Rescue packages: Obama stalls for time

If you are going to throw money at a problem, throw it at the right problem.

The Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan announced by president Obama’s administration in mid-February is yet another example in this crisis of well-meaning legislation that largely misses the point.

The good thing about it is that it is at least attempting to tackle the root of the problem: mortgages. The bad thing about it is that it is tackling the wrong ones. The $275 billion plan is two pronged: first, it will allow mortgages held or securitized by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae that do not account for more than 105% of the current value of the property to refinance. Second, an interest modification programme will enable interest rates on adjustable rate mortgages (alt-A option ARMs) to borrowers at risk of foreclosure to be reduced for the next five years.

The first part of the plan will enable lots of borrowers to refinance – but just not those borrowers that really need to. Refinancing will be available for between 4 million and 5 million responsible homeowners with conforming loans guaranteed by the GSEs on which they made a 20% down payment and are current on their payments. The refinancing option is not available for the $2 trillion of deals that have been written in the private-label MBS market and are the real root of the problem. Delinquency rates on GSE mortgages were running at 2.8% in November 2008 for Fannie Mae and 1.8% for Freddie Mac. In the private-label sub-prime mortgage market they were running at 19.6%.

Some $75 billion has been earmarked to prevent foreclosures on borrowers seen as at risk. This part of the plan is actually tackling problem loans, but only 50% to 60% of them will be eligible for modification. Where a borrower is paying more than 38% of income (but up to a limit of 43%) the lender will reduce interest payments back down to 38% and the government will then reduce payments further to 31% for the next five years. Investors in these mortgages will be compensated for the shortfall.

This part of the plan will probably work – but only in the short term by delaying foreclosures rather than preventing them. It does nothing to reduce loan principal and address affordability – again the root of the problem. So this is essentially a five-year stalling tactic that will keep these loans ticking over until comfortably after the next US election.

No matter how unpalatable, dealing with the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US is, at some stage, going to entail actually dealing with those sub-prime mortgages themselves. The maximum number of homeowners likely to benefit from this plan is roughly 9 million. This is less than half of the 18 million to 20 million US mortgage holders (a shocking 40% of the entire mortgage market) that are already in negative equity.

Legislation such as this simply dances around the issue and prolongs the problem. Incentivizing borrowers in the GSE market to refinance to lower rates achieves very little other than to spur on the refinancing of any remotely viable non-agency mortgage into the agency market. This will leave a private-label mortgage market made up entirely of the most distressed borrowers. There are no incentives for these borrowers to rework their debts, so the incidence of ‘jingle mail’ – whereby they simply hand back the keys – will only rise. And with cram-down legislation (whereby a bankruptcy judge would be allowed to alter the terms of mortgages for borrowers in bankruptcy) waiting in the wings, these mortgages seem more likely to be modified by a bankruptcy court judge than by any new legislation.

The most effective means of dealing with these loans is what it has always been: transferring them into a ring-fenced entity, modifying them and running the portfolio down. This solution is unpalatable to the regulators and the electorate for many reasons, but the sooner they realize that it is the only option that will work, the better.