A question of leadership

The US is unlikely to remain the world’s engine of growth. The trade deficit is at a record high, the federal budget has reverted to deficit, and talk of a fall in consumer spending, even deflation, is growing. The Bush administration appears hell-bent on war with Iraq. Congressional politics are acrimonious and gridlock is the likely outcome of upcoming mid-term elections.

       
Bush and Cheney – both former
company directors and CEOs

TWO WORDS SUM up the defining moment of George W Bush’s tenure as president thus far: Jim Jeffords. It might sound trivial to rank the senator for Vermont above September 11 and its aftermath but no other incident encapsulates so clearly the mindset of the Bush administration as the Republican senator’s defection.

Jeffords is a moderate from a liberal state. His rapport with the Bush administration was never going to be strong, and he soon clashed with it over the proposed $1.3 trillion tax cut that formed a central part of Bush’s election platform of what to do with a proposed 10-year budget surplus of up to $5.5 trillion.

The relationship degenerated into a childish he-said-she-said routine, culminating with the administration neglecting to invite Jeffords to a party at the White House for a Vermont teacher who had won a national teacher of the year competition. It was a public and exceptionally petty rebuke.

Jeffords, re-elected as a Republican senator in 2000, decided to surrender the party whip at the end of May 2001. He flirted with the idea of joining the Democrats but opted instead to become an independent.

It was a severe blow to the party and to the White House. Jeffords’ defection cost the Republicans control of the Senate. The 2000 election had left the chamber with the Republicans and Democrats tied on 50 seats. With the casting vote coming from the vice president, Dick Cheney, the Republicans were deemed to be in control and so had their people running the powerful committees.

The defection handed control of the Senate to the Democrats, and as a result the administration has had a much tougher time getting key parts of its policy agenda through Congress: the tax cut had just been passed but the fast-track trade negotiation authority only just crept through, and a potential reform of the tax code never made it.

The rally-round-the-flag solidarity effect of the terrorists’ attacks cannot disguise the fact that this administration acts on its own. As Kim Wallace, Washington analyst for Lehman Brothers, puts it: “Congressional Republicans and Democrats say that consultation has not been a hallmark of this administration.”

A case in point last month was the staging by the administration of an economic forum in Waco, Texas. It was a blatant attempt to mount a public-relations coup over Congress in general, and the Democrats in particular, in the battle to be seen to be taking charge of the US’s faltering economy.

“The administration was caught so off guard by the corporate governance scandals and the ensuing collapse in the stock markets,” says a senior Wall Street banker with close ties to Republican senators. “It’s incredible that they took so long to take it seriously and come up with a response.”

The Democrats, sensing blood, caught on much more quickly and senator Paul Sarbanes set to work on legislation even before the fraud at WorldCom was announced. The administration favoured the less radical approach of Republican congressman Michael Oxley until the telecoms giant admitted to accounting fraud. “The administration, the SEC, and Oxley all felt initially that no action was necessary,” says Wallace. Meanwhile the Democrats sought to raise the spectre of corporate misdeeds from both Bush and Cheney’s past as directors and CEOs of public companies.

No Democrats were invited to Waco.

Anyone looking for a good debate about the future of the economy and the role of government therein would have been better off staying in Washington. There, after all, the Federal Reserve – the unelected and to date more activist arm of economic policymaking – was announcing the conclusions of its latest Federal Open Markets Committee meeting to set interest rates.

The Waco gathering did provide some humour, though, not least the sight of Bush diligently taking notes throughout the day. At times he took his new role as cheerleader-in-chief of the economy too far. “We have the best tax code in the world”, he told his audience. This is the same tax code that is derided by business leaders as cumbersome, onerous, and anti-competitive. It’s the same tax code that Goldman Sachs chief economist Bill Dudley described last month to Euromoney as “an abomination, a dead-weight loss on the economy”. And it’s the same tax code that Bush had pledged to overhaul during the election. Larry Lindsey, his chief economic adviser as head of the national economic council, has even drawn up plans to send to Congress to simplify it.

