Iranian bank privatizations: another power grab?

Privatization in Iran involves big transfers of stakes from one arm of the state to another, propping up the establishment and helping unbalance the economy.

In the past two months, the Iranian government has sold parts of Saderat, Mellat and Tejarat, three of the biggest financial institutions in the Islamic Republic. In Iran, bank privatization is accelerating. Is this part of the power grab, the conservative coup, that might have occurred during this summer’s disputed presidential election?

One might even suggest that the privatizations were even accelerated so that the Basij, the Revolutionary Guards and other entities with an interest in preserving the leadership could consolidate their power, just at the point when the conservative rule of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad came under pressure from street protesters.

The process was probably not speeded up much as a result of the rulers being surprised by the protests. Iran’s privatization programme, and more particularly the privatization of banks, has not been implemented suddenly. Privatization has been accelerating for more than a year. Long before large crowds started to express their support for opposition candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the state had planned to offload chunks in these banks round about now.

Still, in privatizations under Ahmedinejad, even when stakes are sold on the stock market, only a small proportion goes to entirely private-sector investors (usually individuals). Most shares in Iranian privatizations go to entities that are quasi-governmental, including investment firms owned and controlled, for example, by the Revolutionary Guards, a part of the Iranian military apparatus staunchly in favour of maintaining the status quo. Investments on the stock exchange are similarly sometimes made by the Basij paramilitary, which also acts to preserve the state’s anti-US elements.

The biggest shares in privatizations have gone in blocks rather than on the public market, and most of the time the largest recipients are state-controlled pension funds or allocations for what are known as justice shares. These justice shares are meant for distribution to the poor but they continue to be managed by entities controlled by the state.

The investment funds of the Basij and the Revolutionary Guards have only ever taken small minority stakes in privatizations directly. But the only evidence to suggest that the latest bank privatizations are not putting banks much more under the control of Ahmedinejad and his conservative allies lies in the fact that these forces already dominate the economy and financial system.

In Iran, government departments such as the welfare ministry appoint directors of state banks, as well as of state investment companies and state pension funds. After Ahmedinejad won the presidency in 2005, those directors who remained did so because they were pliant to the new government’s aims. Those who were too senior, or too associated with reformism, were removed.

Ahmedinejad’s economic model of the past four years has been to accelerate public spending, partly through directed lending from the state-owned banks. Meanwhile, the extra inflation this caused, combined with the fall in the global oil price and in domestic property values, has been an addition to the regime’s traumas this summer.