These equity vehicles are very unusual in structured credit in that they tap into the retail investor base (see Asset-backed securities: Funds list to ease first-loss sales, Euromoney, May 2006). Everquest is one of the largest of this new breed of funds and is co-managed by Bear Stearns Asset Management (BSAM) and hedge fund Stone Tower Capital.
The two Bear Stearns High Grade (BSHG) hedge funds that have attracted so much negative attention are managed by Bear Stearns veteran Ralph Cioffi – who also happens to be co-chief executive of Everquest together with Michael Levitt of Stone Tower. The listing particulars reveal that the BSHG funds own 67% of Everquest, and have transferred equity in 10 CDOs to the permanent capital vehicle for a consideration of $548.8 million. Later in the document it is revealed that all of Everquest’s CDO holdings were contributed by BSAM and that the consideration paid “was not negotiated at arm’s length and may exceed the values that can be achieved upon the sale of such assets”. What the BSAM funds were doing was buying the senior tranches of CDOs and leveraging them on repo. Given the fact that one of the funds has been widely reported to have tanked 23% in the first quarter of this year, holding the first-loss pieces of these same CDOs would not be a comfortable place to be. And by forcing sales of the higher rated assets in the BSHG funds, the margin lenders are providing a brutal illustration of exactly what assets like these are really worth in the open market. So at what price should the holders of the first loss pieces be valuing them on their books? In late June London-based Cheyne Capital Management revealed that it had written down the value of securities in its permanent capital vehicle, Queen’s Walk Investment (which bought first loss pieces in both US and European sub-prime RMBS deals), by 50%.
This episode is a stark reminder of just what investing in first-loss pieces actually means. Ever since the problems in the US sub-prime mortgage market began to bite, performance of permanent capital vehicles has been a matter of intense concern. On June 26 Everquest bowed to the inevitable and cancelled its $100 million IPO, but the market has witnessed a boom in the launch of these closed-ended funds in the past couple of years and there are now roughly 15 listed in New York and London. Those listed in Europe have so far fared considerably worse than their US counterparts: in early June, vehicles managed by Ocean Capital (European Equity Tranche), Cheyne and Cambridge Place Investment Management (Caliber Global Investment) were trading at discounts to net asset value of 16.7%, 29.3% and 39.3% respectively (CPIM finally pulled the plug on the Caliber vehicle on June 28, saying that the fund would close within a year). But other New York-listed vehicles, such as those managed by Cohen & Co and KKR to invest in equity pieces of their own CDOs, have fared much better.
Managers of these vehicles have always emphasized (and paid themselves healthy fees for) the skill required to manage these assets. The pulling of the Everquest Financial IPO means that retail investors will have narrowly escaped finding out for themselves just how skilled the asset selection has been in light of the BSHG funds’ performance. Arrangers that have been banking on permanent capital vehicles to absorb the equity tranches of their upcoming CDO pipeline may have to think again. Retail investors – whose presence at the very bottom of the capital structure has always been something of a mystery – might become increasingly hard to convince.