It’s still the economy, stupid

Family history provides strong motives for the Bush administration wanting to regain centre stage on the economy. “There are some eerily striking similarities between the two administrations,” says Josh Feinman, chief economist for Deutsche Asset Management. “War dominated both administrations early on, both received huge ratings approval as a result, and then saw that melt away as the public perceived the administration to be disconnected from and unaware of domestic affairs.”

Bush junior and his team have been conscious of this from the moment the Supreme Court handed out an election victory. Within days Bush had chosen Alcoa chairman Paul O’Neill to be treasury secretary. He described him as a “steady voice” who would be able to “calm the markets”. Before Bush had been sworn in, several members of his team talked of the need for speedy action to avoid a potential recession. The message was clear: the economy’s heading downhill, we weren’t in power when it started, and it’s not our fault.

Few could disagree with that. Much more questionable is the record of the administration since getting into office. “They’ve done well to get some parts of their agenda enacted, such as the tax cuts and fast-track trade authority,” says Dudley at Goldman Sachs. “But I’m amazed that they’ve not shown more flexibility on fiscal policy as the economy changed. They’re too locked into allowing ideology to dictate policy.”

The example raised by virtually everyone – economist and non-economist alike – is last year’s tax cut made even as the Congressional Budget Office began to revise downwards its projections of the hoped for bounty of budget surpluses.

The tax cut, when passed, was similar in structure and scope to that proposed during the election. Times were better then, and Lindsey and others would point out that their tax-cut proposals were designed to be incremental so as to avoid providing any stimulus to the economy.

“As it turned out, the tax cut was exquisitely well timed and appropriate, and all involved deserve credit,” says Alan Blinder, professor of economics at Princeton University and partner in the Promontory Financial Group. That’s high praise indeed: Blinder was the chief non-administration economic adviser to Bush’s contender in the presidential elections, vice president Al Gore. Naturally, there follows a very large but. “The way it was backloaded was quite perverse from a stimulative standpoint,” Blinder continues. “It creates the adverse interest-rate effects up front, while delaying the stimulus until the other cuts come due in later years [the next is in 2004]. As someone on the centre-left of the political spectrum I consider the distribution of the cuts to be quite inequitable.”

“The administration co-opted the tax cut after the event as a stimulus package,” says Feinman. “But no-one would structure a stimulative tax cut that way.”

The tax cut was one of Bush’s main economic election pledges. In fact, along with trying to introduce a scheme for the part-privatization of social security that was about it. Getting fast-track trade authority was more a question of restoring what the president once had, but which lapsed in 1994.

Bull market policies

That is one of the biggest problems facing the administration on economic policy: Bush and his advisers had devised a policy to suit the bull markets. They managed to get the tax cut through but the social security plan has lapsed. There was no rigid structure in mind for social security but any plan would have been based around a Clinton-era study that advocated that employees would get 2% of their payroll back. This money – one-sixth of their overall social security contribution – could then be invested in the markets, probably via specially constructed bond, mutual or index funds.

       
George W Bush and Charles Schwab:
Just who is running the show here?

Aside from the political debate over whether social security should be an individual responsibility or a redistributive entitlement, other factors have pretty much killed this idea off, at least for now. There is probably very little appetite among voters to entrust even more savings to a capital-markets system that has wreaked havoc on their savings over the past two-and-a-half years and has been revealed in the past 12 months to have been a haven for substantial fraud. Secondly, any move to such a system would need to be worked in over 15 to 20 years to make the investment worthwhile for individuals, during which time there would be fewer tax dollars pouring into the coffers to pay those retiring beforehand.

The costs for that were to have been covered in large part by the $3 trillion or more social security surplus that the Congressional Budget Office was predicting in 2000 would persist over the next 10 years. That surplus no longer exists (see above), and the general budget, also known as the on-budget, is already in deficit.

Aside from its pure comedy value the Waco economic forum showed up the paucity of ideas the administration has for an economy afflicted with recession or sluggish growth.

Just one idea appears to have sparked interest. It came from Charles Schwab, chairman of the eponymous discount broking firm turned internet-trading platform and would-be financial adviser to the nation’s affluent. As the president scribbled next to him, Schwab – who had just announced another drop in profits and plans to lay off more staff – suggested that a good remedy for individual investors’ fear of the stock market following the two-year bear market and subsequent corporate accounting scandals would be to increase the annual tax relief on stock losses from $3,000 to $20,000.

