Japan’s banks struggle again

Shinsei provides a reminder that bail-outs don’t make bad banks good.

The end of former Morgan Stanley banker Thierry Porte’s term as head of Shinsei, one of Japan’s rescued banks, and the management shake-ups at Shinsei’s peer, Aozora, have attracted a lot of attention in Japan.

When a consortium including Ripplewood and Christopher Flowers bought Shinsei in 2000, it was the first time that a Japanese bank had come under foreign control. As the bank began to articulate its strategy, focusing on a strong web presence, customer service and technological innovation, it looked as though the bank would stand as a model of what aggressive foreign management could do for struggling Japanese corporations.

Aozora too was rescued by outsiders. After an abortive attempt at becoming an investment bank, the firm was taken over by Cerberus Capital Management in 2006, and set out to be a Tokyo-based retail bank.

Now Aozora is in trouble, reporting an unprofitable first half of the fiscal year and bearing the stigma of being listed as the top unsecured creditor in Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing, with $463 million in outstanding loans.

The two have struggled for mundane reasons: neither bank, since its rescue, has ever hit upon a business plan that makes sense for it.

Aozora simply never achieved the scale it needed to become consistently profitable, and the goal of being a smaller but more selective provider that would outmanoeuvre the megabanks on service for select clients always looked difficult to attain. Japan is already over-banked, and although Shinsei met with some success in its technological advances for retail it was always the bank’s services to corporations that made it the most money.

What is next for the two banks? Rumours that Shinsei is to be sold abound in Tokyo, with most observers reckoning that the megabanks would have little to gain from buying the firm and that a foreign financial institution might want to take the opportunity to expand in Japan. HSBC is aggressively marketing its services in the country.

Divining lessons for the US and European governments in their present predicament of having to rescue financial institutions from Japan’s similar experiences a decade ago has become popular lately. There are many dissimilarities between these mid-sized Japanese banks and the much larger western banks receiving government money now.

It ought to be sobering, however, for governments elsewhere in the world pouring money into banks and expecting to then see them recapitalized and set back on their feet, to see these paragons of that narrative in Japan fail to provide the expected happy conclusion.