Debt buybacks and exchanges are contentious propositions at the best of times. Present loan market trading levels make them very hard to resist for many heavily indebted entities. But rating agency treatment of these trades is having far-reaching consequences – not just for the corporates involved but for the loan market as a whole.
Critics are focusing on the treatment of distressed exchanges – or those from entities rated lower than single-B minus. The agencies treat a distressed exchange as a default, on the thesis that if it did not happen then bankruptcy would be imminent. The entity and exchanged bonds are downgraded to a defaulted rating. But many participants feel that the rating agencies are failing to reflect the circumstances that now prevail in the loan markets.
The logic behind dividing debt exchanges into distressed and opportunistic is clear, but analysts at CreditSights argue that while the treatment of distressed exchanges is appropriate for genuine out-of-court restructurings, it should not stand where voluntary exchanges and buybacks are being undertaken to reduce leverage but do not necessitate a default if they are rejected.
Clearly, any heavily indebted corporate that would be strengthened by buying back debt at a deeply discounted price will be put off if the result is a downgrade to default. Perhaps even more worryingly, rating agencies’ policies on debt exchanges and buybacks are increasing the number of CLO vehicles that fail their junior overcollateralization (OC) tests. These vehicles are particularly sensitive to rating changes as their OC tests are severely impacted by triple-C and lower rated credits. Failure of OC tests can lead to an event of default for the entire vehicle, resulting in the forced liquidation of the entire CLO portfolio – exactly the last thing that this market needs.
This might seem like a technical gripe – but it is not when the volumes of debt involved are considered. At their peak, CLOs were buying 70% of all US loans and around 40% of European ones. Pushing large numbers of these vehicles over the brink to liquidate into an already shattered loan market must surely be avoided at all costs.
The CLO predicament is symptomatic of the unintended consequences that have wreaked so much damage in structured finance. CLOs were never structured to withstand large triple-C buckets, and many structures are already close to breaching their OC triggers on collateral performance alone. By treating debt buybacks as defaults, and thus placing CLO structures under even more pressure, ratings agencies are pushing the long-feared deluge of CLO defaults ever closer to a certainty.