The list of new boutiques trying to gain a foothold in fixed-income investment banking is growing fast. It is an exciting development and one that will be closely watched: if these new firms can survive and prosper, they could dramatically alter the landscape in capital markets.
It is a measure of how broken they think the fixed-income market is that these experienced players are making such audacious moves.
The seriousness of the battle that these new boutiques face is illustrated by comparing what the investment banking world looked like until very recently with what it was like in the 1980s when many began their careers. Back then, in Europe, disintermediation was a fancy new word, generally spoken with an American accent. Only in the US had investment banks broken down the hegemony of bank lending relationships to create a functioning credit capital market.
From the late 1980s, there was a wave of banking M&A across Europe and the US as players scrambled to achieve sufficient scale to compete, even on a regional scale let alone a global one. The creation of Citigroup, when Citibank bought Salomon Brothers in 1999, signalled the end game. This new colossus was to top the global debt league tables for much of the next decade. If Citigroup was the top new-issue house, JPMorgan (following its acquisition by Chase) was the biggest house on the distribution side. Between them, they cast a shadow over the operations of smaller players, especially the non-bulge bracket.
The capital markets arms race got out of control when banks were able to create an entity such as a SIV that would buy not only the banks’ lower tier 2 capital but also the RMBS that these institutions were originating at the same time. They would ramp up a CDO/CLO on behalf of a manager but capitalize the structure with hedge funds, frequently those for which they had provided seed capital. Of course the CDO/CLO would also then buy RMBS or leveraged loans with little regard to risk and reward. At this point, real investors had been relegated to a mere secondary concern for many banks. Fortunes were made selling to hedge funds and structured vehicles instead.
The forces that created megabanks have now been thrown hard into reverse. The way is open once more for smaller players – they should be actively encouraged.
Happily for the boutiques, most remaining large banks have to preserve their balance sheets and cannot hawk them to investor and issuer clients as they did in the past. The long-term survival of niche players depends on whether, when capital does return to the universal banks, they will return to type and squeeze out smaller players – assuming the boutiques achieve traction, that is.
Shareholders and regulators should take care to limit the extent to which large banks are allowed to return to the model of yesteryear. Bank shareholders will want to own easily understandable businesses with relatively low risk profiles. Wiser regulators will not want key providers of basic banking activity mixed up in risky activities – especially given the extent and cost of the bailouts.
It is unlikely that a formal Glass-Steagall-style separation of the two types of banking will be attempted – the authorities are showing a distinct lack of ambition in this regard – and it is very difficult to define where one stops and the other starts anyway. But it could happen via the back door. The most talented individuals will want to remove themselves from governmental scrutiny and restrictions on compensation.