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Alexander Lukashenka |
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If it were a fictional state like Ruritania, Belarus would evoke a wry smile. A fragment of the old USSR with a population of just over 10 million, it is ruled by an elected megalomaniac seemingly determined to show that the Soviet system could in time have redeemed itself. Old ladies, wearing their Brezhnev-era best, shop in well-stocked state stores. The TV offers updates on harvest successes and dwells on the social implosion of rival former Soviet republics. It’s a place where a bottle of vodka costs a dollar and rent only a few dollars more. The hammer and sickle competes with western icons such as Madonna and Sony, and the security forces – still called the KGB – harry the opposition, though it is free enough to complain openly about the lack of democracy.
For more than half a decade, the republic of Belarus has been treated by the international community as a political and economic eccentricity, a joke on the periphery of emerging Europe. But with the country due soon to become a next-door neighbour of an enlarged EU, Belarus’s fate matters. Recent events have added weight to this. The country’s once-whimsical image has taken on a more sinister aspect after charges that the government has been systematically murdering leading opponents. It is also becoming apparent that a bizarre experiment in economic management is bringing increasingly dire results.
It is now clear that the miracle years of 1997-98 – when social stability and near double-digit GDP growth had millions of disillusioned former Soviet citizens elsewhere in the former USSR looking on admiringly – were illusory. But it is hard to assess the true economic dynamics. Belarus’s development model is so convoluted and opaque that economists differ widely on its mid-range prospects, agreeing only that it is among the worst places on earth to do business.
Adding to the confusion are recent moves by the government in the direction of liberalization, including new cooperation with the IMF and World Bank, and pledges from the country’s autocratic president, Alexander Lukashenka, that he would speed up economic reforms when returned to office in the presidential election on September 9. Pre-election polls had suggested that Lukashenka would win with between 40% and 50% of the vote. In the event, he romped home with 76%, amid claims from political opponents and foreign observers that there had been systematic electoral fraud.
Bat’ka knows best
Lukashenka plays a pivotal role in the politics and economy of Belarus. In a region where in other countries even the strongest presidents and prime ministers share or delegate power, the man known to many as Bat’ka (Daddy) rules like a tyrannical patriarch.
First popularly elected in 1994, Lukashenka extended his term and dissolved parliament in a 1996 referendum that most independent observers deemed unfair. He then issued a decree on unemployment that forced ousted parliamentarians to clean streets and perform other menial duties. Another 1996 referendum approved the continuing use of Soviet symbols as the official state iconography. Lukashenka deepened the rift with the west by driving out several diplomats whom he accused of plotting against him, in the process disclosing that his agents had bugged embassies. In 2000 he entrenched his power by engineering the election of a puppet parliament that remains unrecognized by most western governments.
The run-up to this year’s presidential contest was even more poisonous, with American officials backing up claims that Lukashenka was employing an elite commando unit to murder political opponents and settle personal scores.
Six weeks before the first round of voting, a defiant Lukashenka took to the airwaves, vowing that he would forcefully resist any popular uprising should the opposition claim fraud in the polling. “I will win these presidential elections, whether with you, which I would like, or without you, but I will win them,” he declared. “And I am afraid of no-one.”
With his lantern jaw, bald head and trademark moustache, the hulking former collective farm boss has become a symbol of illiberalism. He is the last dictator in Europe following the fall of Slobodan Milosevic. He hires, fires and disciplines local and state officials as he sees fit, and bypasses parliament with flurries of decrees and edicts. Lukashenka is a loner who demands fealty from all who work for him.
Even within the all-powerful presidential administration there are only a handful of individuals – perhaps a half-dozen – who have any influence at all over Lukashenka, chief among them the heads of the militia and KGB units. He has preserved the command system of the former Soviet state, so almost the entire country works for him. Nothing is done without the acquiescence of Lukashenka, from the broad outlines of fiscal and monetary policy to the investment decisions facing small private enterprises.
“Any foreign investment over $10,000 must be approved by the presidential administration – that is, by Lukashenka himself,” says Jaroslav Romanchuk, vice-chairman of the opposition United Civil Party and a vocal free-marketeer.
