German banks get stressed out

Regulators in Berlin have yet to pull off the confidence trick of their US and UK counterparts.

There is something to be said for having a large and loyal domestic investor base. Throughout the crisis, German institutions have benefited from this. So although the wider credit market might view German banks generally as too risky a proposition to lend to without a guarantee, domestic support has allowed them to sell billions of euros-worth of Pfandbriefe.

All this is remarkable because in recent weeks there have been lurid reports that the true nature of the German banks’ bad debts is in excess of €800 billion – a figure that dwarfs those attributed to the much-maligned UK banking sector.

It seems unlikely that the numbers are accurate. They were leaked from a confidential BaFin report and refer, it seems, to the widest possible range of assets up for consideration for inclusion in Frankfurt’s bad bank proposal.

Yet the gap between the number included in the leaked BaFin document and the size of the subsequent bad bank proposal (€200 million) gives weight to those who accuse Germany of enthusiastically pursuing regulatory forbearance.

In essence the scheme provides a mechanism for German banks to voluntarily shift structured credit assets off their books, into a special purpose vehicle, at a 10% discount to where they were marked at the end of March. This is little more than a resecuritization of the bad assets – albeit with a guarantee provided by Germany’s Financial Market Stabilization Fund (SoFFin) guarantee. The cashflows from the bad assets will provide funding for the bonds, with any shortfall being filled by the participating banks which also pay a fee to SoFFin for the guarantee. The list of what is wrong with the plan is rather long and needs no retelling in full here. A summary includes: the delaying of the day of reckoning, reducing the possibility of fresh equity capital from private sources, punishing those banks that have aggressively marked their books. And reducing transparency.

That it is replicating the mistake Japan made by failing to cauterize the 1990s’ bad debt problem is, perhaps, the most powerful accusation aimed at Frankfurt. It might seem a good idea to wait until after September’s elections to take the really tough decisions. But it is a risk.

What are the alternatives? Some are, to be frank, even more unpalatable. The received wisdom of alternative methods of dealing with the crisis is to formally separate banks into good and bad assets. Depositors will be aligned with the good, and wholesale creditors with the bad. This might appear to be a fair outcome. Debt investors’ herd mentality and lack of due diligence were big factors in contributing to the mispricing of credit risk. It is hard not to argue that debt holders should share the pain.

Such thoughts are supported by complaints that the UK and US bailouts socialize banks’ bad debts. That charge cannot be levelled at Germany, whose plan appears to be little more than accounting sleight of hand. Unfortunately, nobody was tricked. It is hard to find a good word spoken on Germany’s plans for dealing with legacy securitized assets in private-sector banks – the troubled Landesbanken await their own scheme.

The state bears no real risk under the terms of this scheme but there are dangers to this approach also. Banks labouring under a pile of bad debts will not help to promote economic growth. If banks are not allowed to fail – the prospect of another general run on the financial system also introduces the prospect of socializing risk – then they must be cleansed. The options are to take away the problematic assets or supply capital – or both.

Governments are attempting a confidence trick: rebuild confidence by rubber-stamping banks’ balance sheets as recession proof. The key to this trick is to assure onlookers without openly declaring banks insolvent. So far the UK and US approach appears to be working. Detractors can pick holes in so-called stress tests that banking regulators have inflicted on their charges all they like. If the audience wants to believe in magic there is little sceptics can do about it. It seems unlikely that Germany has pulled the rabbit out of the hat.