Revenge of the dispossessed

The Islamist AKP fought Turkey’s elections fuelled by discontent with political corruption and incompetence. All the aspirants to power were promising the earth, but can they deliver?

When asked in an interview what the phenomenal popularity of his Islamist Justice & Development Party (AKP) was based on, party chairman Tayyip Erdogan replied: “Hatred, rage and revenge.”

His answer did not need elaboration. Turks understand that he was referring to what many of their compatriots feel about a corrupt political establishment that has landed them with the worst economic crisis in Turkey’s post-war history. Last year’s massive devaluation lost a million people their jobs and 95% of the population has been impoverished by it. Per capita income fell from $2,980 in 2000 to $2,170 in 2001. According to an American banker, in the past three years $45 billion (25% of GNP) has fled Turkey to enter the Swiss banking system.

Turks have always distrusted politicians but their doubts about the political establishment have intensified. An opinion poll conducted by Istanbul daily Milliyet among Turks aged between 16 and 26, the bulk of the population, indicated that 93% did not trust politicians, 89% did not trust bureaucrats and 88% did not trust the government. Young people are so fed up with Turkey that 70% said that given a choice they would live abroad, preferably in the US or Germany.

“The political system has lost its ability to solve problems. It has become a big problem itself,” says a newspaper advertisement placed by the Chambers and Bourses Union of Turkey under the headline “Turkey Wants its Future Back”.

It is impossible to judge the parties by their manifestos. Apart from the fact that no political manifesto has ever been the basis of real economic policy, they are identical in promising the earth.

CSFB organized a roadshow for AKP in London and New York early October. The team was headed by Ali Babacan, a Northwestern University MBA, who is coordinator of the party’s economic affairs and one of its key policy setters. He was accompanied by Nazim Ekren, a professor of economics, and Saban Disli, a banker.

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Playing to the gallery

A report produced by the bank after the visit noted that there were no radical points in the AKP’s policy proposals. But comments from party officials contained pledges about demand-driven growth strategies that might run counter to IMF programmes, which are based on fiscal prudence. CSFB’s analysis concluded: “The AKP seems to be big on the confidence game and its positive effect on interest rates but the generality and vague language of [its] programme and some of its party officials’ comments imply a certain lack of understanding of the IMF’s ways and means.” A Turkish banker who listened to the AKP team’s briefings said: “They are not sophisticated.” His impression was that they put over not what the party actually planned to do but what they thought their audiences wanted to hear. “In London they said ‘we believe in secularism but as applied in England not in Turkey’,” the banker said. “In New York they said ‘we believe in secularism but as applied in the US not in Turkey.’ At the village coffee shop they have a different story to tell. They have a core fundamentalist electorate to which they have to tell their real intention.”

Cem Akyurek, research director of broker Global Securities in Istanbul, says that Turkey needs a government that will “produce a rabbits from its hat – without rabbits it cannot be done”.

The rabbits he has in mind are imaginative and radical reforms, as opposed to the pre-packed and half-heartedly executed IMF formulas with which Turkish economic policy has been conducted since the end of 1999.

“Military spending is one rabbit,” says Akyurek. In relation to its GNP Turkey spends more on defence than any other NATO nation. The precise numbers are not known but annual expenditure is believed to be in the region of $10 billion.

“Another rabbit is debt restructuring,” Akyurek says. Like many market analysts he believes that the 6.5% primary surplus, one of the largest in the world, cannot be maintained indefinitely because it is the product of a distorted tax system. “There is quantity but not quality,” he says. “Every year the reforms that would bring quality are being postponed. Without the quality, one day the debt situation is bound to blow up.”

The Turkish economy is beginning to feel the healing effects of the IMF-supported rehabilitation programme that started in 1999. The figures look good. After a 9% contraction last year there was a remarkable recovery in the first half of 2002. The economy grew by 8.2% in the second quarter and 5.2% in the first half. “Plainly now the official GDP forecast of 3% for all of 2002 will be greatly surpassed,” says JPMorgan’s analyst Yarkin Cebeci.

Tayyip Erdogan: his party has built on
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There is also good news about inflation. Consumer price inflation fell to 37% in September from 69% at the end of 2001. For the first time in decades the market believes that the government might meet its inflation target of 35%, or even better this by two to three percentage points. There are similarly positive developments in industrial capacity utilization and fiscal discipline. At 80% in September, capacity utilization was the highest in nearly two years. This is partly a result of an upsurge in exports. In the January to July period these rose 7% in dollar terms and 18% by volume.

The positive effects of the improvement in the economy are severely undermined by the risks posed by continuing high real interest rates, which remain Turkey’s biggest problem. After falling steadily for much of the first half of 2002, rates shot back up when prime minister Bulent Ecevit’s illness became public knowledge. Interest rates are 35% in real terms.

“It is impossible to overstate the importance of reducing interest rates in Turkey’s battle to service its heavy debt load,” says Mahmut Kaya, chief economist of Garanti Securities. “Rates at the current level are just barely tolerable until the elections, but afterwards they should decline to provide debt sustainability.”

The proportion of interest payments to tax revenues was 95% in the first eight months of this year.

The IMF is not willing to give Turkey the benefit of the doubt. In October, in what would have been the year’s last review of the economy, the Fund postponed the disbursement of a $1.6 billion loan because the government failed to complete certain structural reforms it had undertaken. These included firing workers in the overcrowded state sector, the announcement of the privatization of state alcohol and tobacco monopoly TEKEL and the tabling of the bankruptcy law and the direct tax reform package in parliament.

Turkey’s love-hate relationship with the European Union is continuing to be a source of irritation to both parties. A recent EU progress report highlighted the positive steps taken by Turkey towards democratization, but did not indicate a date for starting accession talks. The final decision will be taken by the EU summit in Copenhagen on December 12, but the market is not counting on a date being fixed then.

More immediately, Turkey is concerned with the political and economic consequences of a possible US-led war against Iraq. Ankara fears that this might lead to the disintegration of its neighbour and the creation of an independent state in the north of Iraq that might revitalize irredentist feelings among Turkish Kurds. Although Turkey is sharply opposed to a war it would take part in it in order to have say in the post-war re-design of Iraq. The economic costs of such a war, which would destroy hopes of an early economic recovery, would be likely to exceed $15 billion.