Author: Chris Cockerill
Russia is booming. And Russian issuers, we are told, are once again queuing up to tap the Eurobond market. The news has prompted enthusiasm from overnight experts on Russia. As one such banker puts it: “It’s been a place of 900 years of serfdom, 70 years of communism, and then was subjugated by 10 years of corruption when nobody knew what the hell was going on. But I’m bullish now, very bullish about the country.”
More such incautious optimism is to be expected, but it’s to be hoped that investors will be wary and not forget that it’s just three years since the sovereign defaulted on its domestic debt, the currency collapsed, foreign investors lost their shirts, a global financial crisis blew up and Russia’s credibility with fixed-income investors was destroyed.
From pariah to performer
Two years ago, enthusiasm for Russian credit was non-existent. But times have changed, and three years after becoming pariahs in the international capital markets, the Russians are back. Debt capital markets teams are delighted. And as one banker eloquently puts it, dripping coffee down his shirt: “There’s a shitload in the pipeline.”
Russia, say bankers, is the story to buy. And, most notably, since the September 11 attacks on the US, Russia has been seen as a safe haven for emerging-market investors. But isn’t it stretching the bounds of credibility to expect international investors to lay out cash for new issues from such a tainted country?
“It’s a single B credit, so you can never say that it’s a safe bet,” says Marcin Wiszniewski, Russia strategist at Morgan Stanley. “After all there is a reason for its rating. But what we are saying is that it’s an improving credit story. And for people who understand these stories there is confidence that the issuance plans are manageable.”
Strong oil revenues, tighter budgetary discipline and an increase in foreign reserves have all boosted Russia’s credibility and investors’ perceptions of its credit.
In the second week of October, the team from the City of Moscow – which has always serviced its debt – arrived in London on the first leg of a European roadshow. Sergy Pakhomov, chairman of the municipality’s debt committee, extolled the virtues of the first Eurobond offer out of Russia for three years. The reception was definitely positive.
Moscow issued an exploratory e300 million ($272 million) retail-driven three-year bond. And there’s a chance it may come twice more before the year-end. But already there’s sniping between the banks lined up behind the various potential Russian issuers. One banker quickly pours cold water on the Russian municipality’s deal. “City of Moscow is an extraordinary issuer to be reopening the market. Six lead managers were picked and you have to ask yourself why the major players were not involved in that deal.”
UBS Warburg and ING Barings, the two leads, will definitely not appreciate that comment. The banker continues: “It’s a very strange issuer. And it’s very interesting that the rating agencies should take the view that they have taken. According to them it’s a much weaker credit than the sovereign.” The banker, perhaps because of his ire, is getting his ratings confused. City of Moscow and the sovereign are both rated by Standard&Poor’s as single Bs with a positive outlook. And if he is referring to Moscow’s bond rating, a single B, then he should note that S&P don’t give positive outlooks to any issuers’ bonds.
Other bankers agree that it might seem strange that Moscow came before the sovereign, but remain unfazed. They believe criticisms are sour grapes. City of Moscow is, after all, stealing some issuers’ thunder by reopening the market. Morgan Stanley’s Wiszniewski says: “I think it’s interesting that, post the Russian crisis, a municipality came to the market first and not the government. But the City of Moscow shouldn’t have to wait for a benchmark from the sovereign, because a benchmark is already out there.”
Moscow didn’t wait for the sovereign and came to the market when it did because it only has a relatively narrow window of opportunity in which to issue. It’s a reason ignored by the banker trying to sell an issue from one of Russia’s major oil companies.
In the wake of the 1998 crisis, the federal government introduced steps to limit the borrowing of municipalities. Now municipals can only issue to refinance maturing obligations. And since Moscow’s window of opportunity to finance the $700 million plus that will have matured by December closes at the end of the year, it can’t wait for the sovereign.
But it shouldn’t be viewed as a desperate grab for financing. Moscow is running a primary budget surplus. And Moscow has other points in its favour. Investors like its pseudo-sovereign risk. Its GDP is 14% of the Russian total and it contributes 30% of the federation’s tax revenues. Its debt history is not tarnished by default, and it has strong cashflow and a good credit rating.
The finance ministry is, however, keeping a close eye on proceedings. Richard Luddington managing director of debt capital markets at JPMorgan explains: “With the sovereign not attempting to access the market this year, it is the closest to the sovereign we are going to get. There will be a lot of focus on the relative coupon and spread. The sovereign knows that it will be priced as a reference to the Russian curve. The good news is, Moscow is the right sort of name and the right sort of maturity.”
Russia’s leading oil and gas companies are lining up behind Moscow. How many will eventually enter the market before the year-end remains unclear. Gazprom has been looking to get something away for the past 10 months. However, because of recent debilitating management shakeouts and being held hostage to broader political issues in Moscow, two previous attempts to come to the market in January and March were delayed. It now looks like being pushed back into 2002.
Sibneft, LUKoil and Tyumen Oil are other names being bandied around. And Rosneft, Russia’s seventh-biggest oil producer, is expected to become the first Russian borrower since 1998 to tap the US bond market, with a $300 million issue.