From leader to led
Belarus has been an anomaly for decades. A backwater before the Bolshevik revolution, its non-farm economy dominated by timber and peat processing, by the later decades of Soviet power it was a showcase of state socialism, the so-called assembly line of the USSR. The republic’s economy grew at a rate nine times that of the union average in 1960 and almost five times the average in 1985. This vaulted it past all but the Czech Republic among Comecon members in living standards, according to UN figures. This progress left most Belarussians content with a system that many others in the USSR were so desperate to scrap. And the first wave of economic reforms did little to endear average Belarussians to the forces of the market. Between 1992 and 1994, GDP dropped by 20%. Crime and civil disorder spread unchecked.
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Belarus’s shops are not bare but brand quality has been undermined by manufacturers |
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Lukashenka stepped in, offering a mixture of authoritarianism and traditionalist leadership.
“His views are very close to communist, but the Communists are his opposition,” says Alexander Sasnow, an economist who was a member of parliament and minister of labour from 1994 to 1996. Lukashenka uses the language of scientific socialism to denounce capitalism and explain his vision, and often seems to go out of his way to bolster his image as the last in Lenin’s lineage. Yet his state-controlled media resort to anti-communist rhetoric when denouncing his chief rival for office, labour leader Uladzimir Hancharik, one of the highest officials in Soviet Belarus to keep his post after the break-up of the USSR.
Initially, Lukashenka had defined his economic ideology as “market socialism” and urged tame experts to flesh out a coherent work of political economy on which he could build a national ideology. But according to Sasnow, now deputy director of the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Sciences, the effort to create a alternative vision came to naught.
Old-fashioned class struggle plays its part in Lukashenka’s credo. He and others with humble roots are pitted against two privileged groupings, the urban elites of the old nomenklatura (the senior members of the official hierarchy) and the nascent business classes. So, though forced to work with slick former communists and young technocrats, Lukashenka’s is a regime of the common people for the common people. The president revels in boorish language in public and private, insulting and physically threatening his opponents.
Many Belarussians share the president’s economic prejudices. According to a survey conducted late last year by the International Finance Corporation, the World Bank’s private-sector development arm, a slim majority of the population support either a market economy with broad state intervention or a command economy modelled on that of the USSR. Almost half of those over 65 said they preferred a fully planned economy.
The heterodox nature of Lukashenka’s appeal is illustrated by his foreign friends: in Russia he is popular with both communist leader Gennadi Zyuganov and neo-fascist Vladimir Zhirinovski, who are received in Belarus like heads of state. Other allies are China’s leaders, who are themselves busy trying to square the circle between socialism and the market.
“He has his own political course, and follows it,” say Sasnow. “And he is quite logical in his behaviour.”
In making economic policy, Lukashenka follows a crude logic too. Production is supported at the expense of trade; so-called fair prices take precedence over market forces, and absolute control from the centre is imposed regardless of the consequences.
How it almost works
One leading independent Belarussian researcher, Leonid Zlotnikov, says there is a historical antecedent for Lukashenka’s seemingly odd system.
| Jaroslav Romanchuk | ||||||
“If you want to understand [the economy], you must return to the 1930s, not to Soviet Russia, but to Germany,” says Zlotnikov.
As in pre-war Germany, private property exists in Belarus, but more in form than in fact. Meanwhile, the state dominates the economy not through comprehensive plans and production targets but through a rigid system of licensing and price controls, as well as control over trade and financial flows.
After gaining power in 1994, Lukashenka stopped privatization virtually dead in its tracks, and to date the state controls all but a few enterprises of any size. By one estimate, the largest privately owned enterprise in Belarus is a construction firm employing roughly 500. But even that gets most of its orders from state companies. Private commercial farmers control only around 1% of the country’s arable land, with the balance controlled by state farms (sovhoz) and cooperatives (kolhoz). Total cumulative foreign direct investment is just over $80 per person, compared with more than $500 in neighbouring Poland and over $1,000 in Hungary, and is mostly composed of oil transit and low-value-added industries such as timber processing. An obscure accounting rule means that many companies are speciously classified as being outside direct state ownership. “A company can have 96% state ownership, and still be called ‘non-state,'” says the United Civil Party’s Romanchuk.
