European government bonds: Times breed unconventional wisdom

Unprecedented high spreads between European government bonds are prompting some radical – and frankly unworkable – new ideas.

The levels of risk aversion among investors has precipitated a flight to quality that has forced spreads on European government paper to worrying levels. Italian BTP yield spreads are almost 100 basis points over benchmark German bunds. Ten-year Greek issues are now 120bp above their German counterparts. With funding this expensive for non-core European sovereigns, the European Primary Dealers Association (EPDA) is revisiting an idea first discussed in 2000: a common European government bond. The EPDA argues that since the government bond markets have become so fragmented the benefits of such a product are increasingly apparent, especially to the smaller, lower rated issuers.

The association outlined in a September discussion paper six possible instrument types. The first would comprise the total annual issuance of the 15 euro area sovereigns, accounting for €1.5 trillion a year. Such a programme would be rated A/A/A1, according to the association. The second option is the same but with a guarantee fund administered through an agency, bringing the rating to triple-A. The other options include issuance programmes that only account for 50% of the annual funding of the sovereigns and issues that exclude the core markets of Germany and France.

The idea was first floated in 2000 as a way of boosting liquidity in the European government bond market and narrowing the gap with US treasuries. Discussions on the topic have mainly centred on the fact that although smaller issuers would benefit from higher ratings, and from being part of larger issuers than those of which they would otherwise be capable, the larger, higher rated issuers would of necessity be paying the difference. Consequently the idea of excluding Germany and France from any such issuance has been included in the EPDA’s discussion, but this would partly defeat the object, as the programme would then need a guarantee fund to ensure high ratings.

Further, the paper makes a number of assumptions. Firstly, that any such issues would be politically possible. The paper repeatedly mentions the importance of any agency involved in issuing a common bond being free of political influence. Also, it assumes the existence of a highly liquid repo market (as the common bonds would be expected to replace government bonds as the repo instrument of choice) as well as a highly liquid common bond futures market. Neither of which are conceivable in the near future.

The EPDA says that a common bond “would better enable Europe to compete with the US treasury market as the most liquid market globally and “could aid the development of the euro as a reserve currency.” In an ideal world that may be true, but the legal and political obstacles of the real world make the possibility of a common government bond any time in the near future a very remote one. Rather, the fact that the idea is again being discussed can be taken as a sign of where sentiment in the market lies. The worse things get, the more radical the suggested solutions become. After all, some of the government measures already put in place would have been unthinkable just a few weeks ago.