In his testimony to the Congressional oversight panel last month, US Treasury secretary Tim Geithner noted that credit conditions had improved in recent weeks and months, with the Libor-OIS spread coming down to about 90 basis points from its October 2008 peak of 365 and corporate bond issuance and issuance of asset-backed securities both rising strongly in the first quarter.
However, he also highlighted reports on bank lending that showed big declines in consumer loans, including credit card loans, as well as commercial and industrial loans. The clear implication is that the banks, having been bailed out by the taxpayer, are not doing their bit to help recovery.
Geithner’s remarks and those from bank chief executives reporting healthy first-quarter profits hint at rising tensions between policymakers and managements of financial institutions.
Goldman Sachs appeared to jump the gun on the Treasury’s stress tests – the results of which were due at the start of May – by selling $5 billion of equity in mid April so that it can redeem the Tarp capital provided by the US government last October as soon as its supervisors permit.
JPMorgan chairman and chief executive James Dimon, not to be outdone, claimed that his bank is sufficiently well capitalized – with $87 billion of tangible common equity, equivalent to 7.2% of risk-weighted assets – that it wouldn’t even need to go to the equity markets to raise new capital to pay back the government’s capital tomorrow. It could do so and still have a 9.2% tier 1 ratio. Dimon is awaiting guidance from the US government on when this will be allowed.
Dimon’s scathing tone was almost as telling as the substance of his comments on government efforts to recapitalize the banks. He has no time for the much-ballyhooed public private investment programme to establish value for and provide an exit from banks’ toxic assets. He says that JPMorgan has no interest in using the scheme, would certainly not borrow money from the US government to do so – it has learned its lesson on doing that – and adds that these much-discussed toxic assets are not even the key problem anyway.
JPMorgan points the way for the banking industry’s mounting credit woes. A record first quarter for investment banking revenues and profits – driven by a very strong quarter in debt underwriting – probably cannot be repeated. For now, it has partially masked worries elsewhere in precisely the markets where Geithner wants to see more lending. In consumer lending, credit card charge-offs are rising in line with the unemployment rate. They rose to just under 7% in the first quarter from under 4.5% a year previously and JPMorgan has told analysts that they can write a 9% charge-off rate into their models for the second quarter, likely rising to 9.5% before the year-end. Rising losses will also continue in home equity loans and prime mortgages.
Two years ago, before the credit bubble burst, JPMorgan’s loan-loss reserve stood at $7 billion. Today, it is $27 billion and it must keep rising from here until realized loan losses peak.
It clearly irritates Dimon to find his bank lumped in with those being criticized by the Treasury for not lending enough when it is already losing money at an impressive rate in the very areas where the government wants to see more lending.
And the bank continues to extend credit – Dimon contends that surviving banks continue to lend at the same rate but points out that they account for no more than 25% of a financial system that in recent years came to be dominated by hedge funds, conventional institutional investors and other non-banks.
Could big banks that regret taking government money at the worst point in the financial panic survive now without its subsidies?
JPMorgan suggests its debt funding cost would rise by 100 basis points without guarantees – a hit to its margins but not a life-threatening one. Partly it can thank the FDIC-sponsored acquisition of Washington Mutual last year for that strong deposit-to-loan ratio. Others, more dependent on wholesale funding, would struggle. And it would seem crazy to seek to repay capital at a time when the IMF suggests banks will more likely need to seek conversion of government preference shares into common equity to bolster their capital and absorb losses.
But it is no wonder leaders of strong banks want out from the clutches of government as quickly as possible. Ostensibly answerable to shareholders and judged by financial metrics, they are in fact increasingly subject to measurement against and coercion to support government policy aims. That would be acceptable if a regulated utility model for deposit taking institutions had been established. This might come. Until it does, confused governance might weigh on bank stock prices and recovery prospects almost as heavily as rising loan delinquencies and volatile investment banking revenues.