It’s an appealing prospect for the man on the street who might still be hanging on to his stocks in the hope of a rebound, or out of fear of registering his losses. Bush readily agreed that it was worth considering. And there is something to be said for raising the threshold, which has been stuck at $3,000 since 1978.

For the government, though, it could provoke a minor crisis. First, tax receipts would drop; no-one has yet done a case study, but the figure of $40 billion has been touted by some. Second, there is a strong possibility that individual investors would all dump their stocks as close to the end of the tax year as possible, in December, which in itself could cause a drop in the markets. And that is without allowing for institutions and hedge funds trying to second-guess what will happen. It would be the market equivalent of a government-sanctioned run on a bank.

And for a society trying to shake off the taint of corruption and collusion, it could be counterproductive for the president to adopt an idea, promoted by one of his campaign contributors, that would increase the trading activity of individual investors and thus benefit a firm whose main customers are… individual investors.

Furthermore, such a policy undermines the basic premise that risk is an integral part of capital markets. It sends a bad signal to have a government, and especially a Republican government, interfere with such a fundamental dynamic.

Congressional politics doesn’t make the job any easier. It’s stuck in gridlock. The Republicans hold a nine-seat majority in the House of Representatives, the Democrats rule by one in the Senate, and the presidency required the Supreme Court to decide who won. This year’s mid-term elections in November, in which all of the House and 34 seats in the Senate are contested, look likely to return yet more gridlock. And it is an antagonistic gridlock, explains Wallace at Lehman Brothers. “The animus between the top party leaders in Congress now equals that of the rank and file. I see scant opportunity for bipartisan leadership before the 2004 presidential election. Those who do have good ideas are locked into partisan positions.”

Add gridlock to what just 18 months ago was supposed to be a huge budget surplus, and the result is a spending spree. Increasing government spending is the other way of providing a fiscal stimulus, of course. And there’s been plenty of that. Some is a direct result of the terrorist attacks – the federal package given to New York to help rebuild, and funding to set up the Department of Homeland Security. The costs of the latter, having initially been negligible, are now estimated to be running into the billions of dollars.

But that’s by no means all of it. In Congress both Republicans and Democrats have been spending beyond their means. During the summer, for example, the House Republicans were pushing through a prescription drug benefit resolution worth $350 billion; Democrats favour a figure closer to $1 trillion.

Defence spending is also on the rise. The Bush administration decided even before September 11 to upgrade the equipment of the armed forces. Now it’s clear that the peace dividend of the 1990s is in reverse.

From a peak of 6% of GDP during the Bush senior administration, defence spending fell to 3% in the last year of the Clinton White House. Since last year’s attacks that figure has started to rise again, and is expected to breach 4% and stay above it for the next few years, and not just because of the war on terror. “I think it will stick at around 4.2%,” says Wallace. “I can’t see it going above 4.5% unless we get into an open-ended war.” That might not be as remote a possibility as it at first sounds.

Back to the war

The most important resolution from this Congress in terms of its effect on the US and global political and economic prospects is the one passed on September 14 last year, three days after the terrorist attacks in New York, Washington DC and Pennsylvania which claimed some 3,000 lives. It’s a simple statement. Congress proclaims that “the president is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on Sept. 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons”.

       
US warplanes, Lyndon Johnson and the
Capitol: The Bush administration argues
that it can prosecute war without further
congressional approval – the precedents
are worrying

It seemed a suitable response at the time but now administration officials are claiming that it provides the president with legislative authority to launch an attack on Iraq and, by extension, to launch attacks on any state the administration chooses to regard as posing a terrorist threat. In the case of Iraq, argue these officials, the 1990 resolution passed in response to the invasion of Kuwait acts as further congressional authority.

The last time a president laid claim to such overarching, open-ended power over Congress to wage war without the pretence of a substantive debate was in 1964. On August 7 that year Congress approved, almost unanimously bar two votes in the House, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Its provisions gave Lyndon Johnson almost unlimited powers to wage war on the North Vietnamese. Three days earlier, claimed Johnson, North Vietnamese forces had launched an unprovoked attack against two US destroyers in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, near North Vietnam’s eastern coast.

