How close did Lehman come to disaster in June?
Senior insiders say that not for a single moment did they fear the worst, such a mountain of cash and near-cash securities is the firm sitting on, so far out has it lengthened the maturities of borrowing that supports its trading activity and so much has it reduced leverage.
Maybe so. Unfortunately, Lehman officials have insisted before that the firm was invulnerable, only to be forced last month into diluting shareholders with a heavily discounted new equity issue as part of a $6 billion capital-raising to cover the bank’s first quarterly loss since going public in 1994.
Even strong capitalization and abundant unencumbered collateral can’t save you, if either your counterparties simply lose confidence and won’t deal with you, or you cannot immediately turn all those near-cash securities into actual cash.
Just ask Bear Stearns.
It never quite threatened to go that far for Lehman. But Wall Street was buzzing at the start of June with talk about losses and capital-raising, and the firm made clear mistakes. It mishandled communication, appearing to disclose losses, deny plans to raise capital, reveal plans to raise capital and then buy in shares all in a confused few days of dizzying volatility in the firm’s stock. Traders at other firms were simply bemused.
Only Lehman can explain why it felt forced to concentrate efforts to reduce problem positions into an extraordinary $150 billion sell-off of assets in a single quarter. That required marking down the rest of the firm’s book, in itself no bad thing, and crystallized losses, taking the market by surprise. And now it faces the same questions it did before: what further losses might it be forced to take on its remaining positions.
At least the firm moved quickly to hold senior executives to account.
Intangibles helped Lehman. Although it has cut many hundreds of jobs, senior management has just about maintained the firm’s legendary team and fighting spirits. The head of investment banking at a rival firm talks with a mixture of admiration and disappointment about a senior hire from Lehman his firm had been poised to announce as the storm hit. The banker amazed his prospective new colleagues by saying he had decided to stay put because it would just feel wrong to desert Lehman in its troubles.
Such spirit is rare and takes many years to build. There are many, many bank and investment bank CEOs that would kill for it.
And Lehman’s troubles provide some crumbs of comfort. The good news is that it was able to complete such a large-scale sell-off, just three months after the markets had been horrified by the prospect of a $20 billion distressed sale from Bear Stearns. There are signs that the logjam is breaking; markets are reviving even for problem securities. That’s the good news.
The bad news is the prices. Firms will probably face more savage losses in the next few months as the economies of the US and UK suffer. There are lots of brave faces out there but the smartest people Euromoney speaks to are mostly fundamentally bearish. Equity markets may be overreacting to these hits, punishing firms on the way down just as vigorously as they rewarded them in the boom times. Weep no tears for investment bankers that complain at this. In the bull market they all got paid for producing alpha, when most were merely delivering beta, accumulating collateral using their firms’ cheap cost of carry. None of them complained then.
In the medium to longer term, it remains to be seen how investment banking will survive all this. The US election provides a welcome delay before new legislation can be passed changing wholesale market regulation. No one expects the Fed window to be closed to broker dealers, implying tighter regulation in return for that safety net. That will change the business model and ultimately the ownership structure of the industry.
Leverage must continue to decline if volatility remains high or increases. Losses will multiply. Earnings will be weak. Even when that phase passes, investment banks will be required to stick to liquid assets rather than the illiquid ones where most recovery value will reside. Perhaps they can devise new fund-like vehicles through which to enjoy gains in these, but the Fed will hardly encourage taking on more hidden exposure in new off-balance-sheet vehicles.
Conventional banks will have their own problems: let’s see how their consumer businesses fare across the cycle. Wealth management looks like one of the better businesses to be in. But those with deposit funding, including some banks that have made awful mistakes of their own, and recorded sizeable losses, will be well placed, should they wish to, to acquire investment-banking expertise.
We could be living through the last days of the independent investment banks.