For most of the country’s productive enterprises, the current system of state control is something of a twilight zone, having elements of both the market and the rigid former system of indicative planning. Sectoral officials in the various ministries will occasionally instruct enterprises to supply other firms with certain goods, or to increase their production by a certain amount. Meanwhile, each of the country’s regions (oblasts), has its own economic planners, and officials who issue broad directives concerning sales growth to all enterprises in their region. Finally, smaller publicly owned enterprises can find themselves taking direction from officials all the way down to the city or rayon (municipal) level.
Nevertheless, only a few enterprises – such as those involved in housing construction – operate under Soviet-style production directives. And even these have more freedom to choose suppliers or subcontractors than in the past.
Analysts say there are several reasons why the centre does not try to plan the operations of state enterprises in detail. First, a higher degree of direct planning is not possible given the nature and state of the economy; many state firms are already under too many constraints to comply further.
Another reason for the lack of full-blooded Soviet-style planning is Lukashenka’s propensity to control or bypass the bureaucracy. The president has been known to use television broadcasts to chastise officials and managers he feels have not performed well enough.
“He meddles, and often in a very rude way,” says Igor Pelipas, who heads the research centre at the Institute for Privatization and Management, a privately funded think-tank.
In fact, although outsiders may assume that the country’s unreformed apparatchik and state firm managers are among Lukashenka’s core constituencies, there is evidence that many who staff the state’s economic command apparatus increasingly resent his rule.
“The upper-level officials are totally dependent on him,” says Sasnow. “They hate him but are afraid of him.”
And there is good reason for them to be afraid. Officials can be held personally liable for decisions they make – such as licensing companies that don’t pay their taxes or debts – or penalized in other, less formal ways, while managers at state firms despise the interference of state control bodies and local officials, however ineffectual. Such managers also resent the fact that they receive pitifully low official salaries, generally a fraction of those in other former Soviet republics.
| Carl Dagenhart | ||||||
Some of the official demands are hard to fathom. All state enterprises, for example, are expected to provide some kind of support to the monstrously inefficient agriculture sector, a favoured cause of Lukashenka. Companies are asked to adopt one or more farms. Local officials are also known to request that employees at state companies in their area donate the income from a “free day” of work to finance municipal projects, or simply to demand cash from the enterprise. Also still extant are the webs of social and community services attached to large enterprises during the Soviet era, such as housing, cinemas and kindergartens. According to the opposition United Civil Party’s Romanchuk, such non-production-related costs are roughly 30% of all corporate expenses. “One company’s budget was recently found to include the maintenance of a local church,” he adds.
Although some of the social obligations imposed on companies are explicit, they increasing come in the form of requests for voluntary contributions. But most enterprise managers and officials understand that there is no such thing as a voluntary request. “If a given company doesn’t do it, they get blacklisted,” says an executive with broad contacts at firms throughout the country. “And Lukashenka leans on oblast or local officials to make sure it gets done.”
As disruptive as such interventions are, they pale in comparison with the damage that has resulted from sweeping price and wage controls imposed in the wake of the government’s disastrous experiment with runaway monetary growth. Although inflation has come down from triple to mid-double digits over the past year, a tangle of more than 250 rules regulate prices on basic and strategic goods. And though the combination of high inflation and low price rise ceilings earlier led to some shortages of basic goods, store shelves were not left bare. But the controls, and the loopholes available to companies subject to them, have devastated profitability and led to a range of wild distortions.
“One result is the total destruction of brands,” says Romanchuk. Because the law says that enterprises have the ability freely to price new products, some responded to the controls by changing the names or characteristics of well-known products. “‘Little Cow Cheese’ becomes ‘Pink Cow Cheese’, or the quality is degraded,” Romanchuk explains. “Brands of sausages that once had 60% meat content are reduced to 20% meat.” Such controls, and the exceptions granted to certain products and companies, have also served to mask the financial situation of many enterprises.