What the administration didn’t tell Congress or the public was that US forces had been conducting sizeable covert operations against the North Vietnamese for months – in fact, they had been doing so on a smaller scale since the French pulled out 10 years earlier.

This only surfaced years later, causing Congress to repeal the act in 1970 and seek to win back some of its power over waging war. Getting the troops out of Vietnam took another three years. By that stage Congress had passed the War Powers Act, which severely limited the president’s powers to conduct military operations abroad – he could send armed forces but had to consult with Congress first and had a window of just 60 days – 90 if an extension was approved – to get them out again.

The legislation restored the intention of the constitution: although the president is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, only Congress has the power to declare war. Richard Nixon, president at the time, vetoed it. But so strong was the will of Congress that its members managed to muster the two-thirds majority in each house needed to overturn the veto – a rarity in modern US politics, especially in the realm of international affairs.

Ceding that much power to the executive in 1964 had disastrous consequences. Vietnam lay in ruins, with Cambodia and Laos hardly better off, and more than 2.5 million Vietnamese were dead. The US lost over 58,000 servicemen, and experienced social unrest and anti-war demonstrations that at times bordered on revolution. From a fiscal perspective, it marked the end of the US budget surplus and the start of continuous deficits until the end of the 1990s.

Bush senior, like his predecessors, baulked at acknowledging the War Powers Act, but did nod in its general direction in preparation for the first Gulf War. It was one of the crucial lessons of the Vietnam War: don’t go into battle without at least the support of Congress.

That was one of many elements that led to the relative success of the first Gulf War. Having the backing of the UN and the military or financial support – sometimes both – of more than 50 countries were others. The second Bush administration appears ready to forswear all of these.

The consequences to the US economy of the current administration taking on similar powers to Johnson’s are unknown. All of the economic projections put forward thus far by private-sector economists – at Morgan Stanley, CSFB, Goldman Sachs and elsewhere – are based on optimistic visions of a war lasting a few weeks, followed by an unknown period of staying after any war to create a .US-friendly regime to take Saddam Hussein’s place. Removing uncertainty will be good for the markets, they say.

The first Gulf War is taken as the reference point, and most expect this war to cost roughly the same – about $80 billion in today’s money. This time, though, assuming there are no changes between now and any attack, the US would shoulder almost all the costs itself; in 1991 US allies covered over 80% of the cost.

Oil price anxiety

The optimists appear to assume a relatively easy victory, based on the precedents of Gulf War I and the Afghan campaign, and rest on the assumption that oil supplies will hardly be affected.

The effects have already started to hit. The spot market for oil in the US breached the $30 per barrel mark towards the end of August. “Fundamentally, WTI crude should be trading between $22 and $23 a barrel based on current supply and demand,” says UBS Warburg’s oils analyst Matthew Warburton. Admittedly, it’s not just the threat of war that has pushed the price up, he says: “The price is tightening in part because the UN retroactive pricing of Iraqi oil is keeping it off the market. They haven’t set August’s US price yet.”

Others link it more directly with the threat of hostilities. “There’s a $5 anxiety premium per barrel,” says Youssef Ibrahim, fellow at the Council for Foreign Relations in New York. “The price shouldn’t be that expensive.” And it’s when at its current price, he continues, that oil takes on all the more importance. “I remember president Clinton saying two years ago that once the price of a barrel hit $30 it becomes a political issue which gets right into the Oval Office.” Oil peaked at $36 a barrel then, and was a contributing factor – admittedly one of very many – to the recession that hit the US in 2001.

Opinions on where the price of oil could go once a shooting war starts vary considerably. On the basis of 1990-91, $45 is possible, although back then considerably more supply, 4.5 million barrels a day, was suddenly off the market and stayed off after Hussein’s troops sabotaged most of Kuwait’s oil wells.

Were the war to finish quickly, the price would drop back to the mid-$20s; if Iraqi production were able to be brought back up to its 1990 level of 3.8 million barrels a day, the price could drop even more. Some estimate that could take up to three years. Any drop below the mid-$20s would have a deleterious effect on Saudi Arabia. “They’ve only ever had budget surpluses when the oil price has been in the high $20s,” says Warburton.

