Buyers regret picking up cheap assets

Hints of a revival of M&A activity should not breed false hopes of a new boom. Accounting rule changes are forcing acquirers to write down goodwill on pricey deals, fuelling the view that M&A doesn’t create shareholder value but destroys it.

Investment bankers were hugely relieved to see a suddenly flurry of M&A deals in March – Sonera bid $6.5 billion for Telia, Imperial Tobacco offered $4.5 billion for Reemtsma and Bcom3 bought Publicis for $3.2 billion. At last, bankers said, confident chief executives were beginning to chase value in cheap corporate assets. But just as a few swallows do not a summer make nor do a few mergers indicate an M&A market heading back to the boom-time volumes of 2000. According to the latest figures released by Dealogic, M&A activity reached its lowest levels for six years in the first quarter of 2002 and there were few headline-grabbing transactions. “This is not an environment that encourages big deals,” says Rick Escherich, an analyst who covers the M&A market at JPMorgan. “We are seeing safe deals, such as companies buying the 20% of a firm that they don’t own already. Large mergers take more courage.” Reported volumes are made up of smaller, opportunistic purchases or clean-up operations, such as Banca di Roma’s acquisition of Bipop-Carire or AT&T’s of the remaining 77% of Telecorp that it didn’t already own.

M&A bankers may cling to the hope that CEOs and CFOs will rediscover their passion for deal-making but the rising tide of companies now being forced to admit that they’ve wasted shareholders’ money on previous deals will dampen their ardour.

AOL Time Warner was forced to write down $54 billion of unrealizable goodwill last year and Qwest announced $30 billion of exceptional charges. French media firm Vivendi wrote off $15 billion on acquisitions it made at the height of the dot com boom that are now worth less than they were at the time of purchase. Close behind come a number of the telecom companies, never renowned for their frugality. Dutch incumbent KPN took a hit of e12.4 billion ($10.8 billion) for 2001, following its acquisition of 77.49% of the shares of German mobile phone company E-plus. France Telecom faces a $4.6 billion write-off on the value of UK cable company NTL.

The only sure thing for hapless investors is that there are more of these nasty surprises to come. In fact, any company that was foolhardy enough to make expensive acquisitions during the tech frenzy of 1999 and 2000 is now waking up and seeing its bed partner in the cold light of day. For many, it’s not a pretty sight.

Some analysts say Vodafone could be about to take a hit of as much as £25 billion ($36 billion) relating to goodwill dating back to its hostile takeover of German rival Mannesmann, which the UK firm used to inflate its balance sheet by some £110 billion. Verizon Communications of the US has also warned of an impending $2 billion charge on investments in Latin America and the US, and Ford Motor Company has put out similar warnings.

With these types of skeletons poised to fall out of everyone’s cupboards, it’s little wonder that M&A has not yet recovered from the sudden slowdown that began in 2001. Who wants to buy a company that has ever been acquisitive – and that’s a huge percentage – when to do so may involve taking on untold liabilities? And why expose your own firm’s shares to the mercies of a market that is today more sceptical than ever about the putative value of M&A?

Many deals that were well under way at the beginning of the year are now being quietly shelved. “Previously, if two public companies merged, they weren’t really worried about lack of transparency,” says Mike Biondi, global head of M&A and vice-chairman at Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein. “They used public information and draft agreements could sometimes be put together in hours. Now they are much more sceptical.”

Where CEOs used to believe it was worth persevering with an acquisition because the reward would be a rise in the share price, they are now digging their feet in on issues where a compromise would have been found 12 months ago. There’s far less upside.

The downside of M&A is greater too. Just look what happened to Tyco earlier this year. It acquired assets with a voracious appetite and for some time was rewarded by the market for doing so. Then, suddenly, investors decided they didn’t like that conglomerate-type model any more and the stock plummeted. Tyco then responded by switching direction overnight and announced that it would spin off some assets. The market reacted by pushing the shares down still further amid rumours of accounting discrepancies. “It’s obvious that for Tyco to bring to light latent accounting problems in the post-Enron era was like spitting in the wind,” says an M&A banker.

Tyco’s fate poses a yet greater challenge to the fundamental raison d’être of M&A: the creation of shareholder value. Though few bankers are brave enough to say on the record that mergers rarely deliver this, one or two at least admit it in private. Others will not entertain this argument, saying that claims by researchers that M&A destroys value are flawed because they demand a counterfactual hypothesis: it is impossible to know how a company would have fared had it not merged or been acquired. “What would Tyco have been without M&A?” asks one banker who is close to the company.

