You did your first dollar bond since the default in July. What was the strategy behind that?
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Guillermo Nielsen, Finance secretary |
We are augmenting issues that are already in the market, be they peso-denominated or dollar bonds. But they are basically Bodens, which is post-restructuring debt, issued under local legislation. One of the lessons of the restructuring is that local versus international legislation doesn’t make any significant difference, if any at all. We are in a truly globalized market. People that buy the bonds come from the usual hedge funds in New York, London and so on. What we have been doing is increasing the supply of bonds they already own.
We also had to be very careful during the restructuring process to disentangle the [huge] number of bonds and financial instruments. That made things very difficult to manage. So now we’re keeping indebtedness in as few bonds as possible.
Who were the main investors in the dollar bond?
Hedge funds.
Do you think that the bond showed that investors have short memories?
[Pausing] No.
The yield was only 7.99% though.
Yes. We could have [raised more] with just a slight difference in yield. We were looking for [a minimum of] $500 million; we got $460 million because we capped the yield. But the point is: do investors have short memories? I would put it this way – what matters is the future. I don’t think investors have short memories. I do think investors have grown more sophisticated. As such they are more willing and able to disentangle past problems from future promises.
But isn’t it remarkable that you priced a dollar bond at 7.99% when you defaulted only three-and-a-half years ago?
Why? My point is that investors realize that the macro-framework is sounder now than it was throughout the 1990s.
Is it just the case that investors have a lot of cash and they are looking for somewhere to put that cash?
No. I mean there is, of course, a driving force behind the cash, no doubt. But it’s not the case that because investors have a lot of cash they are being sloppy in managing that cash. They still have responsibilities and are still accountable. The difference is that when they buy a bond, they are buying a promise. So they have better capabilities and a better understanding of how that promise will be fulfilled from now on.
Sure, but this is from an issuer that broke that promise.
Yes, it broke that promise but not because, as some people tried to depict it at the time, of a conscious decision to break that promise. What happened was that things went totally out of hand. The level of indebtedness was too high to be handled properly and the macro framework was simply not there.
I think that there was, in a way, a superficial evaluation of what was going on in Argentina in the 1990s. Now, most sophisticated investors have a much better understanding of why things went wrong so they will use that [in their analysis].
Do you think the issue therefore validates current economic policy and the restructuring itself?
Yes. Absolutely. It completely validates what we have done.
What is your capital markets strategy?
First, the most important change should be in the reasons for issuing debt. Obviously we will have to follow a very careful liability management policy. The level of debt is still high by international standards, so it has to go down. In some cases, therefore, we will be returning to the markets for liability management reasons. I would characterize our future behaviour as more opportunistic than ever before.
Second, and this is more important, we will get as far as we can from financing the government to financing projects. Part of the nonsense of the 1990s was simply to finance deficits. This is not going to be the case [in the future]. We have a significant primary surplus and we will continue to have [one]. What Argentina needs is a better relationship, a more fruitful link, between international financial markets and specific projects to improve the overall competitiveness of the Argentine economy.
Turning to the restructuring, are you looking at reopening it?
[Pause] It is too early to elaborate on that. There are many requirements for reopening.
Is one that congress will have to overturn the law that forbade a reopening?
Not necessarily. The law was misinterpreted. By constitution, Argentina’s debt should be in congress. Congress has the say on that; it’s not the executive. People sometimes miss this point. They think it’s the executive that can issue debt. No. It’s congress.
The emergency laws that we had to pass to fight the crisis meant that congress gave up these powers in favour of the executive. But that [situation] was over once the restructuring went through.
What are the legal hurdles that have to be overcome, then, for the restructuring to be reopened?
It has to be very clear that there is a critical mass of people that didn’t enter the exchange but at the same time have not gone to the courts.
What do you mean by a critical mass?
We were aware throughout our roadshows, especially in Italy, and we tried to convey to bondholders, that a) this restructuring was going to be successful, and b) that once the restructuring was over it was going to be extremely difficult for them to have a transparent and deep market for those [untendered] bonds.
Unfortunately there was a well-oiled propaganda machine fuelled by the TFA [Task Force Argentina – an Italian lobby group headed by Nicola Stock affiliated to the Global Committee of Argentine Bondholders], some Italian banks and, to an extent, by certain areas within the Italian government, which had the view that this exchange would be a failure.
We are still very concerned for those bondholders that were caught up in this propaganda. The personal and cultural relations with Italy have been and will continue to be extremely important for Argentina. We are worried about those guys that were somehow left [behind].
Have you determined a timetable for a potential reopening or its terms?
No. We are monitoring the market and we will continue to do so.
You haven’t even decided that you will definitely reopen it?
No. It’s too early to say.
But you have sympathy for those retail bondholders?
Absolutely. We tried to convey to them what the real situation was, not the one they were bombarded with.
Did the restructuring’s outcome surprise you? Twelve months before it, some analysts were saying that you would be lucky to get 50% participation [Argentina got over 75%].
No that was never our view. The Argentine process was unique. We always held the view that we would gain momentum and that the transaction would be very successful, regardless of the very tough conditions laid down in the transaction. We were – and I think everyone recognizes this – deeply committed to this transaction. It did not surprise us that we got such a good result.
Moving to your negotiations with the IMF. How are they progressing and do you envisage a new programme soon?
With the IMF, it’s hard to tell. For example, in 2002 we were absolutely convinced that we could have benefited from a programme by mid-year. If you go back and look at all the economic indicators, there was no reason for not having an agreement at the time. Nevertheless it got delayed until January 15 2003. It was an interim agreement by then.
I’m confident and I’m optimistic in the sense that both sides have been dealing with each other for more than three years. We know each other very well. We have had an excellent working relationship with Anoop [Singh, head of western hemisphere at the IMF] and his team.
But there must be big ideological differences? In its Article IV, for example, the IMF recognized that you have made progress on the fiscal front but it still wanted to see a higher surplus.
You have to take all those documents with a pinch of salt. It has all this disdain for [our] accomplishments. No matter [how good] our track record, some people systematically neglect our achievements and they overemphasize our weaknesses.
The report did acknowledge the improvements made, but it highlighted the big issues that still need to be resolved, for instance the need to complete the compensation process for the banks.
The compensation for banking is simply misleading. It knows better. There is no such thing as pending compensation for the banks. Forget it.
I don’t want to go into contradicting line by line [Article IV], which I could. In general, in our experience with the IMF, there are countries and economies that it loves.
It loved Argentina.
We know. We were the poster-child in the 1990s. Some countries are reported in a way that is fantastic when they are not that fantastic. And there are other countries, such as Argentina, that regardless of our accomplishments, it still has to emphasize our weaknesses.
Another perception is that the IMF is actually very happy as long as you keep paying it back. That’s the most important thing to it. So while the bondholders are battling to get their money, the IMF is being repaid.
It’s a very special institution. We are paying the amounts that are due. It should come as no surprise to the financial community that we pay them because that’s what you should do when you have this relationship.
But we have to deleverage vis-à-vis the IMF [reduce Argentina’s debt to the fund]. Of course this has to be done tactfully. The IMF should not be a lender as such, it should be a fire-fighter.
If you don’t see the Fund as a lender why are you looking for a new programme with it?
We need a programme because we need to get into a transition [process] towards this overall deleveraging.
So will the new programme mean a new lending programme?
Partially a new lending programme. Clearly they over-lent to Argentina [in the past]. This was a decision in which we share responsibility. The Argentine authorities requested this additional lending and the [IMF] board accepted. What we’re looking for is a path ahead in which we can reasonably deleverage.