Ever since the financial crisis began in mid-2007, commentators have sought parallels in the hope of finding a template for curing sick banks, especially in the US and UK. The obvious examples are the banking crises in the US in the 1930s, Sweden in the early 1990s and Japan later that decade.
In terms of size and complexity, these crises are probably the most comparable with the one today. There is, however, another example that policymakers should pore over. That is the Chilean banking crisis of the early 1980s, as economists Vitoria Saddi and JF Hornbeck, among others, have recently argued.
Although there are key differences between that crisis and today’s – not least in their origins – there are some valuable lessons that Chile’s recovery plan provides for policymakers.
The Chilean crisis was macroeconomic in origin. In the late 1970s the Andean nation liberalized its financial system, including banking regulation that culminated in a credit-led boom between 1980 and 1981. Bank lending almost doubled between 1979 and 1981 to 45% of GDP, according to Hornbeck. As the global economy entered recession in 1981-82, however, that boom turned into bust.
A deteriorating economic environment and a weakly regulated financial system led to an inevitable outcome – stressed borrowers and overextended banks. Banks’ balance sheets quickly became damaged goods. In November 1981, the authorities were forced to take over two failing financial institutions. With the recession deepening, the crisis continued. Past-due loans as a percentage of total loans rose to 8.4% from 1.1% between 1980 and 1983, according to Hornbeck.
The Chilean government was faced with the same issues that confront the US and UK today – inadequately capitalized banks, a severe contraction of credit, and a clear possibility that the entire financial system could collapse.
Its response was three-fold: a debt-restructuring plan for borrowers; acquisition of non-performing loans from the banks; and the liquidation of failing financial institutions.
Under the debt-restructuring programme, borrowers’ short-term loans were rescheduled into three-year to five-year debts at manageable interest rates. By issuing money, the central bank helped debtors pay up to 30% of their outstanding loans to the banks. There were restrictions, however. Only viable and productive companies – firms producing goods and services – could be part of the plan and have their debts restructured. Banks would have to either seize the collateral or take legal action against ineligible debtors.
The idea was not to bail out reckless borrowers but to prevent a seizing up of the credit markets.
The second part of the government’s response was to recapitalize the banking system. This was more complex and difficult. The process adopted was similar to a repo transaction. In theory, the central bank offered to buy the NPLs of the troubled banks through a secured loan. Future profits were used to provision against potential losses from these loans. At a later date the banks would be required to repurchase the assets and pay the central bank back in full.
In practice, the NPLs would remain with the banks but off balance sheet for accounting purposes. The idea was that the banks would be given time to work through their distressed assets and build their loan-loss reserves without the threat of insolvency. Banks were not allowed to make dividend payments until the central bank had been repaid.
The third leg of the plan involved the liquidation of 14 insolvent banks. For the most part, the government ensured that depositors had their money fully refunded. In addition, the government tightened regulations, especially for capital requirements and provisioning for loan losses.
The Chilean recovery process was neither straightforward nor cheap. The total cost of liquidating failed banks was 10.6% of GDP and the NPLs scheme added another 6.7% of GDP to the bill. At times the government had to adjust its policies and it wasn’t until 1985 that the portfolio of NPLs at the central bank began to fall.
The plan could not have succeeded, however, without all three parts being enforced. It was crucial that the credit markets stayed liquid, with borrowers’ debts restructured not forgiven; that banks were given time to assess and then dispose of their bad assets; and that failed institutions were taken out of the financial system in an orderly way.
As the governments of the US and UK grapple with the intricacies of their financial systems’ malaise, they could do worse than study the lessons of Chile’s bank crisis.