“There has been some progress with price controls,” says Carl Dagenhart, the head of the IFC’s Belarus small and medium-size enterprise development project. “Every quarter there is a list of goods and services not subject to price controls, and this is currently growing. But this progress could be illusory, because until the decree which institutes price regulation and quarterly updates is reversed, the next quarter these exclusions may stop.”
Close observers of Lukashenka and his rule say that the state continues to offer direct subsidies to enterprises ideologically or personally close to the president and his most powerful lieutenants.
“Lukashenka views the economy as 40 to 50 enterprises, and 300 kolhozes,” comments one western official who has dealt closely with the government.
Among the favoured industrial enterprises are the country’s most famous Soviet-era names, including the Miensk Tractor Factory, the Miensk Auto Plant (MAZ) and the Horizont TV works.
These and other state industrial concerns also have a strong ally in Mikhail Myasnikovich, the current head of the presidential administration, and a former first secretary of the central committee of the Belarussian Communist Party. A construction industry lobby is led by National Bank of the Republic of Belarus chairman (and former construction worker) Piotr Prokopovich. Lukashenka himself is said to be most concerned with the fate of the country’s state and collective farms.
Help to these enterprises comes in the form of direct budget support and a number of off-budget vehicles – according to some estimates the official budget encompasses only 40% of the money spent by the state.
One key avenue for subsidies is energy. Although natural gas is reportedly provided to monopoly operator BelTransGaz from Russia at approximately $30 per 1,000 cubic metres – roughly a third of the price charged to other customers in the region – it is passed on to most Belarussian enterprises at closer to $70. Chosen companies, however, receive it at a discount or are allowed to accumulate payment arrears.
Until recently, the forced surrender of foreign exchange earnings also enabled the authorities to channel precious forex to a few firms, while exemptions on such rules limited the amount of hard currency certain chosen exporters were obliged to hand over to the National Bank.
The presidential administration itself reportedly helps finance enterprises favoured by Lukashenka and his close associates. As with all things connected to Lukashenka, what is known as the presidential fund is the subject of much fevered speculation in Belarus. Although it has an official annual budget of just $20 million, most analysts believe it controls, and disburses, much more than that. Millions are said to come from arbitrage on energy trading, kickbacks from customs clearance and a portfolio of property and operating companies, some with profitable monopolies. And then there are the arms deals.
“It’s a known fact that we were selling MiG 29s to Peru,” says Sasnow. “But where is the money? Nobody knows.”
| Leonid Zlotnikov | ||||||
Alexander Mikhenevich, the deputy minister of foreign affairs, describes arms sales and the presidential fund as delicate questions, but says the transactions involved are not nearly as lucrative as assumed. “It has never been a big component of our foreign trade. Maybe this is a pity, because it’s a profitable business.”
Naturally, there is also a rich debate over the extent to which Lukashenka has helped himself to the financial perks open to a man with absolute power. Although few believe he has the kleptocratic instincts of, for example, a Suharto, most assume that his personal income and wealth go far beyond the salary of $2,640 he revealed in a declaration made last month in advance of the elections. And members of his inner circle, including his son Viktar, are believed to have interests in numerous local enterprises and rackets.
Although local analysts put the presidential fund’s resources at $500 million to $1 billion, one senior official at a multilateral financial institution with high-level access to the government says he believes the figure is no more than $200 million.
In any case, it is assumed that funds amounting to several percentage points of GDP are being diverted to targeted enterprises.
You’re all alone
Banks in Belarus, which almost entirely lack independence, have also proved to be a useful source of sub-market-rate funds for government intervention in the economy and conduit for their distribution (see page 86). However, the government’s latitude in using the banking system as a milch cow has been restricted following a pledge to comply with the fiscal and monetary limits outlined in an agreement with the IMF.
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Construction, like other sectors, is almost entirely state-owned |
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Although modest, the IMF’s staff-monitored programme (SMP) that ran from April until last month compels the National Bank to forgo direct financing of the budget, and holds the government to fiscal targets and administrative reforms that are incompatible with its previous policies.
