It’s important for the world financial system that the uncertainty around the future scheme of regulation be resolved quickly. That means in the next few weeks or months.
The debate about appropriate capital levels and accounting rules for the banks, and over which bodies should regulate and supervise them and how, both individually and as a system, has been all over the place.
Much more crucial aspects remain to be settled than setting caps on bankers’ pay. Private suppliers of capital to the banking system will insist on an economic return that, even if lower than in the past, must be less volatile and more dependable. If investors are not able to see this governments will remain large holders of the capital of the banking system for a long time to come.
Given the importance of an efficient money transfer mechanism to the health of an economy, surely no one wants that.
If a new social contract is to be drawn up for banks, what is the proposition to customers as well as to shareholders? It might be acceptable if buttressing the system adds one percentage point to mortgage costs and brings monthly fees for maintaining basic bank accounts comparable to what consumers now pay for their mobile phones and cable TV. If costs rise by a multiple of that, then the debate might not be settled so quickly.
While all this remains undecided, some broad outlines of the future of financial markets are now coming into view and offer encouragement, such as simpler products and greater use of collectively capitalized central clearing counterparties. These are changes that reduce banks’ chances of making profits but because they make the system so much safer the benefits easily outweigh the costs.
Assuming the main points of a new regulatory framework are settled in the next year, a second and so far rather neglected question arises: when should this new regulatory system be implemented? The temptation is to say 2011 or, as the US Treasury recommended, in September 2012. But if there is urgency to agree the new system – banks have not been big lenders in the early stages of economic recovery and can’t engage with the future when they don’t know how it will be shaped by regulators – let’s be generous over implementation and be sensitive to the economic cycle.
A target of 2015 might be more sensible.
Banks aren’t coming at this with a clean plate but rather with what detritus they already have, and it would seem wise to delay or phase new capital and associated leverage ratio and other requirements, perhaps applying them only to new assets while grandfathering existing portfolios.
The early stages of economic recovery are playing out even while banks are reluctant to lend. For that recovery to take hold requires a revival in bank lending to sustain it. European banks, to take just one group, fear that being made to adhere to an amended Basle II regime from the start of 2011 will severely limit their capacity to take on assets.
Anecdotal evidence already suggests that banks are simply unwilling to price certain credits because of uncertainties over future capital requirements against them, and hedge funds are stepping in as the only bidders. A speedy implementation of onerous new capital requirements might prompt banks to turn their backs on whole classes of assets and turn them over to less-regulated lenders with unknown appetite and capacity. That promises worrying consequences for users of capital and for systemic resilience.
So let’s fix the rules soon but let’s give banks enough time to sort out their mess before they must hold to them.