If balance sheet is the ultimate weapon, Citigroup should be knocking the competition dead. Since the brawn bought some brains three years ago, it has become clear that the combination of an investment bank and a commercial bank works. But the merged entity hasn’t yet made it into the top three in every product area and achieving across-the-board success could be a long, hard slog.
It’s easy to understand the appeal of the hybrid banking model for corporate treasurers. When economic conditions are dicey, customers appreciate the security a big balance sheet provides when they’re doing capital-market transactions. “In the last cycle, companies wanted to have a name behind them,” says Benoit Vincenzi at Fox-Pitt Kelton. “That’s why so many dot coms chose Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley for their IPOs. In the next cycle, this will probably be different. Investors are not prepared to buy all issues and so distribution and the ability to offer alternatives to equity are going to be the key requirements.”
Citigroup has managed to cross-sell an investment banking product to 40% of its bank-loan customers in the past 18 months, it claims. Yet it’s debatable whether Citigroup has been any more successful than would have been expected given the components from which it was built. Sure, it has an impressive fixed-income franchise and sits comfortably at the top of the league tables of US and European underwriters. But Salomon Smith Barney was always a leader in the debt business and combining its operations with Citibank’s strong corporate relationships could only improve on that. If Citigroup couldn’t succeed there, it would have been a shock.
More telling are the equity league tables and M&A rankings. In the US, Citi is solidly fifth among equity underwriters and a few places lower in Europe. These lowly rankings compared with its progress in fixed income can be partly explained by the aftermarket performance of some of the deals for which Salomon has been responsible. Genuity – which had its IPO in June 2000 jointly run by Salomon and Morgan Stanley – holds the record for the worst first-day performance for a US stock of all time and the shares eventually fell by 86%. “The client got what they needed and that is my definition of a successful deal,” says a source at Citigroup. Investors unlucky enough to have bought the stock at issue probably don’t share this phlegmatic attitude.
In Europe, most of SSB’s credit for aftermarket performance this year rests on the success of one deal. Shares in Spanish clothes retailer Inditex soared 22.5% on the day of its IPO in May. Inditex is a rising star both in Spain and abroad, and the stock was in strong demand from domestic investors – the issue was 50 times oversubscribed by the time books closed, with 40% going to retail. Of the remaining three IPOs run by SSB so far this year both Générale de Santé and Lottomatica traded down on the first day. Amplifon, the fourth, rose 10% at issue but this was at least partly because, at e108 million ($98 million), it was small.
In the M&A line-up, Citigroup makes it to fourth in the US and languishes at around ninth in Europe. It is impossible to escape the truth that clients don’t automatically include it in the group of firms capable of offering them top-notch advice. A CEO fighting off an unsolicited takeover bid will approach Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley, perhaps Cazenove or Lazard. His first choice is still not likely to be SSB.
The three leading US investment firms have formed a wall of success that Citigroup hasn’t been able to surmount. In fact, it has barely managed to chip away at it. Any gains in this area tend to be at the expense of the smaller players. “When it comes to M&A advice, it is clear that buyers are influenced by people and capabilities. Whether or not a bank is fully integrated is much less of an issue for them,” says David Rhodes, senior vice-president at the Boston Consulting Group.
That’s a difficult nut for Citi to crack. As a senior executive at the bank concedes: “We didn’t come to the market with the same historical presence as [the bulge bracket securities firms] did.” But if Citi doesn’t manage to do this, it will never make it into the big boys’ gang.
All in good time is the perhaps predictable answer. “Since the marriage with Citigroup, the most immediate results have been seen in fixed income because both of us brought skills in that area to the table. Equity and M&A takes a little longer to bear fruit,” says the source.
In Europe the plan is to build on the corporate relationships acquired via Schroders, which Citigroup bought at the start of last year. In the US, they have been swelling the ranks of the M&A team via an aggressive hiring policy, until recently. Along with rival firms, that’s been put on hold for now.
Citi’s balance sheet could also give it some additional leverage, even when the economy picks up and calmer conditions reappear in the securities markets. “Clients tend to go for M&A advice to those they know and trust and that may well be the people who have been lending to them,” suggests Michael Klein, head of global investment banking. By providing a bridge loan, or doing some principal deals to buy assets, the bank can also leverage its balance sheet to win M&A mandates.
If that trend gains ground, arch-rival JPMorgan stands to benefit too. It may find itself in an even stronger position. Before the merger with Chase, JPMorgan boasted a competitive advisory business and was particularly strong in Europe – Citi’s Achilles heel. Europe looks set to be the hub of much of the M&A activity of the next few years – as structural reforms prompt corporate restructuring – so it’s crucial to have expertise on the ground there. Many firms are only now starting to catch on to the principles of shareholder value and Anglo-Saxon ideas about corporate governance and will be looking to streamline their operations and sell off non-core assets in the next cycle.
But the challenge Citigroup has to overcome if it wants to displace the top three is to manage its internal complexity so that, while undeniably huge, its clients do not feel overwhelmed by that size. There’s little value in scale per se, aside from IT and back-office synergies. Indeed corporates often criticize the hard-sell tactics used by the big banks and dislike feeling that every conversation with their investment banker will lead on to an attempt to sell a product.
Citigroup’s solution since the merger has been to introduce a dual-coverage model, so that each client has a designated investment banker and a commercial banker. So although both are aware of work being done for that company on the other side of the bank, neither has to be concerned about the relationship outside his own area. “Being such a big and complex organization does make our day-to-day existence more complicated,” admits a senior executive. “But clients like the fact that we can offer a wide range of services in every geographical area.”
Although that may be true, all eyes are on Citigroup today.
It’s quite conceivable that it could wind up with a fantastic fixed-income franchise and second-rate equity and M&A divisions.