Mark Horton, the head of the IMF team responsible for Belarus, says that though most of the quantitative targets have been met, full compliance with the programme will require a more concerted effort by all branches of the state.
“Well, the authorities did make considerable efforts to meet all of the end-June targets under the SMP, and only the target on payment arrears of the central government was missed,” he insists. “Targets for foreign exchange reserves, central bank credit to the government and the size of the fiscal deficit were met. However, there was a very sharp rise in arrears of the local governments during the first half of the year, due in large part to the policy to raise wages to US$100 per month during the pre-election period.
“While local government arrears are not formally monitored under the programme, this outcome does indicate that fiscal policy is under stress and not fully in line with the SMP.”
Horton also emphasizes that the SMP is a first step, and that the Fund is not just interested in macroeconomic stability. In particular, he points to lack of any movement to revoke the notorious Decree Number 40 of November 1999, which empowers the president to nationalize the property of any Belarussian or foreign individual should the president decide that the individual has caused damage to the state.
Revocation of this would be “viewed as a symbolic step to demonstrate an improvement of the business environment”, Horton says. “We’d also like to see price liberalization moving somewhat faster.”
Horton declines to comment on the possibility that the SMP might lead to a full standby arrangement with the IMF. Progress, though, is unlikely as long as the government refuses to be more forthcoming about its finances, including the proceeds from arms sales. And although the World Bank recently approved a small loan for energy conservation projects, significant multilateral financing is probably unthinkable as long as Lukashenka stays in power.
“They have no advocates, not even the Russians,” says a multilateral official.
As for significant financial help from Russia, the time for this may have passed as well.
Last month Belarus did receive from Russia the first tranche of a Rb1.5 billion ($51.4 million) credit similar to an IMF standby arrangement. Indeed, one official familiar with both the Russian and IMF programmes says the Russians might have prodded Miensk into its IMF administered monitoring programme because they wanted the Fund to vet the details. And Moscow earlier wrote off $1.4 billion in energy arrears. But the much-heralded relationship between the two countries, manifested in the customs union treaties signed by Lukashenka and then Russian president Boris Yeltsin, has been in decline since the rise of current Russian president Vladimir Putin.
One sore point is the distribution of costs and benefits associated with the existing customs union. In 1999, the head of the Russian customs authorities was quoted as saying that Belarus had captured $800 million in one year alone just from the customs clearance of motor vehicles. But according to officials on the other side, the Russian state budget gets as much as $200 million a year from Belarus via refunds of value-added tax.
Meanwhile, the flood of Russian goods into Belarus is leading domestic firms to demand protection, non-tariff discrimination that would not improve trade relations between the two countries.
Finally, the prestige the Russians get out of the linking of the Belarussian rubel to the Russian currency is next to nil. The Belarussian rubel currently devalues at a rate of 2% a month against its Russian counterpart, and 2.7% in relation to the dollar. Even though it is reportedly the appetite of Russian banks for short-dated Belarussian paper that is keeping Belarussian rubel parity stable, the risk of a delinking is high, according to Zoya Yarmosh, director of Priorbank’s liquidity and risk management department.
The notion that Russian foreign direct investment will arrive to save the Belarussian economy – given a boost by an August 27 announcement of a potential $1 billion investment by LukOil – is similarly overplayed.
Despite the widespread hope or fear that Lukashenka will seal Putin’s support by offering up choice industrial enterprises to Russian businesses with close links to the Kremlin, most analysts believe he would be loath to give up control over any important existing assets. This is especially true given that he has been subsidizing many such assets for so long, to the detriment of all other aspects of the economy. “At any moment he wishes, he could give this country to Russia,” says Sasnow. “But [he will agree to such sales] only in a critical moment, if he thought he was going to lose power.”
The rot spreads
Faced by all these problems, some heads of government would change tack and embark on reform. But though the Belarussian government has over the past two years taken some important steps towards macroeconomic reform – notably the adoption of a single exchange rate and the easing of inflation – few believe that Lukashenka will agree to anything that will jeopardize his control over Belarus and its economy.