Ibrahim gives what is probably the most honest outlook for oil prices. It is unfortunately, as a result, almost useless. “Depending on what happens, oil could hit anywhere between $5 and $55 a barrel.”

The US administration has built up the strategic oil reserve and observers expect that this Bush White House will not be as slow to release the reserves once a war starts as the previous one was.

Even then, there is still the potential for oil prices to stay high. The price of oil played a major part in sending the US economy into recession back in 1990-91. Months of bellicose rhetoric from this administration have already pushed the price to its politically and economically sensitive threshold of $30 a barrel. There’s very little room in this sluggish economy for it to get too much higher without threatening the economy.

Danger signs

Few economists are expecting a double-dip recession in the US, but then few expected last year’s recession, either. There are some dangers to watch out for: a potential mini-bubble in the housing market, or a drop in consumer spending, both of which stayed robust throughout the last two years. There’s even chatter about the potential of the US entering a deflationary period.

Any one of these could stifle an economy that is at best growing very slowly. If that happens, the US faces a tough ride. There’s little direction on the economy coming from the White House. A Congress in acrimonious gridlock is more likely to get bogged down in a war of attrition fought over tax cuts versus increased spending than it is to tailor a pragmatic solution. And there is the potential for the administration to wage war virtually unchecked.

Even with some stunning military victories, Bush’s bid for re-election in 2004 could mirror that of his father. More important, the US could find its federal deficit increasing way beyond the current moderate estimates. Once that reaches somewhere between 3.5% and 5% of GDP a year – $340 billion to $490 billion in today’s money – economists start worrying about its effect on taking investment away from the private sector. And waiting in the wings for the end of the decade is that little problem of social security, which will send the deficit to 175% of GDP by 2025 if lawmakers don’t act.

On a positive note, says Wallace at Lehman, “there have been eight spikes in federal debt since the Treasury was founded in 1791, seven of them due to war or spending for war. We’ve paid them all down again.” There are only three basic choices to make: be willing to raise more debt, increase revenues through taxation, or cut back on services.

Making those choices requires real leadership.

What, no surplus?

Two years ago the two main US presidential candidates faced an enviable choice. That summer the Congressional Budget Office calculated that over the succeeding 10 years the surplus would be worth between $4.5 trillion and $5.8 trillion. Of that, at least $2.3 trillion was set aside for the social security trust fund, which is set to come under severe stress by 2015 as the baby boomers start to retire. So what to do with the rest: spend it or give it back to the people?

Now, in late summer 2002, that surplus has all but disappeared. In its latest report, at the end of August, the CBO forecast a deficit of $157 billion this year – and there could still be significant spending to come. “There’s been a 3.5% to 4% fiscal swing from surplus to deficit this year as a result of tax cuts and increased spending,” says Gemma Wright, market strategist with Barclays Capital in New York.

The CBO is now predicting deficits until 2006, when it expects a $15 billion surplus, and is still clinging to the hope of a $1 trillion surplus over the next 10 years. Given its record on short-term predictions, that’s hardly comforting. The only other multi-trillion dollar figure being touted around these days is the $7 trillion of collective household net wealth lost in the past two years.

You can lay the blame for this massive restatement at many doors: some cooking of the books, for example. The CBO’s figures have been wildly inaccurate for years, and that was in part the result of a blinkered approach to what made up the surplus to begin with. Ram Bhagavatula, chief economist at Royal Bank of Scotland in New York, says: “The CBO used to claim that their figures for GDP growth in the 1990s were purely economic growth, and had nothing to do with huge revenues from capital-gains taxes. Now they acknowledge that capital gains made up a material amount of their figures.”

But the real disabusers of the figures are the politicians. Congress has been dipping into the projected surplus since 1998. “Congressional Republicans and Democrats have both had both feet fully in the trough,” says Kim Wallace, Washington analyst with Lehman Brothers.

Fuzzy math

Bob Hormats, vice chairman at Goldman Sachs, takes an even stronger line: “The hard-won budget restraints of 1974 and the 1990s have collapsed, and that is the great governance failure of the last two years.”

