It did not take long for the bond syndication process to revert to type. A year ago selling new issues was dangerous. The damage to an underwriter’s reputation from failing might be serious, although not as serious as for the prospective borrower, which would then need to fend off accusations that it had no access to the capital markets.
Failure to deliver a deal was not an option, which meant that syndication was reminiscent of days long gone. Cooperation between bond managers was crucial to success, as was persuading a number of core investors to agree to purchase the bonds before a deal’s official launch. Proper bookbuilding therefore returned. Syndicate structures started to change too, with certain frequent issuers implementing selling groups that played to niche domestic investor bases.
Then came the deluge of investor money during the course of the year. A rarely identified but substantial flaw in the capital markets occurs when there is a big mismatch between supply and demand. When demand outweighs supply, lead managers can become lazy. It is hard to blame them. Why should they search out pockets of demand in hidden corners? Is there a point to having an enlarged selling group when investor demand is overwhelming? There is little need to think about growing the investor base when even the biggest asset managers are allocated only a small proportion of bonds during book building.
But there is a potential problem with the market’s structure. It contributes to inefficiencies in distribution, and concentrations of risk.
When the concept of investment banking supermarkets became pervasive, large selling groups fell out of fashion. For at least 10 years now, the number of bank participants in new issues has been whittled down.
Whereas once a new-issue tombstone (remember those?) might have included the names of more than 20 participants, deals rarely have a group larger than eight these days. Even the biggest global deals might have a group of three or four lead managers – and nothing beneath it. The rise of the pot distribution method – whereby all investors’ names were placed in a single pot and then allocated by the bookrunners – led, over time, to those without book responsibilities not providing any investor names.
That small group of lead managers was usually able to cope, because of the rise of the big investors and leveraged accounts and the demise of small retail tickets.
While small lead management groups facilitated speed in deal execution, there are arguments against too much haste in the allocation of credit or capital.
Can a small group of banks access the full potential investor base? Is it wise, in these days of careful risk management, for a handful of leads to take huge chunks of underwriting risk? While banks are looking for ways to make steady, relatively risk-free returns, does it not make sense for co-managers to aim to actually sell bonds, rather than flip them straight back to the leads?
For the efficient allocation of capital, engaging a greater number of buyers should surely be better for price stability and risk dispersal. Certainly issuers might find that they have a bigger following if their bonds are offered to pockets of demand as well as the wallets of the biggest investors.