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Soviet iconography remains de rigueur |
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For one thing, Lukashenka has continued to make costly promises to enterprises and individuals. For example, he recently pledged that average salaries would be raised by a quarter before the election, to $100 a month. He also shows no apparent interest in any reforms apart from the bare minimum needed to keep potential voters or foreign lenders on the hook until their support is no longer needed.
“The tough monetary policy is not because of long-term strategy but because of short-term problems – the need to keep prices stable before the election,” says Pelipas of the Institute for Privatization and Management. “When the ‘problem’ is solved, policy will be loosened.”
It is also questionable whether the authorities can maintain a unified exchange rate and continue to maintain sufficient reserves or meet their foreign exchange liabilities, which include official and commercial debts totalling $2.3 billion.
“The external situation will deteriorate,” says Axel Gerloff, an economist at Dresdner Bank. “The question is how fast that will happen.”
Meanwhile, any positive results in fiscal and monetary policy are of questionable value without corresponding structural reforms, which officially remain anathema. “You may have a unified exchange rate, but if you don’t create the right incentives for the private sector to grow and function, everything will be built on a shaky foundation,” says the IFC’s Dagenhart.
But the deterioration in the economy may already have gathered a momentum of its own. Although officially the economy grew by more than 3% in the first half of 2001, most independent economists believe that figure is bogus. A marginal increase in industrial output largely went into increased inventories, and the long binge of government-financed housing construction started to decline in the first half. And although the ruinous practice of intermediary-led barter continues, arrears to Russian companies grew by $300 million in the first half, according to Zlotnikov. A similar growth in inter-enterprise arrears took place within Belarus.
Among state-owned companies, profitability has collapsed. Officially, 40% of enterprises are loss-making, and unofficial estimates put the figure as high as 75%. And with 80% of plant and equipment fully amortized, many firms are running on empty.
“All the indicators suggest that all the resources have been exhausted,” Zlotnikov says. “The turnover capital of the enterprises has been consumed. They can’t continue production. It is a crisis.”
In Smorgon, a town 200 kilometres from Miensk, some plants have been told by their suppliers that they must pay cash, or have been forced to take loans to pay their workers. Others, such as the mini-tractor plant, have not paid their salaries in several months. Idle workers at some firms are known to put in one day a month, to avoid being forced to report for public works jobs that pay as little as $7 a month, and aged pensioners are ordered to weed the fields of the local koholzes.
“After the elections, we think the situation will be disastrous,” says a local lawyer who runs a human rights and social service NGO.
By most normal measures, the situation is already disastrous. To accompany his annual list of terrible laws, the United Civil Party’s Romanchuk keeps an index of how long it would take an average wage earner in Belarus, Poland and the US to earn enough to buy common products. The first entry says it all: In 1990, it took the average Belarussian 31 minutes to earn enough to buy a litre of Coca-Cola, and it took the average Pole almost two hours. In 2000, the average Belarussian was grinding away for more than an hour and a half for his Coke.
Long way down
Despite the dire economic situation, Lukashenka remains popular with a significant minority of the population.
And most analysts say a well-implemented reform programme, coupled with official aid and foreign direct investment, could quickly produce strong results. “When change begins, it will happen much faster than in Russia or Ukraine,” says Dagenhart. “The country is full of hard-working, patient people.”
But the initial stages of liberalization would likely be very painful, especially given the absence of a private sector able to mop up labour forced from restructured or liquidated state enterprises.
“We only hope that, if there is privatization, it will be like the in the west, not like in Russia,” says Gennady Bykov, chairman of the Belarussian Free Trade Union
Although some observers believe change is inevitable, given the rapid deterioration of the enterprise sector, even opposition figures agree that the system could survive for quite some time. Lukashenka will finance his continuing stranglehold on the country through a further decline in living standards.
“There has been talk about this economic ‘crisis’ for seven years,” says Pelipas. “For one country it may be a crisis. But for another it may be a normal situation. And if the economic situation gets much worse, the majority of the population has plots of land to cultivate, or relatives in the villages.”