Corporate financing: Too big to survive?

The difficulties in trying to marshal large numbers of disparate creditors will push more corporates into bankruptcy.

If you are going to borrow large amounts of money, you are going to need a lot of people to lend it to you. So the jumbo deals of the recent boom have left behind companies with creditor groups that run into the hundreds: for example, UK petrochemicals company Ineos, which has just agreed new debt terms, had to negotiate with its 230 lenders to get there. But large creditor groups are not new – for example the lender group to UK building firm Beazer in the early 1990s included 98 banks (some of which even went out of business as that restructuring dragged on). But the key difference this time around is that creditors are not all banks – they are a multitude of entities with very different appetites and capacities to lend. And many of these lenders might also hold CDS protection on the corporate – which could make agreement impossible if they would rather see a default trigger their CDS protection than save the company.

Getting hundreds of different parties to agree on anything is fiendishly difficult and time-consuming. But in some cases company and lenders alike need to recognize earlier rather than later that their attempts are futile. When Pimco reneged on a debt swap agreement for GMAC last December, chief investment officer Bill Gross simply stated: “We are not good committee members. We have the interests of our clients more at heart than the interests of particular corporations or even the government.” Struggling companies would do well to remember this.

The market might therefore see greater use of bankruptcy proceedings to force decisions through. There is already growing use of pre-pack administration, whereby companies reorganize in private and dip in and out of bankruptcy in order to present the new structure as a fait accompli. Even where new money can be agreed upon, bankruptcy might still follow. For example, lenders to The CIT Group, which recently provided the company with $3 billion of emergency lending, are still being advised to pursue a pre-pack bankruptcy for the firm. More and more restructurings are likely to adopt strategies such as the scheme of arrangement in the UK where existing lender rights can be extinguished and dissenters removed.

The same logic applies to securities restructuring, where the appointment of a receiver means that security can be enforced over the assets. This has been successfully achieved in the structured investment vehicle market and might now be applied to other structures.

And, as ever in these interconnected markets, if there are more corporate bankruptcies, more and more financing vehicles might find themselves considering the merits of receivership sooner rather than later. According to Standard & Poor’s, The CIT Group is referenced in 1,053 European synthetic CDOs – a full 66% of the entire market. So if the company does declare bankruptcy via a pre-pack, the CDO market should brace itself for yet another body blow too.