Fixing the money markets is more important than any bail-out

Analysts at JPMorgan suggest that prime money market funds, which had $2 trillion of assets under management in early September and are a leading provider of short-term liquidity to the banking system, suffered between $350 billion and $400 billion of redemptions after the Prime Reserve fund broke the buck following losses on its $385 million holdings of Lehman commercial paper.

Analysts at JPMorgan suggest that prime money market funds, which had $2 trillion of assets under management in early September and are a leading provider of short-term liquidity to the banking system, suffered between $350 billion and $400 billion of redemptions after the Prime Reserve fund broke the buck following losses on its $385 million holdings of Lehman commercial paper.

Other funds also might have broken the buck in the week beginning September 15 had not their parents injected cash.

At the surviving prime money market funds, these vast redemptions have eaten into the substantial cash cushions – between 10% and 20% of assets under management – all must hold to meet forecast investor calls for their cash back.

These funds must now sell good-quality assets to rebuild cash levels. They are selling some of their longer-maturity holdings to do this, shortening their funds’ average maturities and further reducing supply of one-month and particularly three-month money which banks roll over to fund loans and build assets.

Amid all the sound and fury generated by the troubled asset recovery programme (Tarp), policymakers’ speedy efforts to restore order to the short-term money markets have been rather overlooked.

This is a pity, because this was an example of targeted emergency government intervention in markets having – just about – a positive result.

As well as funding banks, money-market funds are a key source of day-to-day working capital for US corporations – the source of short-term cash to pay suppliers, to pay wages. To have this source of finance suddenly cut off would be the corporate equivalent for a householder, not of having a mortgage loan application to buy a house turned down, but of finding a credit card rejected and cut up at the supermarket check-out line. The authorities had to act rapidly and effectively and managed, just barely, to do both.

First, on September 19, the US Treasury announced a $50 billion guarantee fund to insure participating money market mutual funds so that investors would be guaranteed to be able to retrieve their cash at full net asset value.

Of course, all government action can have unintended consequences. Presumably some bright spark somewhere in the Treasury spotted, or perhaps a banking industry lobbyist pointed out, that a federal guarantee on money market funds risked prompting retail depositors to pull their money out of the banks and place it in the funds.

So, two days later, the Treasury issued clarification that the guarantee extended to amounts held in money market funds up to close of business on September 19.

A run on the banks was narrowly avoided.

In a perhaps more significant and certainly more subtle move, the Federal Reserve opened the discount window to money market funds, using the banks as an intermediary.

It created assured liquidity for the $300 billion or so of asset-backed commercial paper held by 2a-7 money market funds by allowing banks to buy the paper from funds at amortized cost – effectively at par – and then post it as collateral to raise cash from the Federal Reserve with a zero haircut and zero risk-capital weighting.

Use of this facility helped inject $73 billion of liquidity into money market funds in the first three days of operation. The immediate crisis in money market funds appeared to pass.

Still, that $400 billion coming out of prime money market funds, reducing available funding to banks, is unlikely to return quickly, suggest analysts at JPMorgan. It has mostly been recycled into short-term government bills and more conservative money market funds that invest exclusively in them, helping to drive down treasury yields and lower the government’s cost of short-term borrowing, even to zero at moments of extreme panic.

It remains the case that it is only the US government now that has unlimited access to low-cost funding. It may yet be required to use this capacity to ease markets again. While politicians pass the blame for failing to enact the bail-out bill, it is to be hoped the Federal Reserve and the Treasury’s best minds can keep their focus on the money markets.