More than an oil play
It could be argued, judging by the companies coming forward, that Russian issuers are hoping to benefit from the inflated oil prices of the past two years – a simple oil play. The oil sector is after all a natural borrower that looks, for long-term financing to support big investment projects. The companies are also among the few to enjoy strong fundamentals and are critical to the Russian economy, accounting for 50% of GDP. Oil corporates’ risk therefore remains closely entwined with sovereign risk. Unfortunately, the oil price has been falling in recent weeks.
But believing that Russia is just a punt on the oil price is perhaps unfair. Putin’s government has been pushing through a comprehensive reform programme. Already a broader, more effective, tax regime has sprung into operation, the monopolies are being broken up, and corporate governance is the phrase on every chairman’s lips. “The stress test of falling oil prices will show Russia’s new resilience,” says Alex Garrard, director of emerging Europe research at UBS Warburg. “It’s no longer a question of, if oil prices fall can Russia make the next payment and / or access capital markets to bridge any financial shortfalls. Patient reform strategy has been focused on increasing transparency, implementing international accounting standards and building a track record for international investors first.”
With spreads on EU accession candidates from central and eastern Europe already converging on euro sovereign levels, is Russia is going to be the big Eurobond play for the next two or three years? If the first deals are successful, more investors will take notice. Good supply generates strong demand. But there are only a few credits that investors should get serious about. “There is a lot of noise about the Russian corporate pipeline but a number of these mandates make me a bit sceptical,” says JPMorgan’s Luddington. “It happened in 1998 too. A lot of Russian entities were looking to jump on the bandwagon and then stepped back for a variety of reasons. You are going to see a trickle not a flood.”
| City of Moscow, which has always serviced its debt, has led the sovereign back into the Eurobond market | ||||||
Indeed there are those who suggest that there may already be irrational exuberance in the market. “There are a lot of banks that are too bullish on Russia,” says one banker. “CSFB and Deutsche, for example, are picking up mandates that I don’t think will be executed. Fifty per cent of that stuff is only executable in a hot bull market, and we are not in a hot bull market. They are probably just trying to justify their big Russian offices.”
To suggest that the two mandates CSFB has won, Gazprom and Tyumen Oil, are desperate is just taking pot shots for the sake of it. As CSFB’s director and head of EEMEA debt capital markets, Peter Malik says: “I don’t know how anyone could say that they are not tier one corporates.”
It is not a surprise however, that a deal that Deutsche has lined up has raised eyebrows: Magnitogorsk Steel Works. As one banker puts it: “It’s a bloody steel company. No investor is going to take a look at that. And if any bank flaunts a pipeline with this in it then it is failing where it should be succeeding.”
Not well known but top tier
Deutsche’s spin is that Magnitogorsk ranks 17th globally in steel output, exports more than half its product for hard currency and has $1.7 billion turnover. Deutsche’s Peter Schikaneder, managing director, head of debt capital markets origination, central and eastern Europe is, as is to be expected, very upbeat and believes he has fallen on a gem. “We’ve looked at the winners and losers. This company is profitable, there’s transparency and it has a strategic focus and knows what it wants to do with the money. It’s standing before the ratings agency now and it should be classed as top tier even if it isn’t well known.”
Whichever way this mandate is viewed by the market, others of lesser calibre will keep being awarded. Russia is a capital-scarce country with high financing needs, especially in the energy sector where huge infrastructure improvements are needed and massive capital investment is required to secure reserves. And there are always debt capital market bankers willing to sell any kind of story to the unwary. Investors have short memories. “The market will get overexcited and then pop. But that’s the way markets are supposed to operate,” says one banker. He boasts about bringing more companies to issue than anyone else and does not reckon there is any problem in bringing untested tier-two and tier-three Russian corporates out to the international investor.
Will investors really buy into even more uncertainty when there’s gloom in the corporate sector in developed markets, with big names such as Railtrack and Swissair failing?
To a certain extent it will be up to the Russian Federation who it allows out to play. It will attempt to control the amount of issuance, since it is all too aware that if too much is coming to market it could cannibalize demand for sovereign debt that has been earmarked for launch next year. Russia faces a spike in principal repayments on sovereign debt in 2003. But ultimately, however, the market will control the flow and stop it from becoming saturated. And what investors want out of Russia for now are just quality names.
Investors in the emerging markets realize there are few sovereign credits that will provide upside next year: and even fewer that have the same prospects as Russia. But while money is leaking out of Argentina, Brazil and Turkey and dripping into Russia, the challenge is to get a broader base of investors interested and more comfortable with its credit. For now the main participant is not the developed-market crossover investor looking for extra yield but an aggressive, risk-seeking, total-return emerging-markets investor. The much larger group of crossover investors still haven’t mentally recovered from the crisis and Russia remains strictly off bounds. Persuading them that it has changed is not going to be easy. It still only has a single-B rating and is not at the point where it can be described as a transition economy.