At the annual Euromoney Borrowers and Investors Forum last month, the great and the good of the sovereign, supranational and agency issuer community gathered in London to meet market participants.
Many of the conversations between issuers and dealers centred on the macro picture, or likely future supply and demand dynamics following record new-issue volumes in the first half of the year.
But behind the scenes, hidden in the nuts and bolts of clearing and settling derivative trades, there were increasingly tense talks on a problem that is responsible for draining substantial levels of liquidity from banks and whose cost could amount to tens of billions.
At the heart of the problem is the fact that credit support agreements (CSAs) – protocols that are essential for the conduct of derivative deals – were established in another era: one when bank funding was so cheap that it wasn’t even deemed a cost.
It is a problem that is not only complex but also where the costs are uncertain – both in terms of scale and timing.
CSAs came about as a means of eliminating credit risk in OTC derivative transactions. Ideally, all should be symmetrical two-way CSAs, meaning that both counterparties to a swaps trade may either receive or post collateral – depending on whether it is in or out of the money.
Unfortunately, in the SSA sector many issuers have one-way CSAs or two-way CSAs that are very asymmetric. In other words, when their trades go against them they do not have to post collateral with the dealer counterparty. Frequent borrowers argue that because they have minimal credit risk they should not post collateral in such circumstances. Unfortunately the dealer does not benefit from the same advantages and will have to give government bonds or some other form of collateral to whatever bank they have closed out the other side of the swaps transaction with. This state of affairs was fine when funding was cheap and plentiful – raising the financing to buy collateral was inconsequential.
This is no longer the case. Banks are paying hundreds of basis points over Libor for their funds, meanwhile they will only receive interest at an overnight rate on the collateral posted.
In the words of one market participant, this is a serious problem in the making. Why? Because of the risk that the banks winning the swaps business associated with new issues are not fully pricing it into their costs. The difference in swaps pricing might also be a function of banks’ differing funding costs. A small number of banks have increased the amount of swaps business they are doing. At some point in the future they run the risk of having to post collateral for the business they have won with these SSA clients. Will the losses to their swaps books be compensated for by the fees they’ve charged for primary business?
If there is one lesson that can be drawn from the credit crisis it is that there are dangers from risk being mispriced. An inefficient market serves no one well. What happens to the provision of swaps when certain banks pull out of the business because of these structural deficiencies? Or when losses hit home at those banks that continue to ignore the true costs? If issuers continue to look at this from a purely short-term perspective, they run the risk that in the long term there will be collateral damage to the wider market.