Rather than challenging it, “Tyco really underscores the importance of our profession,” says the head of M&A at a US house. “There is a danger that things go wrong but, if you get it right, M&A does add value to a business.” He adds that, in his view Tyco got it right at least most of the time, slashing costs, doing it in a logical way, and building shareholder value.

What has triggered the sudden rash of confessionals is the introduction of new accounting rules in the US. These stipulate that companies must regularly reassess the value of any goodwill held on their balance sheets. If it is found to have been impaired for any reason they are obliged to reflect this in the next set of results. So the rash of write-downs being seen today is the result of managements evaluating the earnings potential of assets snapped up in the heat of the moment and realizing, with a sickening jolt, that they’re worth a lot less now than they thought at the time.

The thing that really turns the stomach – or should do – is the prospect of having to own up to shareholders that they got a little carried away. To make things more palatable, CEOs and their bankers are fabricating the seemingly plausible tale that goodwill write-downs are simply accounting minutiae. The high-profile cases are frequently stock-for-stock transactions. In other words, these apparently massive write-downs are nothing to worry about because they don’t involve real money.

Don’t worry, we only overpaid with your stock

“Companies only have a problem if they paid for acquisitions with cash,” says one head of M&A. All that’s happened is that the market has corrected itself to a new, lower level. “Lots of $100 million companies today were worth $10 billion two years ago,” he continues. So if the same deals were done now, the stock swap would be done at the same ratio but the total deal value would be lower.

“Goodwill has always been controversial,” says James Neissa, head of M&A at UBS Warburg. “Many analysts ignore it out when they’re evaluating a merger or acquisition. New accounting rules have caused some companies to write down large amounts of goodwill which they booked as a result of past acquisitions done with stock which traded at lofty valuations.”

But, according to Rick Antle, professor of accounting at the Yale School of Management, the argument that goodwill write-downs are therefore insignificant just doesn’t stand up. “I never understand it when companies behave as if the only thing they can do with their stock is use it to acquire at a very high level,” he says. If a CEO believes that his shares are trading well, the argument that he should issue stock and invest capital raised into the business, rather than making hasty and expensive acquisitions, is a strong one.

Buying for the sake of it is poor management. “There’s a distinction between an investment decision and a financing decision,” Antle continues. “A decision to invest should be based on whether the company is worth it or not, then the most efficient way to pay for it is a separate decision. Companies have an obligation to shareholders to profit from a bubble, not just ride it.”

Besides, not all the boom-time M&A deals were stock swaps. For example, in December 2000, US fibre-optics firm Corning bought the optical components division of Italian tyre and cables company Pirelli for $3.9 billion. For Pirelli, this was a great deal that furnished it with a war chest that enabled it to go off and buy Telecom Italia, a real bricks-and-mortar – if highly indebted – enterprise. But it was a disaster for Corning, forcing it to take a goodwill impairment charge of $3.1 billion on the purchase in the first half of 2001.

Now the question is how long the sense of apprehension resulting from these write-downs – a mixture of the fear of punishment from investors and wariness of the unknown – will continue and how long it will be before M&A returns to a more normal level.

During the equity boom years, companies had conditioned the stock market to expect a certain level of growth that is increasingly difficult to meet through cutting fat. “As companies become more efficient, they will not be able to drive growth internally and so M&A will remain a strategic tool again,” says Stefan Selig, vice chairman at Banc of America Securities. CEOs will have to find mergers or acquisitions to meet expectations, optimistic M&A bankers argue, as the alternative is to confess that growth is going to be more modest from now on.

But maybe companies will just have to come to terms with that uncomfortable fact. “Some of the fundamental drivers of M&A may not come back,” says Escherich at JPMorgan. “During 1999 and 2000 half of it was technology media and telecom related.”

Indeed some investors are hopeful that M&A will never again reach the same dizzying heights. One of the drivers of takeovers, at least in the US and the UK, is the sort of situation where an incumbent management has destroyed value and the share price is down – even though the business is fundamentally sound. In response another management team has been encouraged to take advantage of the low share price to take over the business.

The earlier intervention of more active institutional investors could forestall this. “As shareholder activism increases, it produces an environment where investors are more willing to confront boards before everyone wants to sell off,” says one investor at a pension fund known for its stance on corporate governance. “This means that the fall in share price is stopped, so you never get to the situation where a company is an obvious target.”

This pressure may grow as more and more fund managers decide to stick around and try to bring about changes from the inside, rather than selling out of their positions and leaving the market to do something instead. How much of a threat this really poses to the livelihoods of M&A bankers remains to be seen.