almost all the US banks are in the top right of the graph (most profitable, provisioning most) and none of them are in the bottom left, where the large majority of Europeans lie. Only three European banks – BBVA, Santander and Lloyds – are in the top right. JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank are at opposite ends.

Commerzbank, Societe Generale and UniCredit also neatly fit this pattern of less profitable banks provisioning less. The only two that don’t fit relative to global or currency-zone peers are Barclays, which has a big US credit cards business, and Casa, Crédit Agricole’s listed arm, which excludes most of the retail banking business.

So are European banks kicking the can down the road again? The cliché is less popular now that banks, as they keep telling us, are “part of the solution”.

The problem is that reporting by European banks has a credibility problem, as they have been slower to write off loans in the past.

Before Covid-19, the total non-performing loan ratio in the eurozone was more than three times the US’s 1% and, unlike the US, was still not fully covered. Italian banks were only just getting to the bottom of a huge NPL problem that they had allowed to fester and grow in the 2010s.

D-Day will be the end of the moratorium, next spring

Corrado Passera, Illimity
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This makes it harder for the banks to convince investors that their recovery won’t be just as slow this time.

“The US approach has been one of recognizing losses hard and early, and moving on,” says Samuels. “In Europe, there’s been a culture of extend and pretend – of providing for the minimum you can afford and get away with.”

The European tendency to forbearance was supposed to have ended with the creation of the ECB’s Single Supervisory Mechanism in 2014. Nevertheless, while Covid-19 has sparked new debate about the pro-cyclicality of IFRS9, banks have been advised they don’t need to provision for borrowers who are temporarily unable to pay as a result of the pandemic.

European governments have coerced banks into granting retail and business borrowers repayment holidays, with EU moratoria reaching €871 billion of loans by June, according to the European Banking Authority (EBA). Lenders don’t need to set aside capital for those loans automatically – although these programmes will inevitably hide some loan losses, especially when the holiday has only been given at the borrower’s request.

Understandably, there is concern that sudden and overwhelming writedowns might trigger a financial crisis.

Banks cannot lend and earn a profit against capital that they have set aside, so there should be no point if it is unclear that the loan is at risk – in this case, because of government support measures. It could end up being a self-fulfilling prophecy if the hit to banks’ capital ratios led to a restriction in lending.

“The supervisors and banks have to tread a thin line between avoiding a credit crunch and proper recognition of losses,” says an EU supervisory official.

Risk-return dynamics

While supervisors are still shy of saying so publicly, it seems there is a degree of consensus among European policymakers that a less aggressive push on provisioning is acceptable this time, despite the damage it did in the 2008 and eurozone crises.

“That’s OK, given the high degree of uncertainty, when you don’t know if it is purely liquidity or a solvency problem,” says Thorsten Beck, professor of banking and finance at Cass Business School.

Clearly, commercial bankers – encouraged by this summer’s bounce – are still hoping for a rapid rebound in 2021. But they are also hoping, perhaps optimistically, that structural differences with the US mean that provisions should be lower in Europe.

Over the last 20 years, US banks’ cost of risk has almost always been higher – on average about twice as high, according to data from the Bank for International Settlements. US banks got back to pre-crisis levels two years sooner, but they only wrote off less than their eurozone peers in the immediate aftermath of the European sovereign debt crisis.

Perhaps then risk-return dynamics are why even mid-tier banks in the US have higher profitability than their European counterparts. It is not just about competition, as US banks don’t enjoy the same kind of oligopoly in retail as they do in investment banking. Rates are not negative in the US, although slightly higher rates make servicing debt slightly harder.

“The balance sheets of US banks are very different,” Bordenave argues. “Lower-risk mortgages are sold out to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Even student loans and car loans are securitized. More of the corporates fund themselves in the market. What’s left on banks’ balance sheets are non-conforming sub-prime mortgages, credit cards and especially SME debt.”

However, the ECB does not seem to be expecting lower losses than the US Federal Reserve. The Fed’s ad hoc stress test in July modelled loan losses of about $700 billion for a U-shaped recovery, which is less than Enria’s worst-case estimate of €1.4 trillion, even proportionate to the larger aggregate size of eurozone banks.

A similar ECB analysis this July also modelled larger hits to banks’ capital ratios than the Fed in a severe scenario.

Moreover, what’s true in France and Germany is less true in the UK, where capital markets have a greater role, and in the eurozone periphery, where unemployment is higher and where economies are less stable and more dependent on small businesses.

Banks’ cost of risk in France was about a third of the level in the UK and Italy in 2008/2009 and 2011/2012, according to McKinsey. It was by far the lowest in Germany and by far the highest in Spain.

Appropriately, Spanish banks BBVA and Santander have set aside the highest amount among the large European lenders. They’re also among the most profitable ones, largely due to large operations in the Americas, again suggesting risk-return is part of the story.

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On the other hand, data from S&P Global shows that in northern Europe – especially the UK – the increase in loans moving to an expected lifetime loss (stage 2, under IFRS9) has generally been bigger than in southern Europe. The increase is much smaller at BBVA and Santander, albeit from a higher base. The increase and absolute size of provisions in 2020 is also much higher among the UK than the Italian banks.

Encouragingly, government support measures in southern Europe are not lagging as much as first feared. After a late start, Italy’s state-guaranteed loan scheme is the biggest in Europe as a proportion of the economy.

Meanwhile, the general message from European banks’ third-quarter results, notably in France, was that the vast majority of borrowers exiting loan moratoriums are restarting their payments.

Nevertheless, in the UK, where banks have given payment holidays to one in six mortgage borrowers, the scheme has been extended until summer 2021.

In the eurozone, Italy has placed by far the biggest amount of loans under a moratorium, which covers business as well as retail loans, and it has extended that moratorium until mid 2021.

“D-Day will be the end of the moratorium, next spring,” says Corrado Passera, formerly Intesa Sanpaolo’s chief executive, now running Illimity, an Italian NPL fund and digital bank. “For a few more months, many positions that are non-performing exposures really are still officially performing.”