Just as bad are the two candidates for the 2000 presidential elections. They based their entire economic programme on what they would do with the projected fiscal surplus, and the winners have been steadfast in trying to push that through despite the rapid and profound change in economic fortunes.

This new 10-year surplus will only appear if the Bush tax cuts expire in 2010 as they are supposed to. That was the bizarre accounting quirk of last year’s tax-cut legislation: the cuts would be brought in gradually over 10 years, so as to avoid providing too much stimulus to an economy that was supposed to remain constantly sound at an average annual growth rate of 2.7%. And then, in 2010, the 2000 rates would click back in.

Now we have no multi-trillion dollar surplus to dip into, an economy underperforming the average, the return of budget deficits, and calls from Republicans to make the tax cuts permanent, which would destroy even the much smaller surplus the CBO is now predicting. Andersen didn’t sign off on this, did it?

The O’Neill factor

Secretary of the Treasury Paul O’Neill hardly ever gets a good press. Some wags have even dubbed him the Dan Quayle of the administration, referring to Bush senior’s gaffe-prone and rapidly-sidelined vice president. O’Neill’s recent remark that much of any IMF loan to Brazil would end up in Swiss bank accounts caused panic in Brazilian markets which a subsequent IMF loan barely quelled.

       
Paul O’Neill

He was a surprise choice, having been chairman of aluminium company Alcoa. The markets had grown used to having one of their own in charge in the form of former Goldman Sachs chairman Robert Rubin, who’s now at Citigroup. Once he left, they had one of his anointed disciples, Larry Summers, even if he was a more traditional left-of-centre Democrat.

The lack of a Wall Street type on the Bush economy team irked many on the Street, some of whom were hoping for the call themselves – JPMorgan’s Sandy Warner and PaineWebber’s Donald Marron were two names mentioned. They were ready to pounce on anything O’Neill said. They soon got their chance when he appeared to be advocating a weak dollar early into his tenure.

“Rubin had a good team which was very disciplined on its PR, very on message,” says Barclays Capital’s US economist Henry Willmore. “He was always comfortable rolling out the same sentence about wanting to maintain a strong dollar. O’Neill couldn’t do it without rolling his eyes.”

During the boom a strong dollar helped to attract foreign investment. Now, in a weaker economy with the trade deficit above $400 billion, a strong dollar is more of a liability. “The strong-dollar stance was an easy play to make back in the 1990s,” says Mickey Levy, chief economist at Bank of America. “All O’Neill said was that he wouldn’t prop up the dollar, which is hardly different to what Summers and Rubin advocated.”

His timing can leave something to be desired. One banker in New York mentions O’Neill’s first speaking engagement at the Economic Club of New York. “I went along to the lunch hoping for some insight into what he was about,” says the banker. “It was his first appearance, yet he chose as his topic something about safety at the workplace. It’s an important topic, no doubt, but if I’m going to take two hours of my day to hear him speak, I want to hear about policy and the multi-billion dollar issues, not the million-dollar issues.”

Being abroad when the corporate scandals broke and hit the market was unfortunate, and he came under a great deal of criticism for not being in the US to at least try to calm the markets. But, says Bob Hormats, vice chairman at Goldman Sachs, “more power to him. I like the fact he goes to emerging-market countries. Their problems affect us. I hope he goes abroad more, and I hope he takes more members of Congress with him.”

“He’s a pretty likeable guy,” says Goldman Sachs chief economist Bill Dudley. “He’s straightforward, consistently open, and seems to have no secret agenda. Most of his opinions are surprisingly correct, but some of them are perhaps not so well suited for an administration official to say out loud. And it is strange that he is surprised by the interest in and response to his comments.”

The gossip is that Bush is about to replace O’Neill. That’s nothing new: those rumours were doing the rounds last summer, as was the theory that the new treasury secretary would have more of a rapport with Wall Street.

That was useful on Rubin’s watch, as the Asian, Russian and Long-Term Capital Management crises required a savvy Wall Street type to reassure his own. This time it’s the public who need reassuring about Wall Street, and it’s not clear that any individual can pull that off.