Given the pounding they have received for nearly two years now, structured finance investors could be forgiven for seeing their glass as half empty rather than half full. At many points it seemed as if there was no floor low enough for these securities – and just when it appeared that valuations could not fall any further – they did. In late May, however, they could have been forgiven for thinking that they had just woken up from a bad dream: a portfolio of ABS and CDO securities was put up for sale and not only were investors falling over themselves to buy but many did not get their orders filled and came away disappointed.
No, this was not a parallel universe, it was the auction of a portion of the failed Whistlejacket structured investment vehicle. The $7 billion fund defaulted in February 2008 when it was cut loose by sponsor Standard Chartered. In late April, receiver Deloitte auctioned off just over 54% of the remaining securities in a $2.5 billion sale. The last time that a SIV portfolio was auctioned off in this way – the sale of 20% of the assets of another defaulted vehicle, Cheyne Finance – the process was a depressing fire sale, with just 11 bids for $1.7 billion of assets and the highest bid just 44 cents on the dollar.
But that was July 2008, and this is now. The Whistlejacket sale achieved an average price of 67.1% – with bids as high as 80% for some CMBS paper and even 70% for certain UK non-conforming names. All of the paper was snapped up by 14 institutions, with smaller asset managers and insurers failing to get a look-in. The auction was a sorely needed piece of very good news in the battered ABS market, and an indication that buyers are starting to come to their senses in valuing certain triple-A rated securities.
But before the market breaks open the champagne, two things need to be borne in mind. First, the Cheyne and Whistlejacket portfolios were very different. The Cheyne Finance SIV was stuffed full of low-quality assets generated at the height of the boom while Whistlejacket was a long-established vehicle with good-quality collateral. If Whistlejacket had been auctioned in July 2008 it might well have done much better than Cheyne did. Secondly, the vast majority of buyers in the Whistlejacket sale were the dealers themselves, not end investors. The prices paid to take advantage of what might turn out to be a suckers’ rally should not, therefore, be unquestioningly taken as a measure of buy-and-hold appetite for ABS and CDO assets.
But it seems churlish to pour cold water on what little good news is emerging from the structured finance industry. Immediately following the auction, spreads for UK triple-A RMBS moved in from around 330 basis points over Libor to around 280bp. There is still a long way to go, but this is definitely a step in the right direction.