UK bail-out: It’s the pricing, stupid

The UK Treasury’s latest bank bail-out plan will fail unless it works out what bad assets are worth.

The crisis in the banking sector will only be resolved when the toxic assets that caused the problem are entirely removed from the system. This may be as self-evident as a man in possession of a good fortune being in want of a wife, but governments and regulators alike have spent a lot of time and money trying to convince themselves otherwise.

The latest initiatives announced by the UK Treasury are a step in the right direction in that they propose to start buying assets. But they are only proposing to buy good assets; bad ones will just be insured.

The initiative involves an Asset Protection Scheme under which the Treasury will insure institutions against future credit losses on defined assets to the extent that they exceed a first-loss amount. The statement says that the scheme will specifically target those asset classes “most affected by current economic conditions” by which we can assume they mean bad ones. It will cover the “major part” of these credit losses which exceed the first-loss amount, as participating institutions will be required to pick up a further 10% of losses over and above the first-loss amount that they are already on the hook for.

The announcement is determinedly vague as to how the first loss that the insured institution must bear will be calculated, saying that the Treasury and its advisers will “take into account their estimation” of the performance of the assets to be insured. In these markets, this sounds very like pulling a number out of a hat. But the premium that the government will require to take on the tail risk of losses over and above the first loss plus 10% level could be unpalatably high for the banks.

Traditional first-loss exposure in securitizations ranges around the 10% to 15% level. So banks looking to use the scheme could be picking up the first 25% on losses from whatever the asset is valued at when it is insured. That is a very big deductible indeed.

The £50 billion ($70 billion) Asset Purchase Scheme is targeted at “high quality private sector assets”. What does this mean? Will it mean highly rated paper? Relying on ratings is what got us into this mess, not what will get us out of it. Some have argued that the scheme should be used to buy tier 1 and upper tier 2 bonds instead, as propping up the subordinated bond market is the only thing that will convince bank shareholders that their holdings are anything but worthless.

One of the most frustrating aspects of this crisis is that strong, performing assets have been marked down to levels previously associated with distressed debt. So how will value for these purchases be determined? Could assets potentially qualify for both the purchase and insurance schemes?

The fine detail of this latest bail-out will remain frustratingly sketchy until the end of February. But its success depends, as ever, on determining the price at which a “high-quality” asset is bought by the government or a lesser-quality asset is insured by it. This proved the stumbling block for the US Tarp scheme when it was first mooted, and the UK Treasury had better have spent many late nights figuring out an answer if it is to have any more success with this scheme. There seem to be two clear choices: establish a market-clearing price through a reverse auction – and risk establishing a low-level price for assets across the board. Or establish a price at which the banks are prepared to sell – and end up subsidizing their bad decisions with taxpayers’ money. We await further details with interest.